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This paper explores the legacy of past United States
involvement in South Asia and the policies of the current
administration under President Reagan. The generally posi-
tive attitude that the Soviet Union has adopted towards
Indian strategic goals is contrasted with American policies
that have tended to oppose Indian objectives. The military
capability, economic growth and self-sufficiency, and the
increasing diplomatic strength of India, are reviewed with
the conclusion that the emerging national power of India
precludes a South Asian policy that is driven solely by
East-West issues. Current Indian policies including the
import/expert policy, the Mid-East, arms transfers, and
policy towards Pakistan and China are probed to determine
areas of current or potential agreement or disagreement with
the United States. The policy recommendation formulated
from the above factors includes specific measures for recog-
nizing Indians growing power status, support of Indian nona-
lignment, and support of a responsible Indian de facto
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I. PAST POLICY ^ h IEiME QP REFERENCE
A study whose purpose is to help clarify the formulation
of an American pclicy towards India must have at its incep-
tion, a clear understanding of the current and past rela-
tionship. Past and current policy form a legacy, a
framework within which current policy must be implemented
and future policy formulated. Indo-American interaction
over the past thirty-six years has conditioned the beliefs
and attitudes with which the elites in both countries
approach policy questions. Past, policy actions contribute
substantially to the limits and range of options available
to both parties.
With this in mind, this chapter will look for the
primary motivations of the United States in its involvement
in India since 19U7. The Indian perception of United States
motivations will be studied to see if there exists a differ-
ence of interpretation. Additionally, specific issues
including economic aid, arms transfers, nuclear nonprolifer-
ation and the naval build-up in the Indian Ocean will be
reviewed.
A. THE US BECOMES INVOLVED
The United States did not have official relations with
India before WWII. Prior to that time, all of India's
foreign affairs were handled through the British Foreign
Office. [1] The actual American presence in India was
limited to a few ccnsular offices. This changed in the
spring of 1942 when Eresident Roosevelt sent Colonel Louis
Johnson tc India as his personal representative and with the
rank of ambassador. The settling of the Indian question was

of concern to President Soosevelt. He urged the British or.
more than one occasion to take sraps to reach a settlament.
The good will that Booseveit and people such as William
Phillips were able to establish was negated by American
actions at the end cf and after WWII. These included the
support for colonial powers in Indonesia and Indo-China, the
use of the atom bomb on the Japanese, and a failure to
provide India with industrial capital on favorable terms.
[2] State Department actions concerning the independence of
India also served as grounds for Indian grievance. The
State Department supported the British Labour Governments
plan for an undivided India in February 1947. In June of
the same year, the labour government reversed itself and
supported a plan calling for partition. The State
Department supported the reversal. [3] This led to many
Indians developing the idea that the Anglo-American friend-
ship tock precedence over American concerns for India's
welfare. This was a preview of a problem that was to
bedevil Indo-U.S. relations in the future. Indian politi-
cians failed to take into account the global requirements of
American policy actions. Likewise, American policymakers
either failed to comprehend the impact of the actions on
local opinion or they discounted it as unimportant in the
global context.
The United States did not become fully, involved in the
subcontinent immediately after WWII. The first active
involvement in the subcontinent by the United States was
directed towards Pakistan. It is important to relize that
U.S. -Indian relations are irrevocably interlinked with
US-Pakistan policy. Any change in policy towards one has
invariably drawn a reaction from the other. It is true that
prior to 1953 the United States had been deeply involved in
the Kashmir question during debate in the UN. This even
went to the point of supporting the concept of a UN force

being established in Kashmir. [4] Actual involvement with
the subcontinent itself in the form of economic or security
aid however, did not come until the Eisenhower administra-
tion took office in 1953 with Secretary of State Dulles.
United States involvement in South Asia was driven by
global balance of power politics. Fiscal considerations in
the Onited States caused the Eisenhower Administration to
develop the "New Look". The New Look was based on massive
nuclear retaliation and placed a premium on the ground
forces for local aggressions being supplied "largely by our
allies." [5] The policy of containing the expansion of the
USSR while maintaining American troop strengths at a
low levsl produced a need for regional alliance systems.
Thus SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) were bcrn.
The United States initially attempted to get both
Pakistan and India involved in a regional security scheme.
When India declined, the Onited States belief in the Tight-
ness of its policies led Secretary Dulles to declare India's
nonalignment "an immoral, and shortsighted conception." [6]
The northern tier scheme was not developed by the
Eisenhower administration. Selig Harrison argues that the
idea was born in 19 49 with Sir Olaf Caroe, a former Governor
of the Northwest Frontier Province and Foreign Secretary of
the British-Indian government. [7] By 1951 this concept had
teen refined to exclude India due to its professed nonalign-
ment and was referred to by Caroe as the "Northern Screen."
In his book Wells of Power, Sir Olaf openly directed an
argument towards the Onited States that American defense of
the Mid-East must be based on Pakistan. [8] The Onited
States government did not envision a formal military alli-
ance with Pakistan, but it did consider a limited arms
assistance program. In December 1951, the Pentagon was
given pernission by the State Department to discuss such a
program with Pakistan and an agreement in principle was
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reached ty mid- 1952. [9] No actual commitment was made by
the Truman administration. An arms security agreement was
finally approved on February 3 r 1954, by the Na-cional
Security Council. The assistance program envisioned a $25
million package. United States economic and military aid to
Pakistan between 1953 and 1961 eventually totalled almost $2
billion. [ 10]
After the initiation of the security assistance to
Pakistan, the United Stages then worked for the formation of
SEATO. During the formulation of the treaty at the Manila
Conference, the United States 1 motivation for participation
was clearly evident. Under pressure from Pakistan, the
United States, agreed to the text reflecting the treaty
being directed against aggression. Pakistan's goal was to
have the treaty worded to include all aggressions so that
American involvement would te triggered by any Indian moves
against Pakistan. The United States insisted that an under-
sranding be attached that only Communist aggression would be
automatically considered by the United States as endangering
its security and would thereby trigger United States
involvement. [11]
SEATO was followed by the Baghdad Pact in September
1955. Although the United States did not actually join the
Baghdad Pact, it did lend its support to the organization.
Pakistan thus became a linchpin in the United States 1 policy
of containment. Pakistan acted as a base upon which the
United States could hinge its Mid-East and South-East Asian
policies.
The Indian reaction to Pakistan gaining such a strong
ally and supplies for its armed forces was initially
restrained. In early 195 3, Prime Minister Nehru firmly
stated that India could not be indifferent to American mili-
tary assistance to Pakistan. [12] India's concern was
natural. A U. S.-Pakistan alliance would involve the region
11

in the ccld-war, it would complicate the In do-Pakistan
relationship, and it would add to India's security needs.
In a written statement to the Lok Sabha, Prime Minister
Nehru voiced these concerns:
This grant of military aid by the United States to
Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and
for Asia. It adds to our tensions. It makes it much
more difficult tc solve the problems which have
confronted India and Pakistan. it is vitally necessary
for India and Pakistan to solve these problems ana
develop friendly and cooperative relations which their
geographical position as neighbours as well as their
long common history demand. These problems can only be
solved by the two countries themselves and not by the
intervention of others. It is, indeed, this interven-
tion of other countries in the past that has come in the
way of their solution. Recently a new and more friendly
atmosphere had been created between India and Pakistan,
and by direct consultations between the two Prime
Ministers progress was being made towards the solution
of these problems, That progress has now been checked
and fresh difficulties have arisen. The military aid
being given by the United States to Pakistan is a form
of intervention in these problems which is likely to
have more far-reaching results than the previous types
of intervention. M3]
President Eisenhower wrote Prime Minister Nehru to
inform him that the military aid to Pakistan was not
directed against India and that the United States would come
to the aid of India were she attacked by Pakistan. William
Barnds opines that the letter had the opposite effect from
that intended. Nehru dismissed the assurances as meaning-
less and was incensed at the implied suggestion that Indian
opposition was based on calculation rather than principle.
[14] One of the concrete actions taken by India was to
demand the withdrawal of American personnel from the UN
observers group in Kashmir. [15] The coincidence of
Khrushchev's visit in November and December of 1955, and the
joining of the Baghdad Pact by Pakistan in September 1955,
suggest the policy direction that India considered as a
result of United States actions.
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The next major shift in United States policy came during
the period 1959-62. Again, the impetus was ant iccmmunism.
In 1959 the Sino-Indian border problem began to become
apparent to the world. Indian officials started to see in
China the threat that the United States had always warned
about. Even before the 19 62 border war f the United Statas
started to affect a rapprochement with India. In 1959,
President Eisenhower was given a tumultuous welcome in
India. In 1960, the United States signed a five-year agree-
ment with India to deliver 17 million tons of wheat which
would be paid for in rupees. The United States was also a
major figure in establishing the Aid India Consortium in
conjunction with the World Bank. [16]
The rapprochement with India did not mean an abandonment
of Pakistan. The United States negotiated and signed a
bilateral security treaty with Pakistan in 1959. [17] When
President Kennedy assumed office, he assured Ayub Khan of
continued United States support. He backed this up with
delivery of F-104»s and a sharp increase in economic aid.
On 20 October 1962, China attacked Indian forces in both
the Northeast Frontier Agency and Ladakh areas. [18] This
provided the impetus for the United States to now supply
arms to India. Between 1962 and 1965, the United States
provided approximately $10 million dollars in grants and
credits (primarily grants) to help India convert six
infantry divisions to mountain divisions, improve its air
transport capability and upgrade its radar and communica-
tions. [19] The Indian gcal of self-sufficiency in arms
production was furthered through the transfer of a $2
million small arms ammunition factory which opened in 1964.
[20] The United States did not fully open its arms coffers
to India. Requests for three squadrons of F- 104*3 were
turned down. [21] Defense Minister Chavan is cited as saying
the United States response to a request for military
assistance was: "1) India was advised to strengthen its
13

economic rase, 2) the United States implied that American
naval equipment was too complex for India to handle, and 3)
the United States also implied jet aircraft were available
only on dollar payment. [22]
The United States policy of supplying military and
economic aid to both India and Pakistan continued through
1965. It was a policy motivated by anticommunism and did
not sufficiently account for regional rivalry. The question
of Kashmir still deeply divided the two countries, both of
which were now being armed by the United States, although to
different degrees. The outbreak of the 1965 Indc-Pak War
signalled the failure of U.S. attempts at balancing Indian
and Pakistari security needs. On September 8, Secretary of
State Rusk told Congress that military aid was suspended to
both countries and the no new commitments of aid were being
made. He went on to say, "Our problem has been, and obvi-
ously we have not succeeded, to pursue policies with
Pakistan and India related to matters outside of the subcon-
tinent and at the same time try not to contribute tc the
clash between the two within the subcontinent." [23]
The thirty-day supply leash that the United States main-
tained on Pakistani security assistance effectively stopped
the Pakistan army dead in its tracks. At one point, 80% of
Pakistan's equipment was of United States origin while the
percentage of American equipment in the total Indian armed
forces was never significant. Unable to procure ammunition,
spare parts, and petroleum products, the Pakistanis were
obliged tc accept a cease fire. This led to an understand-
ably bitter response from Pakistan as it saw its ally essen-
tially desert it in its time of need.
The Indian response revealed an underlying difference of
perception concerning United States goals in South Asia.
The United States aid programs to India and Pakistan were,
in American eyes, aimed at opposing the southward expansion
14

of the USSR and the PRC. In Indian eyes a totally different
thesis emerged. The United States was deemed responsible
for the war having occurred. Indian analysts argued that it
would not have been possible for Pakistan to adopt its
confrontaticnist policy if it had not been built up by the
Dnited States. Baldev Raj Nayar echoes an argument consis-
tenly heard in Indian writings when he proclaims that the
United States 1 build-up of Pakistan was done not to halt
communism, tut instead to balance India. [24]
Nayar, using a pure balance of power argument, posits
that a great power will resist the emergence of new great
powers. Since balance of power politics is a zero-sum game,
the emergence of any new great power detracts from the rela-
tive strength on any current great power. He further argues
that a great power will generally use one of three policies
towards the middle power in question: containment, satelli-
zation, and accomodation. Nayar cites George Liska when he
states that American containment was not limited to just
communism, it included all independent centers of power.
[25] Nayar asserts that American attempts to contain India
came after the United States first attempted to draw India
into its sphere of influence in the early 1950' s and failed.
Examples cf the United States failure were the Indian posi-
tion on the Japanese Peace Treaty, Indian support for
membership of the PRC in the UN, and Indian actions with
regard to the Korean conflict.
The Indian thesis cites U.S. policy statements to
support the claim of a United Stares policy of containment
towards India. Then-Vice President Nixon, on returning from
a fact-finding trip to South Asia, told a press conference
that Pakistan's readiness to enter into a military pact
offered an opportunity to build a counterforce to Nehru's
neutralise. [26] The perception of a United States
containment policy was strengthened by a 1963 pledge to
15

Pakistan that the United States commitment "was not limited
to communist countries but indeed specifically included
India," [27] Ambassador Goheen is quoted in 1977 as saying:
The events of the last decade have brought it about that
whether ycu look at it in geographical terms, in mili-
tary "terms or in economic terms, India and Pakistan
really aren't competitors any mors. India is clear and
away th€ preeminent nation in the subcontinent, so that
game we played for many years of trying to balance cne
off against the other - that's a dead game. [28]
The importance of the above argument lies not in its
rightness or wrongness, but in its ascribing totally
different rationales to American actions. If indeed, Indian
leaders perceived an anti-India containment policy on the
part of the United States, it makes their subsequent actions
in seeking and gaining Soviet assistance much more under-
standable. The much-publicized Indian tilt towards the USSR
becomes, at least in Fart, a result caused by United States
policy actions.
E. THE US BOWS GOT AND THEN TILTS
The effect of the cut-off on American policy was to
totally freeze the U.S. out of a position enabling it to
participate in the Soviet-sponsored Tashkent meeting.
Furthermore, Pakistan now openly courted China and opened
ties with the USSR. In 1966, the USSR committed $84 million
in aid to Pakistan. The April 1968 visit by Kosygin to
Pakistan, the May 20, 1968 refusal to extend U.S. leases in
Peshawar and the July 1968 Soviet-Pakistan arms deal illus-
trates the trend of U.S. -Pakistan relations after the 1965
war. [29] For America, Pakistan's value as an anti-communist
ally declined.
India's domestic problems and continuing regional
conflicts decreased her value to American planners. A
16

lessened concern for the subcontinent as a whole developed.
The continual regional conflict made the expenditure for
arms against external threat useless. At the same time the
danger of an internal takeover by the local ccmmunist
parties was deemed very low. [30] The U.S. provided limited
military aid to the subcontinent in the form of spare parts
and non-lethal items in 1966 and 1967. [31] Economic commit-
ments remained large. [32] This aid also showed a decrease
eventually. The 1967 high of $838 million in aid to India
was dcwn to $466 million by 1969.
Under the Nixon administration, U.S. interest in South
Asia continued to decline. The closing of Peshawar in July
1969 had effectively ended any U.S. -Pakistan alliance. In
its place emerged a policy of gradual tilt towards Pakistan.
The $15 million sale of armored personnel carriers and
aircraft to Pakistan in October 1970 was an early indicator
of this. [33] United States-Indian relations became more
distant and were marked by occasional incidents such as the
closing of several cultural centers for alleged espionage
activities in 1970 [34] and India's complaints over United
States arms sales to Pakistan.
The year 1971 was a watershed for the subcontinent.
During that year, the regional power balance shifted
greatly, India signed a Friendship Treaty with Russia, and
the United States opened ties with the PRC.
India's anti-U.S. Vietnam policy [35] and Nixon's
personal antipathy for Indira Gandhi (with a concurrent
"special relationship" with Yahya Khan) led India to
correctly perceive that it would not receive U.S. support in
the Pakistani-Indian tensions over the Bangladesh indepen-
dence movement. At the same time India knew that in the
absence cf a resolution of the border question with China,
she could expect no support from that corner either. It was
more likely that India would be actively opposed by the PRC.
17

In view of this likely opposition and China »s nuclear
capability, the Indians initiated discussions with the
Russians concerning developing closer ties. The surprise
announcement of Nixcn's upcoming trip to Beijing added to
India's feeling of diplomatic isolation and created fears of
a Washington-Islamabad- Beijing axis arrayed against New
Delhi. [36] The result of these cross-currents was the
Soviet-Indian Treaty cf Friendship, 1971.
The bettering of OS-PRC relations simultaneously worked
to decrease the threat to U.S. security and to increase the
Soviet security problem. The key to achieving better
D.S.-PRC relations was the ties Pakistan had with both coun-
tries. The U.S. had to balance its nseds for a contact with
the PRC and its dislike for the policies being adopted by
the Pakistani government in East Pakistan. It adopted a
policy of expending large sums of money on the refugees in
India in. order to lessen pressure on the white House. [ 37 ] A
U.S. "tilt" towards Pakistan became the stated desire of
President Nixon. [38]
When war became imminent, the White House attempted to
forestall hostilities. This changed to an active policy of
support for Pakistan when it became accepted that India was
out tc dismember Pakistan. [39] At this point Nixon expected
both that China would increase its aid to Pakistan, and that
this increase which would bring resulting pressure on China
from the USSR as it honored its commitments to India. Nixon
made the decision in this case that the U.S. could not stand
by if China was threatened with war. Nixon therefore
decided "tc risk war in the triangular Soviet-China-United
States relationship." [40] The ordering of the Enterprise
into the Bay of Bengal was a signal of this intent. It was




The 1971 policy eased the U.S. transition into its new
global policy but it created difficulties for U.S. South
Asian policy. The 1S71 arms cut-off [41] (same as in 1965,
instituted at the outbreak of war) curried no favor with
either Pakistan or India. India saw the use of the
Enterprise as nuclear-age gunboat diplomacy. It constituted
the first time that India felt itself actually threatened
with th€ use of force by either superpower. A major argu-
ment advanced by proponents of India developing a nuclear
capability is that if India had such a capability, the
United States would never have dared use Task Force 74 in
the manner that it did.
The breakup of Pakistan produced a new power balance in
the subcontinent, a fact that Nixon was aware of. He
expressed his desire in 197 3 "to join with India in a mature
relationship founded on equality, reciprocity and mutual
interests." [42] This policy statement did not result in any
commensurate change in policy in either the Nixon or Ford
administrations. The U.S. did agree to liquidate the rupee
credit it had accrued for PL 480 food aid. Of more impor-
tance, the U.S. did not consult India when it resumed arms
sales in 1973 to Pakistan (case-by-case non-lethal items).
Neither did the U.S. consult India prior to deciding to
develop Diego Garcia.
C. DIEGO GABCIA 1974-1980
Two Indo-U.S. issues evolved in 1974 that were an
outgrowth of the 1971 war.
1. The actions of Task Force 74, while not causing a
total reorientation of Indian perceptions of the
threat, heightened awareness of the seaward flank as
a source of threat. The Enterprise acted as a sudden




2. The 1971 reliance on the Russian nuclear umbrella
provided the necessary impetus for pro-nuclear forces
in India to receive the go-ahead for an actual deto-
nation which took place in May 1974.
The American decision to expand Diego Garcia was an
outgrowth of both the Nixon doctrine and a sudden realiza-
tion of the criticality of mid-east oil for western econo-
mies. The Nixon Doctrine, a product of the Vietnam
experience, appreciated that when the United States sought
to fight Asian adversaries on the ground, the United States
was attacking the adversary*s strength. The emphasis on a
seaward defense attacked the weakness of Asian countries.
By calling upon others to tear ths burden of land forces,
the United States sought a "more equitable sharing of the
material and personal costs of security." [43]
Under the Nixon Doctrine the Navy provided a presence
that reminded the Indian Ocean littoral nations of United
States commitments and power. That presence and its
viability as a fighting force is defined to a large degree
ty the staying power which is a function of the logistical
support system. The advantages of a Diego Garcia base for
supporting United States action near the Straits of Hormuz
are evident in the steaming times necessary to transfer
United States forces from the Mediterranean or Pacific
fleets. United States forces from the Seventh Fleet
(Pacific) require six days steaming time (at 600 nautical
miles par day) to reach the Persian Gulf. They are then
limited to their on-hand provisions and replenishment ships.
Forces from the Sixth Fleet (Mediterranean) require 7.5 days
steaming time, if the Suez Canal is open. Even if the canal
is open, it will not support carriers. [44] The presence of
a support facility at Diego Garcia allows the stationing of
a carrisr group in the Indian Ocean. The saving of six to
seven days would be critical to United States reactions to
20

any crisis such as an Iranian invasion of the gulf sheikdoms
or a Soviet move through Iran or Pakistan.
Diegc Garcia first occupied Dnitad States planners in
the early 1960«s. [45] In 1970, $5-4 million was approved
for the development in FY 1971 of an "austere communications
facility" at Diego Garcia. This was augmented by an addi-
tional $8.95 million for FY 1972 and $6.1 million for FY
1973. [46] The commuuica tions facility became operational on
March 23, 1973. [47]
Dp to 1973, Dnited States planning envisioned only a
communications station. The 1973 Arab-Israeli war changed
Dnited States strategic thinking. The Indian Ocean
(controlling access tc the Persian Gulf) was now viewed as
being capable of shifting the global balance of power.
Persian Gulf oil in 1981 accounted for 50% of Western
Europe^ oil imports, 90% of Japan 1 s, 65% of Australia's,
and 2 million barrels a day for the D. S. [48] A cut-off of
oil would have frozen western industry. The FY 1974 mili-
tary appropriations bill included a $29 million request for
an expanded facility to support the added mission cf logis-
tical support. The national intarests involved and the
implications of not funding were listed in the justification
for the expenditures when presented to Congress:
Requirement: Recent events in the Middle East, the
energy crisis, and the potential for hostilities in an
area subject tc chicnic instability have necessitated a
reevaluation of D.S. national interests m the Indian
Ocean Area. problems that may affect those interests,
and the adequacy of the means now available for their
protection- These national interests which could
require an occasional increased Navy presence are: 1)
free access to and transit in the Indian Ocean, 2)
protection of D.S. nationals, and 3) protection of sea
lines cf communication. These events and interests are
the basis of a requirement to provide logistic support
facilities to support a task force operating in the
Indian Ocean Area. Facilities to be provided are the
minimum required to support surface and air operations.
• • •
Impact if not provided: If this project is not
provided, there will be no fixed site to support carrier




The request was eventually passed in a reduced amount in the
FY 1975 appropriations bill. The expansion of Diego Garcia
is best portrayed by a review of FY 1971-1978 appropriations
and their uses as shown in Table I.
India's response to United States plans for a build-up
was quite negative. Foreign Minister Singh called the issue
"a matter of great concern to India" and voiced the govern-
ment *s "total opposition" to the establishment of an
American naval base in the Indian Ocean. Mr. Singh went
on to say, "Our view is quite clear. We have told the
Americans that the bringing in of naval units, including
aircraft carriers, in this region without any obstensible
objectives, has caused concern to all littoral countries,
including India, and that this type of show of force will
never be relished by any country in the region. We have
adopted a clear and categorical position." [50] Mrs. Gandhi
embellished that point by stating that India faced increased
external dangers because of the "activities of some pcwers
who are planning to set up a nuclear base in the Indian
Ocean." [51 ]
India took pains to differentiate between the American
and Soviet presence in the area:
As for the difference between the Russian presence and
the American presence, I think the difference is that
the Russians do not have a base. They may be going back
and forth, but we hear that the American base at Diego
Garcia is going to be a nuclear base. [52]
The Indians fully supported the Russian response to
Fresident Ford^s assertion that the Soviets maintained bases
in Somalia and Southern Yemen, and at Umm Qasr . [53] The
Soviet responded that they did not operate bases. This
claim is based on the fact that it is not known if the USSR
has formal treaties or agreements concerning usage of facil-





Diego Garcia Construction Program - Construction Status
Fiscal Year Project and Appropriation Amount
1971 Naval communications station (1st increment)$5.4 million. Communications facilities -
completed. Personnel support facilities -
completed 1976. Fuel system - completed
December 1975. Airfield - completed. Water-
front facility - canceled. Utilities -
completed 1 975
1972 Naval communications station (2nd increment)$8.95 million. Airfield facilities - com-
pleted 1975. Public works, maintenance
facilities - completed 1976
1973 Dredging - completed 1976, $6.1 million
1974 none
1975 Expansion of facilities, $14.8 million.
POL facilities - February 1976 to April 1979
Pier - June 1976 to February 1978
Airfield pavement - November 1975 to April
1977
Personnel support facilities - December 1975
to September 1976
Power plant and utilities - June 1976 to
March 1979
Air Force - parking apron, POL stroage, ammu-
nition storage - November 1975 to April 1979,
$3.3 million
1976 Expansion of facilities, $13.8 million
POL facilities - February 1976 to April 1979
Airfield facilities - November 1975 to May
1978 J
Personnel support facilities - March 1976 to
November 1978
Communication facilities - May 1977 to
October 197 8
Supply facilities - October 1976 to February
Power plant and supporting utilities - June
1976 to March 1979
1977 none
1978 Expansion of facilities, $5.9 million
Recreational facilities - July 1978 to March
1980
Supply facilities - July 1978 to March 1980
Land operational facilities - July 1978 to
January 1980
Airfield facilities - July 1978 to October
1979
Maintenance facilities - July 197 8 to
December 1979
Source: United States Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Af-
fairs, Commander, Gary G. Silk, Country Director for the
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. Cited in Monoranjan Bezborauh,
United States S trategy In The Indian Ocean, The Inte r-
national "RespD.nse JTl<s\i Yorlc , 1T77J"7 p. 577
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However, the informal character of the facilities which
Moscow enjoys in a cumber of harbors permits it to denyhaving bases at all and encourages critics in the
regional countries to practice a "double standard."
Accordingly, these critics condemn the West for its
militar^"
te:
Soviet presence, which lacks sovereign
facilities. [ 54]
India was a major force in the Indian Ocean Zone of
Peace movement. While the concept was first given voice by
Prime Minister Bandaranaike of Sri Lanka on 21 January 1971,
India has enthusiastically supported calls in the ON for a
Zone cf Feace and is a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on the
Indian Ocean. [55] While supporting diplomatic moves calling
for a Zone of Peace, India has done little to implement
viable alternatives tc a superpower presence. India refused
to talk with Australia on a joint-security collaboration and
categorically rejected the idea of a Canberra-Tokyo-Delhi
alignment. [56] India has made substantial progress in its
naval program, as shown in Chapter III, but she still does
not possess the capability in the view of western planners
to act as a guarantor of stability in the region.
Similarly, India has shown no desire for assuming such a
role, or of accepting the western view of what constitutes a
threat. In the absence of some form of regional order, the
United States under President Reagan has strengthened its
commitment to an American presence in the Indian Ocean. The
United States currently is maintaining an aircraft carrier
task force in the Indian Ocean on a permanent, rotational
basis. Diego Garcia has been upgraded to the point of being
capable cf accepting and supporting B-52 , s and several
ships. [57]
The United States build-up in the Indian Ocean remained
a point cf contention between the United States and India
throughout the 197Q , s. The United States, acting out of a
global perspective, sought to fill a critical need. India
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was perceived as making no effort to understand the
differing American and Soviet needs. The navy was, and
still is, the primary means of the United States for influ-
encing the region militarily. The Soviet Union on the ether
hand can easily introduce massive land and air pow^r into
the region. Americans further perceived India as being
hypocritical by blaming the United States for the increased
level of activity when an increased Soviet presence (as
determined by ship days) claarly preceded American
TABLE II












19 76 7', 3 00 1',7 50
Source: Eezboruah, p. 97.
7,171 1,921
tuild-ups. American discontent with India was further
strengthened because of Indian insistence on differenti-
ating between United States and Soviet bases.
The Indian objections centered around a decrease in
Indian influence with the littoral states. Also the use of
Eiego Garcia, rented from the British, significantly dimin-
ished United States need to consult with India and increased
the United States ability to act unilaterally. The Indians
additionally blamed the United States for raising India's




Diegc Garcia as an issue in Indo- U.S. relations, is
quite similar to the United States involvement with
Pakistan. Again, as with Pakistan, the United States acted
out of a global perspective while India reacted out of a
totally regional perspective.
D. HUCLE1H BOHPHOLIfERATION 1974-1980
The issue of nuclear nonprolifer ation replaced contain-
ment cf communist expansion as the motivating force of
United States policy in the subcontinent in the mid and late
1970* s. This was in large part due to the earlier mentioned
shift in Unitad States perceptions of the importance of the
subcontinent.
The 1974 detonation of the PNE was met by immediate and
categorical condemnation by the Unitad States. American
reaction was concerned with the reaction of other near-
nuclear countries. An American official is quoted as
saying, "If there isn't some cost to India for doing this,
ether ccuntries will go ahead." [58] The first concrete
action by the United States was to threaten a cut-off of
nuclear fuel for India. This was not carried out when India
was convinced to give assurances that any plutonium produced
in the reactor would be used only as fuel in the Tarapur
power plant. This ruled out any diversion of fissionable
material into an explosive device.
The primacy of the non proliferation issue was given a
boost with the election of President Carter in 1976. Under
President Carter, the global issues cluster came tc be
centered around human rights, arms sales, and nuclear
nonprcliferation. [ 5S] The Carter administration had at its
disposal two powerful, but blunt weapons in its strategy for
nonprolif eration. These were the Non-Prolifaration Act of




The Indo-U.S. confrontation revolved around the
Non-Proliferation Act and its application to the Tarapur
plant. The United States and India signed an August 1963
agreement for the construction of the Tarapur nuclear power
station. Ths essence of the agreement was that the United
States would supply the plant and a guaranteed supply of
fuel. India in turn, was to accept safeguards at the plant
and buy cnly United States fuel. [60] Another agreement,
signed on May 17, 1966, extended the guaranteed fuel supply
to cover the life of the station. [61] When the PNE was
detonated, the termination provisions were not put into
effect because United States fuel was not used.
The Ncnproliferation Act of 1977 further tightened
United States nonprclif eration rules. S.127-S.129 estab-
lished the additional criteria. A.G. Noorani summarizes the
new criteria starting with S.127 which called for:
Application of IAEA safeguards to material exported; a
ban on their use in PNE's as well as on "research or
development of any nuclear explosive device"; adequate
physical security measures; a ban on the transfer,
expert, and reorocessing, S. 128(a) imposed yet another
ana more draszic condition, namely "full-scope safe-
guards." that is, IAEA safeguards are maintained with
respect on all peaceful nuclear activities in, under thejurisdiction of, cr carried out under the control of
such (non-nuclear-weapon) state at the time of export.
S. 128(b) allowed a grace period of 18 months with
respect to any application for the export of special
nuclear material (September 9, 1979) and of 24 months
for any such application "under which the first exoort
would occur." 5.129 listed acrs which would result in
the termination of exports: detonation of a nuclear
explosive device; termination of IAEA safeguards of
violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement; or even if
the recipient state has "engaged in activities involving
source or special nuclear material and having direct
significance for the manufacture or acquisition of
nuclear explosive devices" and has failed to mend irs
ways by talcing steps that the President regards as
"sufficient progress towards terminating such activi-
ties." [62]
The President is authcrized to waive S.128 or S. 129 but his
waiver is subject to Congressional veto.
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In April 1978, President Carter allowed shipment of 7.63
tons of fuel. Another shipment was allowed in March 1979.
In 1980 however, when the president authorized two ship-
ments, congressional approval was obtained only when
Secretary of State Muskie assured the Foreign Relations
Committee that shipment of the second load would be delayed
a year. [63] In view of the difficulty of getting approval
of licenses requested prior to September 1979, the
Administration did not even attempt to get approval of
applications requested during the grace period.
The Indian reaction to United States actions (starting
with the O.S. reaction to the 1974 PNE) were those cf an
injured party. In Hay 1974, Prime Minister Gandhi
complained that India was "a favorite and convenient whip-
ping boy." [64] India felt it was being unjustly accused of
three things: 1) Indian protestations of peaceful use were
not true, 2) India had raised tensions with the blast, and
3) India was squandering money that could be put to much
better use. [65]
India maintained throughout that her test was legal. It
was underground and India was not (and still isn't) a signa-
tory of the 1968 Non-proliferation Treaty. India views the
NPT as being unequal and unfair, asserting that the NPT
addresses only horizontal prolifaration and not vertical
proliferation. Prime Minister Gandhi, in defending the
test, said India would sign a ban to all nuclear tests if
everyone were to agree, however the current treaty allowed
some nations to stockpile weapons while other nations were
"not even allowed to experiment for peaceful purposes." [66]
India argues that they should not have to be subject to full
scope safeguards as long as the nuclear weapons states do
not submit to safeguards.
Indian objections to the holding up of fuel supplies
center around breach cf contract, need, and a discriminatory
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O.S. policy. India does net consider the PNE as placing it
in breach of the 1963 contract. Indeed, the absence of
United States action in reference to the 1963 agreement in
1974 would substantiate the Indian position. Article 27 of
the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, 1969, stipu-
lates, "A party may not invoke the provisions of its
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty." [67] That is exactly what the United States was
attempting to do as evidenced in a rider attached to S. 1439,
1976, by Senators Glenn, Percy and Ribicoff:
Because these agreements for cooperations remain in
effect for 30 to 40 years, and do not contain formal
provisiens for renegotiation, we feel strongly that it
would be highly irresponsible for the United States to
rely sclely upon the conditions and circumstances that
existed when an agreement for cooperation was originally
negotiated in determining whether or not a current
application for a specific export pursuant to the agree-
ment is inimical to the common defence and security.
[68]
Arguments seeking to justify the hold-up/cut-off of
nuclear supplies in Congress first centered on an argument
based on the 1971 amendment of the 1966 fuel agreement.
This argument was refuted by Dixon B. Hoyle, the chief nego-
tiator of the agreement. The second argument centered on
India's need for fuel. This line of reasoning posited that
the United States fuel supply obligation was on an as-needed
basis and India didn't currently need it. This argument
ignored the fact that Tarapur had been operating at 60%
capacity since 1977 in order to stretch out supplies. [69]
Nuclear nonproliferation through the mid and late 1970's
was a major block to Indo-U.S. relations. In the United
States the guestion of the fuel supply was a divisive
internal issue, while nonproliferation overall was a major
foreign policy goal. In India, U.S. actions were viewed as





Economics has played an important role in shaping rela-
tions between India and the Dnited States. Between 1956 and
1975 India received ncre than $10 billion in assistance from
the United States. About half of American aid was in the
form of El 480 food aid. This program had two advantages
for India. It provided food and loaned back the rupees paid
for the food to the Indian government for development assis-
tance. Rs16. 64 billion ($2.03 billion) of the rupee funds
were converted to a grant in February 1974. [70] Despite the
massive infusions of food and capital, United States aid and
economic policy has been a source of contention between the
two countries. The Indian and United States disillusionment
with aid was boiled dcwn in the following extract from a New
lork Times editorial:
The standard indictment of aid in Washington used to be
that it failed to buy influence and gratitude. The
Indians complained that aid was an attempt to buy influ-
ence and gratitude and r besides, that it saddled them
with a monumental debt without aDDreciably relieving
their huge burden of poverty. [71]
Much of the contention over economic policy derived from
differing objectives. Myron Weiner deduced from AID presen-
tations tc Congress and State Department presentations to
the same body during the period 1960-76 that that there were
five explicit political objectives the United States hoped
to gain from its aid to India:
1. Help India maintain her democratic institutions
2. Indian self-reliance in her planning and capital
formation for development
3. Strengthening of the private sector
4. Keep India in the "free world"




To this list should be added one more objective that became
apparent through United States policies such as the "short-
tether" policy for PL U80 during the Johnson era. This
sixth objective was a desire to gain influence over Indian
foreign policy actions. It was due to efforts such as the
short-tether and the United States promotion of private
sector over public sector development that a great deal of
Indo-U.S. antagonism developed.
1 . Pub lic Sector Inves tment
Irdian priorities are best exemplified in her five-
year plans. In the First Plan, India emphasized the agri-
cultural sector and included land reforms, farmer education
and large-scale irrigation investment. [72] With the Second
Plan, India adopted a program of developing her large-scale
heavy industries. The strategy, attributed to P.C.
Mahalanofcis, sought through capital investment to spark
further capital production which would eventually result in
increasing production of consumer products. The United
States disagreed with heavy-industries strategy on two
accounts: 1) it did not address the wide-spread poverty and
hunger in India and 2) it relied heavily on public sector
development.
United States opposition to the public sector is
evident in the events surrounding the Bokaro steet plant
construction. India approached the United States in 1962
for assistance in building the Bokaro Steel Plant because of
the United States^ technological lead in steel production
at the time. By May 1962, the Agency for International
Development (AID) requested United States Steel to do a
feasibility study. [73] American participation in the
project had the support of both President Kennedy and
Ambassador Galbraith. Rajan Mencn cites Galbraith»s diary
for September 23, 1961:
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This prefect (Bokarc) is very important. It is needed,
useful and symbolic. Many of the things we are doing
are rather anonymous -- we provide copper and nonferrous
metals which are needed and useful but not very
dramatic. And our past help to private sector plants,
such as Tatas, has evoked the comment, "The Americans
help tte Tatas and Birlas who are already rich. By
contrast, the Soviets or British build plants that
belong to the people." Now we are in the same league --
provided we can perform. [74]
The United States proposed a $512 million turn-key effort in
which the United States would build and operate the plant
for ten years and then turn it over to the Indian govern-
ment. [75] Indian planners sought Indian participation
throughout. United States Steel felt that additional plan-
ning was required tc solve supply and market problems and
suggested in 1963 two additional years of planning. In the
meantime, the project was being attacked from other quarters
on the basis of it being a public sector project. The
report of the presidential committee studying foreign aid,
headed ty General Lucius Clay, recommended that aid not be
granted for projects which ran counter to the American pref-
erence fcr the private sector. The report stated that "the
United States should net aid a foreign government in
projects establishing government-owned industries and
commercial enterprises which compete with existing private
endeavors." [76] The Clay report contributed to the strength
of the anti-loan forces in Congress. The Brcokfield
Amendment to -che fcreign aid bill required Congressional
approval of any project over $100 million. This requirement
combined with the Clay report to cause India to withdraw its
request in 1963. [77 ]
The affect cf the United States unwillingness to
fund the public sector was evident in Sudhir Ghosh's
memoirs. Ghosh contrasted United States reticence with USSR
willingness to support Indian objectives to the detriment of
the United States. [78] This American behavior was not an
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isolated case. American support of private enterprise was a
pattern followed in the petroleum and fertilizer sectors
also, two of Indians critical industries. The affect of -he
unwillingness of the United States to support the Indian
public sector efforts was compounded by the exorbitant terms
that the multinationals proposed for their projects.
2. II 480 and the Short-Tether
A second American objection to -he Indian heavy-
industry, capital-intensive development plan centered on the
shortcomings of the Indian agricultural sector. With this
in mind the United States adopted a self-help requirement
for food aid to India. This was done in large part tc end
an increasing Indian dependence on United States grain
supplies. Continued food assistance allowed India to
continue its heavy industry strategy. A comment by a
ranking Indian official in 1961 illustrates the Indian atti-
tude, when asked abcut grain reserves, he replied, "Oh,
they 1 re in Kansas." [79]
The policy of self-help was written into law as the
preamble of the revised PI 480 in 1966:
The Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the
United States to expand international trade; to develop
and expand export markets for United States agricultural
commodities; to use the abundant agricultural produc-
tivity cf the United States to combat hunger and malnu-
trition, and to encourage economic development in the
developing countries, with particular emphasis on assis-
tance to those countries that are determined tc improve
their own agricultural production; and to promote in
other ways the foreign policy of the United States. (7
U.S.C. 1691) [80]
Some of the self-help criteria written into subsequent
Pl-480 Agreements included; 1) proportion of national budget
allocated to agriculture, 2) emphasis on provision of chem-
ical fertilizers, either through foreign imports or domestic




In India, with the accession of Chidambaram
Subramaniam to the post of Food Minister, agricultural
development regained a position of importance. [82]
Self-help was made an integral prerequisite for the reestab-
lishment of United States aid to India in 1966 (it had been
halted at the start cf the 1965 War) . In 1966, India under-
took an economic liberalization in response to United States
and World Bank pressure. This included a restructuring of
the food zones, liberalized imports, purchase of a ferti-
lizer plant from American International Oil Company and a
one-third devaluation of the rupee. [83] For its part, the
United States announced a $150 million loan in February;
committed itself to 3.5 million tons more grain, $33 million
for the Beas Dam Project, and $50 million for power genera-
tion projects in June; and in July promised another $150
million for further industrial and agricultural production.
[84]
The Indian concessions, particularly the rupee
devaluation, were taken by many Indians as a sign of
increasing western influence in determining Indian develop-
ment strategy. [85] Indian mistrust of U.S. aid received a
real boost when President Johnson initiated z he short-tether
policy. As early as 1965, President Johnson had been using
a short-tetfcer in order to force the Indians to show they
meant business about boosting food production. The policy
took en political overtones when in July 1966, Gandhi signed
a communique in Moscow criticizing the "imperialists in
South East Asia." [86] Johnson strictly applied the short-
tether policy from August onwards. Throughout 1967,
President Johnson approved repeated PL-480 shipments, but
only after each one was held up long enough to register
displeasure with Indian actions such as the Indian position
on the Arab-Israeli War and Gandhi's attendance at the 5 0th
anniversary celebrations of the Russian Revolution in
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Moscow. The whole self-help policy came to be recognized as
being tied to political events and not to economic
performance.
The legacy of United States opposition to public
sector investment and attempts at using it for political
leverage is a feeling cf mistrust on both sides. While the
American perceives ingratitude on the part of the Indian,
the Indian saw the aid a a tool of neo-colonialism.
P. THE HEAGAN APPROACH
The 1979 invasion of Afghanistan reestablished Scviet
containment as the prime motivating force behind United
States policy towards the subcontinent. The shift was
apparent even during the twilight of the Carter administra-
tion when the "peanuts" offer of $400 million was made to
Pakistan. The current policy towards the subcontinent aims
at three fundamental objectives: 1) rearm Pakistan against
external aggression, 2) address the economic sources of
Pakistan's national strength, and 3) conduct a rapprochement
with India.
!• Arming and Stabili zing Pakistan
After a decade of minimal interest, the United
States has revitalized its relationship with Pakistan. The
U.S. formulated a $3 billion aid package for FY 1983-1987.
Of the total, $1.56 billion was oriented towards military
aid and $1.48 billion was oriented towards economic aid (see
Table III)
.
The political conditions exacted by the Pakistanis
are significant. No U.S. limitations on arms use are
attached to the weapons being provided. This means that
Pakistan is not United from using them against India.




Proposed O.S. Assistance to Pakistan, Piscal Tears 1982-87
(In millions of U.S. dollars)
FY FMS IMET ESF DA PL480 Tot Tot Out Total
Mil Econ lay
1983 275 0.8 125 75 50 275.8 250 250.8 525.8
1984 300 0.8 125 100 50 300.8 275 275.8 575.8
1985 325 1.0 125 125 50 326.0 300 301.0 626.0
1986 325 1.0 125 150 50 326.0 325 326.0 651.0
1987 325 1.0 125 150 50 326.0 325 326.0 651.0
Total 1550 4. 6 625 600 250 1554.6 1475 1479.6 3029.6
Source: "Proposed U.S. Assistance and Arms Transfers to
Pakistan: An Assessment, Repcrt of a Staff Study Mission to
Pakistan and India, September 30 - October 17, 1981," Committee
On Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Reprssentatives , November 20,
1981, Appendix Four.
condition. First, the current overall military balance,
even when the new Pakistani arms are counted, is so over-
whelmingly in India's favor as to seem to preclude a
Pakistani attack on India. This seems to be recognized in
Pakistan's various proposals for a no- war pact and other
rapprochement policies adopted by Pakistan. The second
reason for O.S. acceptance is that there is substantial
reason to doubt if the Zia government would accept a package
that openly limited their sovereignty. A final considera-
tion is that just such a condition was attached to U.S. arms
prior to 1965 and it manifestly failed to accomplish its
purpose. The example of the Symington Amendment can also be
called on as a case which shows how U.S. leverage doesn't
work when it runs counter to Pakistan's primary security
problems.
The U.S. also agreed to accept Pakistan's status as
a nonaligned nation and as cne with a respected position in
the Islamic world. [87] In return for the aid and the lack
of U.S. conditions attached to it, Pakistan has refused to
accept the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Pakistan
refuses to recognize the Babrak Karmal regime and funnels
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economic and military aid to the Afghan insurgents arrayed
against the Soviets and Karmal. Pakistan also accepts
implicitly by allowing a continuing of the arms flow, a
continuing cf the refugee burden. This carries a heavy
economic price and severe political costs. [88] The Afghans,
armed as they are, cculd become a potent force in internal
Pakistani politics. Iheir increasingly heavy draw on scarce
Pakistani resources is also bound to aggravate the existing
ethnic and tribal frictions in Pakistan.
The military package is not designed to halt a
determined Soviet push into Pakistan. Its purpose is to
increase the costs of a Soviet invasion and to enable
Pakistan to handle the isolated air and ground incursions
that are occurring. [89] The make-up of the military aid
package was the primary focus of Congressional debate. The
actual piece of equipment that caused the most debate was
the F-16. The underlying concern of the F- 1 6 issue was the
offensive capability of the F-16 and other weaponry being
proposed. Concern focused on the applicability of the weap-
onry to Pakistan's northern border (stopping the USSR) and
its possible uses against the eastern border Pakistan shares
with India. [90] Pakistan clearly attached a symbolic
significance to the F-16 that far exceeded its actual capa-
bilities cr affect on the strategic balance in the region.
The Reagan administration fully accepted this position and
argued that the inclusion of the 40 F-16's was critical to
Pakistani acceptance of the package. The Congressional
Staff Study phrased it as follows:
In offical Pakistani thinking the F-16 has assumed an
overwhelming symbolism far beyond the aircraft's actual
numbers or capability. As seen by the Pakistanis the
aircraft are the keystone of ths U.S. aid package.
Accordingly, U.S. willingness to provide them in the
numbers and scheduled time frames specified is a litmus
test of D.S. credibility. In short, Pakistan's image of
U.S. trust and reliability hinges primarily on the F-16.
Any move to reduce the number of aircraft from 40 or
otherwise to modify the package would probably cause
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Pakistan to review its entire relationship with the
United States, including the possibility of cancelling
the entire package. [91]
An additional argument used was the need for Pakistan to
leap-frog the current level of aircraft technology in the
subcontinent since Pakistan would have to use these planes
for the next 20 years for economic reasons. Indian immense
military advantage was also quoted to support the irration-
ality of the weapons ever being used againsx India. [92]
Various Congressional witnesses quoted ratios of aircraft
ranging from 3:1 to 6:1 in India*s favor. The administra-
tion projected a 4:1 Indian advantage would still be in
effect after Pakistan received the 40 F-16 f s. Other major
weapons systems include the M48A5 tank, self-propelled 155mm
artillery, the AH1S Cobra (with TOW) , and rows for the
ground forces. An important point to notice is that the
first six F-16's were paid for in cash. The source of the
funds is believed to be Saudi Arabia.
The economic package proposed for FY 1982-7 is
designed to attack the problems contributing to the internal
instability of Pakistan. An additional goal is to provide
short-term balance of payments support. The estimation of
the Pakistan economy by the 1981 Congressional Staff Study
was that the economy has significant problems but the prob-
lems are manageable.
The U.S. aid package is heavily oriented towards the
agricultural sector. Projects such as the road to market
fund will increase agricultural output and provide for the
overall growth of the agricultural sector. This will
contribute to a greater affluence in the various tribal
areas with a resulting lessening of separatist pressure.
The ability to market farm products also has a direct
bearing on the success of the government programs designed
to shift farmers out of the narcotics business.
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The Baluchistan and Tribal Areas funds can also be
pointed to as direct U.S. efforts to increase stability.
Many of the Pushtu and Baluch complaints emphasize a
disproportionate amount of government projects being
oriented towards the Punjab or being controlled by Punjabis.
The result over time has been a vastly underdevelopd infras-
tructure particularly in Baluchistan. O.S. direct designa-
tion of funds for these areas with emphasis on local
participation again addresses the reduction of separatist
movements.
The current nuclear nonproliferation policy as
applied to Pakistan works from the dictum that we can do
more from the inside than the outside. Deputy Secretary of
State Howard B. Schaffer states, "We believe that a program
of support which provides Pakistan with a continuing rela-
tionship with a significant security partner and enhances
its own sense of security may also help remove the principal
underlying incentive for the acquisition of a nuclear
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weapons capability." [93] U.S. planners realize that using
the threat of an aid cut-off is a bankrupt policy. Nor only
did it net achieve its goals in the past, but it also
decreased O.S. influence. It is a policy much like nuclear
deterrance, its use signals its failure. The more accepted
belief new is that hopefully the U.S. can slow development
by decreasing Pakistani need and eventually develop the
leverage to halt the program.
2- The Indian R espo nse
India has articulated two basic arguments against
the American aid package. One centers on the F-16 and the
other on nuclear non proliferation.
Opposition tc the F-16 focuses on the added capa-
bility it has given Pakistan to strike deep into India.
India refuses tc admit its pronounced military superiority
over Pakistan. Both of these facets of threat perception
are evident in an interview by O.S. News and World Repor t
with Mrs. Gandhi:
Q. Isn't India more powerful militarily than Pakistan?
A. It's not. That also is an image that is now being
built up. And in today's world the question is not
being powerful militarily; the question is that Pakistan
now will have planes which can reach up to any part of
India— and our installations are all over India.
Q. Yet your armed forces are twice the size of
Pakistans
—
A. What can the armed forces do when an F-16 comes and
destroys something in Madras or Bombay or anywhere? [ 94 ]
The sale cf the F-16 is also blamed for causing increases in
the Indian Defense budget. The $3 billion purchase cf the
Mirage 2000 was presented to the Lok Sabha by Defense




While India has reacted adversely to the arms
package, its reaction has not been to the degree that was
anticipated by various Congressional witnesses during hear-
ings en the arms package. There is an aknowledgement on the
part of India's leadership of Pakistanis right to defend
itself. This right is tempered by a concern that India
might become the target of those capabilities. Foreign
Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao r in an interview with Far
Jastern Eco nom ic Rev iew , stated, "Pakistan, like any other
sovereign country, has the right to acquire arms for her
legitimate self-defence. However, when Pakistan goes in for
a massive acquisition of highly sophisticated armaments, it
becomes a matter of legitimate concern for India. The ques-
tion that becomes relevant is: self-defense against whom?"
[96] This contrasts to a previous attitude which could be
described as "becoming hysterical every time Pakistan bought
a pistol." [97] An editorial by the Indian Herald, a
moderate newspaper, actually sought tc defend the aid
package by pointing cut the balance between military and
economic aid. The editorial noted that Pakistan did have a
demonstrated need for greater armored forces. The article
also stated that the D.S.-Pak arms deal does not constitute
aid; the Pakistanis are paying market prices. [98]
The on-going problem of fuel and spares for Tarapur
has sparked Indian cries of discrimination by the United
States. The Indians are quite aware of the Pakistani
nuclear program and view it as militarily oriented.
Pakistan, like India, is not a signatory to the NPT.
Pakistan also does not currently accept full-scope safe-
guards, just like India. [99] India's cries of discrimina-
tion are rased on the United States strictly adhering tc the
Non-Proliferation Act in its relations with India while
submitting to Congress a request to change section 669 of
the Foreign Assistance Act. [100] The purpose of the change
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was to allow the resumption of United States aid to
Pakistan. The Indians fail to aknowledge that the United
States did cut-off all aid to Pakistan in April 1979 because
of that country*s efforts to acquire a uranium enrichment
facility. They also fail to recognize that The cut-off was
manifestly unsuccessful in attaining its objective.
Interestingly enough, Pakistan feels that it is also being
subjected tc a double-standard. They argue that "although
the Symington amendment was enacted by Congress chiefly as a
result of Indian 1S74 nuclear detonation, it is Pakistan
against whom the prohibition on assistance has been exer-
cised, while India has continued to receive U.S. assistance,
including nuclear fuel and equipment." [101]
3 . Tar apu r
The Reagan A dninist ration recognizes that the issue
of Tarapur constitutes an obstacle of considerable magnitude
standing in the way of improved relations with India. At
the August 1982 summit in Washington between President
Reagan and Prime Minister Gandhi, the Tarapur nuclear fuel
issue was solved without forcing either side to' back dcwn
from their positions in this contentious issue. By agreeing
to let France supply the low-enriched uranium fuel for
Tarapur, [102] India did not have to abandon her stand on
not accepting full-scope safeguards and the United States
was net placed in a position of saying it can 1 1 meet its
external ccumitments due to internal laws. Significantly,
the details of the agreement left open an area of dispute.
The United States interpreted the agreement as meaning
nuclear fuel could not be reprocessed without United States
permission. [103] The Indians meantime, in a press release
by the Foreign Office, stated that India retained its right
to reprocess fuel. [104] However the appearance of progress
had been achieved and the problem of supplying the fuel and
the status of spent fuel became a French problem.
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Tarapur remained a problem in 1983 fcr ether
reasons. India needs approximately 30 types of spara parts
to insure the safe operation of the plant. The United
States has agreed to try and get non-United Statas suppliers
in West Germany and Italy to provide the needed parts. [105]
India understood from the initial discussions with the
United States that parts would be supplied under the terms
of the 1963 agreement. As a result West Germany informed
India that it would supply the parts on the same terms that
the French have applied towards the fuel shipments. This
would mean that there would be no pursuit and perpetuity
clauses. Since then, West Germany has asked for stricter
safeguards at the prompting of the United States according
to Indian sources. [106] The same sources reveal that the
United States has informally requested the continuance of
safeguards upon the expiration of the 1963 agreement in
order to insure Congressional passage of any spare parts
that cannot be obtained outside the U.S. It remains to be
seen as to whether tie administration will be able to force
the Congress to accept shipment of nuclear parts to India.
Tarapur remains an issue. It is however, not of the same
scope or tone as previously. This is largely a result of
the conciliatory and positive attitude of both governments,
demonstrated during the 1982 summit meetings in Washington.
*• Foreig n Aid to India
Actual bilateral aid to India in FY1984 consists of
$86 million in development assistance, $123 million in PL
480 Title II, and $200,000 in IMET. [107] This is substan-
tially the same level as FY 1983.
The United States position on foreign aid assistance
to India is part of a world-wide policy that promotes the
private sector. A Treasury Department study stated the
United States aid position quite well. It called for the
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promotion of private enterprise in the Third World. The
study recommended that development banks seek changes in the
economic policies of borrowing countries and that develop-
ment banks phase out loans to borrowers that are no longer
in severe need. [1C8] The study favored the International
Finance Corporation as a means of aid. This is due to the
IFC's charging of market rates and the IFC's practice of
retaining eguity in the companies it helps create until the
companies are making steady profits. The IFC then sells its
shares to local stockholders. President Reagan stated, "We
want to enhance the IFC activities, which foster private
sector debt and equity financing of investments in the
developing countries." [109] The United States implemented
an institutional change with the creation of the Bureau for
Private Enterprise in the State Department. The objective
of the Bureau is to increase foreign aid and investment
through tie private sector.
The United States is retrenching its aid effort.
The American contribution to the Asian Development Bank went
up in absolute dollars but down in percentage of total ADB
funds (from 22% to 17%) [110] in 1982. The United States
scaled tack its commitment to the International Development
Agency from $1.08 billion to $700 million. [111] The United
States also was recalcitrant about raising its International
Monetary Fund quota which currently constitutes 20% of that
agencies funds. The initial American position in early 1982
was that there be no increase. After the Mexican debt
crisis, this was changed to an acceptance of a modest (25%)
change in quotas. The United States position compared to a
developing nations stance asking for a substantial (50-100%)
increase in commitments. [112] The American position was
further adjusted to a 40% increase in November [113] and
finally arrived at an agreement with the other industrial
and developing nations for a 50% quota increase. [114] The
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50% increase represents an additional $8.4 billion that must
fce approved in Congress. By October of 1983, the increase
was still facing heavy opposition in Congress and passage
remained in doubt.
The United States has not been particularly suppor-
tive of Indian ventures into the aid market. The United
States openly opposed the November 1982 World Bank energy
loan of $165.5million to India. The United States has been
pushing for more active private sector investment in India 1 s
oil development program and the absence of multilateral aid
is one way of forwarding that goal. The United States has
also opposed Indian moves to borrow from the ADB. India
hoped to borrow $2 billion during the period 1933-87. This
would constitute 11.3$ of the ADB's ordinary capital
resources and Asian Development Fund III and IV. The AEB is
currently negotiating with its major lenders for a third
general capital increase (GCI III) . The United States is
using the threat of not taking part in the GCI III as a
means of preventing India from getting the loan. [115] The
United States executive director asked that there be no
lending to India while the GCI III is in effect. The United
States opposition is based on the premise that India can
afford hard loans and the ADB's soft loans should be
afforded to countries in worse financial need than India.
Another United States consideration is the emergence of
China as a major borrower. China currently receives aid at
a level well below that enjoyed by India. The convergence
of American and Chinese global interests vis-a-vis the
Russians is producing strong U.S. support for an increased
percentage of aid being committed to China.
The United States is net opposed to aid to India;
its position is that the Indians can afford loans at market
rates. This policy is demonstrated by the January 1983
offer by the Export-Import Bank to loan $1.6 billion to
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finance purchases of American machinery and services ($600
million for oil exploration). The terms were for a 10-year
credit at an interest rate cf 10%. [116]
The Reagan administration has been quite clear about
its formula for external aid. This runs counter tc Indian
needs. As discussed in Chapter III, India needs soft loans
as a source of capital in order to pursue a nationalistic
development course based on self-sufficiency. The question
remains whether a change in the American position to support
of India's aspiraticns will bring about a more positive
Indian attitude towards the United Sta-es or whether a
changed United States policy will merely result in a morally
self-righteous India declaring "it's about time."
G. COBBEBT POLICY ASSESSMEST AND THE LEGACY
The American policy on key issues such as Pakistan,
nuclear ncn proliferation and external aid would seem to have
set the stage for worsening Indo-American relations. Each
one of these issues form an obstacle to better relations.
The overall drift of the relationship however, seems to be
towards rapprochement. This apparent contradiction can
largely be attributed to the Afghanistan invasion, Indian
attempts to achieve a position of leadership in the
Nonaligned Movement, and efforts by both governments to
limit the damage caused by points of disagreement. The
impact of the F-16 deal was limited by the small number of
planes involved, consultations with India throughout the
negotiating process, and the offering of the same aircraft
tc India. [117] The United States has also offered India rhe
M198 self-propelled howitzer, the TOW anti-tank missile
system, and the C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. These
deals are currently hung up on United States export laws,
but the offering of the weapons opened a new chapter in
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United States arms transfer policy for South Asia. The
solving of the Tarapur fuel issue is another example of a
desire to solve problems and was the result of both sides
attempting to find a conciliatory position compatible with
the other's.
On some basic issues, current Indian and American policy
remains diametrically opposed. The United States continues
to develop the Diego Garcia base and strengthen its presence
in the Indian Ocean. The United States is also continuing
its support of the Afghan insurgency which perpetuates the
need for active American involvement in Pakistan.
In addition to opposing Indo-U.S. views on many current
issues, the modern policymaker will have to account for the
mistrusts built over 36 years. India holds the United
States in large part responsible for the wars of 1965 and
1971 because only through United States support was Pakistan
able to build up to a position where it could challenge
India. India remembers the short-tether aid policy of the
mid- I960 1 s. The problems of Tarapur will not be easily
forgotten either.
Many Americans see India as a beggar who takes aid and
then doesn't show gratitude. India, from the American view-
point, can be seen as hypocritical: proclaiming nonalign-
ment, yet signing treaties with the USSR; decrying nuclear
armament yet detonating a "peaceful" nuclear explosion; and
making mcral pronouncements about human rights, yet
declaring the Emergency. Congressional leaders, ever-
mindful of getting their dollars worth, can also question
the value of aid to India. India has received billions of
dollars in international aid, yet the continued mass poverty
leads to a negative image.
The policymaker will have to work in an environment
where better relations are desired but national interests do
not always converge. Any future policy will also have to
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take into account the various memories referred tc above.
This policy review has not attached a moral judgement to
either country* s position. Each acted out of its own
national interest. The key to a future policy will be to
seek out areas of agreement in the two countries respective
national interests and minimize araas of disagreement.
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II. SOVIET EX PANSION INTO INDIA
The Soviet Onion has acted as a focal point for United
States involvement in the subcontinent. America became
involved in 1953 in order to contain communism. The United
States changed policies in 1959-64 in order to adjust to a
new communist threat. An important consideration in the
United States 1 disengaging from the subcontinent during the
period 1S65-79 was an understanding that the subcontinent
for various internal reasons was not likely to go communist.
The next significant shift in American policy occurred as a
result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While many
can argue that today*s policies are oriented at the contain-
ment cf Scviet power, not communism, the point remains that
the predominant driving force of American policy in South
Asia since 1947 has been the Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union currently occupies a favored position
in India. Economic involvement is extensive with the USSR
currently India's largest single-trading partner. The
formal interchange of governmental delegations continues at
a heavy rate with numerous resultant protocols. A majority
of the eguipment in the Indian armed forces is of Soviet
origin or design. Internationally, the Soviets and India
are in agreement on many of the dominant issues such as the
Mid-East, Kampuchea, and the Law of the Sea. India is not
however, a satellite of the Soviet Union. In many ways her
policies, such as rapprochement with the PRC, are in direct
cppositicn to Soviet objectives.
An understanding of the Soviet objectives and policies
in the general areas of economics, security and diplomacy
will serve as a valuable tool for the United States policy-
maker. The success or failure of various Soviet policies
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can fc€ studied to determine the reasons for the outcome with
the eventual purpose of applying this knowledge to American
policy formulation and implementation.
A. SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN INDIA
Analysis of Soviet pronouncements and policies towards
India produces six general Soviet objectives in India:
1. Enlist Indian participation as a counterweight to
China in the Asian balance-of-power game. This
includes exclusion of Chinese influence from India
and Bangladesh, and minimization of Chinese influence
in Pakistan; enlistment of the Indians as partners in
the deterrence of Chinese military action in Asia;
and encouragement of positive Indian diplomatic
efforts which assist in the containment of China.
2. Enlist Indian participation in the limitation of
American (and western) presence and influence in
Asia. To the degree that Chinese and American influ-
ence is limited, Soviet influence can expand.
3. Encourage the Indian government, as a leader in the
Third World, tc take international positions as close
as possible to those of the Soviet Union. The
Soviets seek tc promote the image of a Soviet-Indian
identity of views, for its impact both in Washington
and Peking, and in the Third World.
4. To encourage India's political, social and economic
development in the direction of a socialist econcmy
(the noncapitalist path) and a progressive polity
(the national -democratic state).
5. To build strcng and lasting commercial ties with
India. The reorientation of India*s trade away from
the capitalist markets of the west and toward the
Ccmecon markets can serve to reinforce India*s
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diplomatic orientation and exert an influence on the
direction of her internal development.
6. To create attitudes among the Indian elite and mass
which are favorable to the Soviet Union and the
attainment of its objectives. [118]
The Soviets have pursued these objectives through econcmic r
security and diplomatic initiatives which are discussed in
the fcllcwing sections,
B. SOVIET DIPLOHACT IN INDIA
The degree and intent of pre-independence interaction
between the Soviet Onion and India is subject to wide inter-
pretation. Generally three arguments are presented.
Chat tar Singh Samra in his book India an d Anglo-S ovie t
Eolations, presents a case in which Soviet actions were
predicated on the flow of Anglo-Soviet interaction. His
case is based on pclicy actions such as the Anglo-Soviet
Trade Agreement of March 16, 1921, in which the two nations
agreed:
That each party refrains from hostile actions or under-
taking against the other and from conducting outside of
its cwn borders any official propaganda, direct or indi-
rect, against the institutions of the British Empire or
the Russian Soviet Republic respectively, and more
?articularly that the Russian Soviet Government refrains
rom any attempt, by military or diplomatic or any other
form of action or propaganda, to encourage any of the
Peoples of Asia in any form of hostile action against
ritish interest or the British Empire, especially in
India and the Independent State or Afghanistan. The
British Government gives a similar particular under-
taking to the Russian Soviet Government in respect of
the countries which formed part of the former Russian
Empire and which has now become independent. [119]
Samra^ case is further strengthened by the Soviet direction
of the Communist Party of India (CPI) during WWII to support
the British war effort in contrast to the "Quit India" move-
ment of the Congress Party,
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A second argument is presented by J. A. Naik. Naik
asserts that official Soviet interest in pre-independence
India was nil. Naik bases his argument on the lack of
mention of India by Lenin and Stalin in their letters and
speeches. Naik writes, "If Lenin's references to India were
rare and far apart Stalin's were even more so. A survey of
Stalin's writings shewed that throughout his long stay for
more than thirty years at the helm of the CPSU and Soviet
state, Stalin referred to colonial India only six times."
[120] Naik does recognize a continuing interest in India on
the part of the Comintern, but concludes that the Soviet
government had little interest in the formulation of the
Comintern's India policies. [121]
The third interpretation of pre-independence Indo-Soviet
relations is provided by authors seeking to stress the
strength of the relationship. These authors stress private
Soviet writers and the actions of -ha Comintern. [122]
The three arguments each present a facet of the rela-
tionship. Comintern concern for India was high as is
evidenced by the prominence of M.N. Roy through 1929 and the
attention paid to the India question at the Sixth and
Seventh Congresses. At the same time, Stalin was interested
in nation-building and securing the Soviet Onion's borders,
not in exporting revolution to India. His priorities
focused on securing some modus vivendi with the western
powers, repulsing Germany and developing internal cohesion.
If the actions of the Stalinist government towards India
from 19U7-1953 have any continuity with pre-war attitudes,
this also would lead one to conclude that India ranked well




1 • Stalin and the Two- Camp Theory
Stalin's lack of interest in India continued after
1947. Two reasons contributed to this. Firstly, Stalin*
s
priorities now were the rebuilding of a war-devastated
Russia and securing Russia from any external threat.
Stalin's security concerns emanated from Europe and America,
not Asia. The second factor attributing to Stalin's lack of
interest in India was his subscribing to Andre Zhdanov's
theory of the division of the world into two political
camps, "imperialistic and anti-democratic camp on one side,
and anti-imperialistic and democratic camp on the ether
side." [ 123]
Which camp the Soviets thought India was in is clear
in various articles in the Soviet press of which the
following is representative.
The last year-and-a-half since the "transfer of power to
Indian hands" has made it quite plain that the national
bourgeois leadership of the Congress obtained the reins
of power by signing a treacherous deal with British
imperialism. The subservient big bourgeoisie with their
close ties with British and American monopolies, and
their Congress champions, sold India's freedom for a
deal with British imperialism in order to save their
parasitic orivilages from the advancing sweep of demo-
cratic forces. [124]
Rejection of the policy of nonalignment is evident in the
following quotations concerning neutrality and the Third
Camp:
gis programme for his 'Third Camp' shows that the latter
is in tact nothing other than the aggressive pacific
oact which the American imperialists Have so long been
trying to engineer and which the British labour leaders
support. [ 125]
Stalin's Kashmir policy is a reflection of the
status he awarded India. During the period 1949-1953, the
Soviet delegate to the Dni ted Nations spoke only twice on
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the Kashirir issue. [126] On both of these occasions, the
clear purpose of the speech was not to advance any Indian
cause, but to attack Anglo-American intervention. [127] The
Kashmir issue served as nothing more than a tool to further
the Soviet position in the East-West confrontation. At no
time during this period did the Soviet Onion take sides with
India or Pakistan. On practically every occasion the matter
was brought to vote, Russia abstained.
The preceding is not meant to say that the Soviet
attitude towards India did not evolve during Stalin's
tenure. Much of the reason for any evolution in Soviet
Indian policy is due to a change in Soviet priorities. The
Korean War shifted Soviet attention from Europe, where Asian
and neutral powers have little influence, to Asia, where
their opinion and influence was much greater. Indian oppo-
sition to the sending of United Nations troops across the
38th Parallel and the Indian peace initiatives gained
Stalin's attention. A changing Soviet perspective is
evidenced in Soviet support for Indian inclusion in the
Political Conference established in Paragraph 60 of the
Korean' Arnistice Agreement. [128] Indian support for seating
the PEC in the United Nations created another convergence of
Indian and Soviet objectives. This changing view cf Irdian
influence did not necessarily mean that Stalin believed
India was any the less in the western camp. The remark by
Soviet United Naticns delegate Vyshinsky epitomizes the
Soviet attitude under Stalin.
At best, you (Indians) are dreamers and idealists; at
worst ycu don't understand your own position and camou-





Khrushchev and Hind i-R ussi Bh ai^Bhai
lith the rise of Khrushchev to power in the Soviet
Union, a new Indian policy was formulated. This was tased
on recognition of the fact that the two-camp policy had not
worked. It realized that the Soviet Union, by adopting the
two-camp approach, was forcing neutrals into the western
camp since the global economic and military reach of the
U.S. and European powers was so much greater than that of
the USSR.
Khrushchev recognized that a nation could be nona-
ligned. He also recognized that the nationalistic, anti-
imperialistic view of many of the nonaligned former colonies
would cause them to guite often adopt anti-western posi-
tions. Khrushchev sought to enlarge the role of the nona-
ligned. In the case of India, he accepted India's view of
India being a great power.
Khrushchev worked for the inclusion of India in
several international forums. These included the Korean
Conference already mentioned, the Geneva Conference on
Indochina in 1954, [130] a proposed 1956 Conference of the
Big Four plus India en nuclear disarmament, [13 1] the 1957
5-Power Disarmament Conference in London, [132] a proposed
summit council in July 1958 on the Lebanon Crisis, [133] and
the 18 nation Disarmament Conference in 1961. This
contrasts with an American position which opposed Indian
involvement in most of the above forums. While the U.S.
continued to adopt an East- West attitude, Russia recognized
the forces behind nonalignment and sought -co use them. The
contrasting U.S. -USSR positions contributed heavily towards
the formulation of theories such as Nayar's balance-of-power
approach outlined in Chapter I.
Soviet support in forwarding Indian pretensions of
greatness were accompanied by Soviet support of Indian
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policies. Soviet Kashmir policy made a complete turnaround
during Khrushchev's three-week November 1955 visit to India.
While in Srinigar, he proclaimed, "The question of Kashmir
as one cf the states of the Republic of India has been
settled ty the Kashmir people themselves." [134] Three days
later he stated the citizens cf Kashmir "have welcomed their
national liberation, regarding their territory as an inte-
gral part of the Republic of India." [135] The Soviet posi-
tion went beyond mere pronouncements. The Soviets exercised
their veto power in the United Nations in both 1957 and 1962
in support of Indian positions. [136]
The Soviets adopted a firm position of support for
India on the Goa issue. When the United Nations moved
against the Indian invasion and absorption of Goa, the
Soviet Onion again exercised its veto to protect the Indian
position. India and the Soviets also adopted very compli-
mentary positions on the 19 56 Suez Crisis. The Indian posi-
tion at the Onited Nations during the Hungarian invasion in
1956, was noted for the Indian unwillingness to condemn the
OSSR. India abstained on the vote condemning the USSR.
Follow-on official Indian criticism was very light, as was
the Soviet response to the Indian criticism.
It should be noted that the Soviet adoption of
pro-Indian positions on Kashmir, Goa, and Suez, was in line
with broader Soviet cbjectives and did not incur any real
costs for the Soviets. The Sino-Indian conflict of 1962
provided the first instance where Indian and Soviet polit-
ical goals radically differed. India naturally sought a
purely anti-PRC policy. The Soviets on the other hand, were
still seeking to close the Sino-Soviet rift. The relative
positions of India and China in Soviet priorities, was
clearly evident in the initial stance taken by the Soviets.
In an editorial by Pravda on 25 October 1962, the McMahon




The problem of the Chinese-Indian border is a legacy
from, the days when India was under the sway of the
British colonialists who carved and recarved the map of
Asia .at thair pleasure. The notorious "McMahon Line"
was imposed on the Chinese and Indian peoples; it was
never recognized by China. [137]
The editorial went on to recommend Indian acceptance of the
Chinese call for a withdrawal of 20 kilometers from the de
facto line of control. In November Pravda adopted a more
balanced approach which stressed peaceful negotiation. [138]
The damage of the initial editorial had been done however.
This was magnified when the western armslift to India was
contrasted with Soviet nonaction. The Soviet lack of
support caused one columnist to write:
Yet another, a Dullesian, truth brought home to us is
that in this world sharply divided between the Communist
and non-Communist blocs, thars is no room for neutrals
— not when the chips are down. [139]
With the exception of the Sino-Indian War, the
Khrushchev period was one in which the Soviet Union's poli-
cies supported Indian aspirations. When this is combined
with the economic pclicy followed during the same period
(discussed in Section 2.3) , there emerges a strong
Indo-Soviet relationship based on mutual objectives. When
contrasted to American political opposition, the favorable
attitude of India towards the USSR becomes understandable.
3 • Bre shn ev At tempt s a Ba lanes
Khrushchev^ policy of committing the USSR to India
so heavily carried with it certain costs. Primary among
these costs are the continued amnity of the PRC and
Pakistan. Breshnev initiated a program of rapprochement
with Eakistan. The visit of Pakistani President Ayub Khan
in April 1965 was replete with agreements to double or
treble USSR-Pakistan trade. During the 1965 War, the
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Soviets took care not to take sides as is shown in a Pravda
article which stated:
An armed conflict has broken out between the two neigh-
bouring states. The Indian and Pakistani press give
different versions of the situation. He will not go
into a discussion here of which of these versions mere
precisely reflects the course of events. The main thing
is to find a way to stop the bloodshed immediately and
to liguidate the conflict. [140]
The Soviet sponsorship of the Tashkent Conference in January
1966 was noticable for its evenhandedness. It is believed
that Kosygin was responsible for pressuring PM Shastri to
yield Haji Pir and Kargil back to Pakistan. [141]
The changing priority between India and Pakistan in
the eyes of the Soviets was apparent in the official Soviet
slogans for the two countries. Each year, the USSR devel-
oped official slogans for all of its allies and friends.
The rank ordering of the slogans is indicative of the posi-
tion a country occupies in Soviet priorities. During
Khrushchev's era, the Indian slogan was ranked immediately
after those of the Warsaw Pact countries and was worded to
reflect such a ranking. In 1967 the wording of the slogan
for India was downgraded tc match that of Pakistan and was
ranked immediately above Pakistan's. Pakistan had received
their first slogan only two years prior. Symbolic measures
were matched with hard action. In April 1968, Premier
Kosygin made the first state tour by a Soviet leader to
Pakistan. The USSR agreed to finance 21 projects in
Pakistan including assistance in the construction of a steel
mill, and a 140 megawatt power station in East Pakistan.
The Soviets provided Es. 865 million towards the Third Five
Year Plan (1965-70). On April 1968, a Cultural and
Scientific Cooperation Pact was concluded. In probably the
most meaningful action, the Soviets agreed in the summer of
1968 to supply Pakistan with 100 T-54/55 tanks, 22 130mm
58

artillery pieces and spare parts for the Mig-19, Mig-21 , and
IL-28 aircraft. [142]
While the Soviets adopted an evenhanded approach to
Kashmir (which they still maintain) , their growing detente
with Pakistan was slowed when vigorous Indian protests were
made concerning the Soviet sale of arms to Pakistan. [143]
With the cessation of OS arms sales in 1965, and USSR arms
sales being halted after 19 69, Pakistan turned towards her
most reliable source cf arms, the PRC. This effectively
ended any hopes for rapprochement between Pakistan and the
Soviet Union.
** • Treaty of Fr iendship and Coop_er at ion
The Indo-Soviet relationship received its next major
diplomatic testing in 1971 with the Bangladesh Crisis. The
April 2, 1971 letter by President Podgorny to Ayub Khan,
laid cut the initial Soviet position. It called upon
Pakistan to solve its problem peaceably and not by force of
arms. Importantly, it referred to East Pakistan as East
Pakistan and not Bangladesh. References to the "vital
interests of the entire people of Pakistan" indicated a
desire to see Pakistan remain whole. [144] Actions such as a
clearing of the technical plans in April 197 1 for the steel
mill in Karachi are further evidence of a balanced Soviet
approach.
The Soviet positions divergence from the Indian
position was evident during Swaran Singh's June 1971 visit
to Moscow. The joint communigue ncticably did not lay out
any specific measures for settling the conflict, and it
continued to refer to the area in question as East Pakistan.
[145] Indian leaders by that time were habitually referring
to the area as East Eengal and Bangladesh. The Indians were
also openly engaged in suppcrt of the Mukti Bahini guerrilla
movement in East Pakistan.
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The Soviet approach to the conflict changed radi-
cally with the announcement on July 15 of Henry Kissenger's
trip to Eeijing via Islamabad and President Nixon's
announcement of a proposed presidential trip to Beijing
prior to Hay 1972. [1^6] India responded with an announce-
ment of recognition of the provisional government of
Bangladesh. On the same day the Treaty of Peace, Friendship
and Cooperation, 1971, was signed between India and the
Soviet Onion- [147] The twenty-year pact enjoined the two
countries to cooperate in multinational arenas and in
economic and cultural forums. More importantly were the
stipulations of Articles VIII-XI.
Article VIII
In accordance with the traditional friendship estab-
lished between the two countries, each of the High
Contracting Parties solemnly declares that it shall not
enter into or participate in any military alliance
directed against the other Party.
Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from
any aggression against the other Party and to prevent
the use of its territory for the commission of any act
which might inflict military damage on the other High
Contracting Party.
Article IX
Each High Contracting Party undertakes to abstain from
providing any assistance to any third party that engages
in armed conflict with the other Party. In the event of
either Party being subjected to an attack or a threat
thereof, the High Contracting Parties shall immediately
enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such
threat and to take appropriate effective measures to
ensure peace and the security of their countries.
Article X
Each High Contracting Party solemnly declares that it
shall net enter into any obligation, secret or public,
with one cr more states, which is incompatible with this
Treaty. Each High Contracting Party declares that no
obligation exists, nor shall any obligation be entered
into. between itself and any other state or states,
which might cause ailitary damage to the other Party.
Article XI
This Treaty is concluded for the duration of twenty
years and will be automatically extended to each succes-
.iigh
to the expiration of the Treaty.
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India accrued tremendous advantages from the Treaty.
Primarily, it no longer had to fear an
Islamabad-Beijing-Washington axis. It also precluded the
Soviets from assisting Pakistan while not ruling out unilat-
eral Indian action against Pakistan. The other major advan-
tage was that Soviet assistance was gained without India
having to subscribe to a system of collective security as
outlined by Breshnev in June of 1959. [148]
The Soviet swing to the Indian side was further
evidenced by Soviet actions in the United Nations.
Thant's proposal for United Nations action to stem "clandes-
tine raids and acts of sabotage" was blocked by the Soviets.
The Soviets however continued to call for a solution that
would not dismember Pakistan. Ths Pakistani decision to
continue with the trial of Mujib and continued Pakistani
efforts to obtain Chinese assurances of support were factors
in the Soviet decision to adopt a pro-Indian stance after
fighting rrcke out on December 3, 197 1.
In the 5 December 1971 speech of the Soviet delegate
to the United Nations Security Council, the subject of
secession by East Pakistan was declared to be the right of
the "elected representatives" of East Pakistan to decide.
[149] Those elected representatives had been identified
during a speech on 3 December as the representatives of the
Awami League, elected in December 1970. On 4 December, the
Soviets vetoed a Security Council Resolution calling for a
ceasefire. The Soviet veto was exercised again on 5 and 15
December.
The presence of a Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean,
which the Soviets stated would prevent any intervention by
the Enterprise, [150] deepened and heightened the visibility
cf the Soviet involvement.
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5. Nonaligned or Ally ?
The Indian dependence on Soviet arcs, diplomatic
influence and nuclear umbrella, combines with the Friendship
Treaty to present the image that India is an ally of the
Soviet Union. Subsequent Indian efforts to downplay the
treaty, would suggest that the treaty was a tactical move
designed to met the exigencies of the moment. Robert
Donaldson, in his study of Soviet influence, notes that the
second anniversary of the treaty received only "pro forma"
statements by Indian officials and restrained notice in the
press despite Soviet attempts to play it up. [151] Donaldson
cites interviews by FM Gandhi to reinforce this point. The
Janata's treatment cf the treaty stressed that the treaty
"does not hamper in any way the development of their rela-
tions with third countries." [152] This pattern continued
through the 10th anniversary of the treaty when India gave
cnly perfunctory recognition to the occasion. [153]
Indian diplomatic and security policy actions have
shown a willingness tc act against Soviet interests. This
is evident in the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion, [154] the
Janata Party's proclamation cf following a truer nonalign-
ment, the policy of rapprochement with the PRC started by
the Janata and continued by the current Gandhi administra-
tion, and the post-1980 efforts to improve relations with
the United States.
India has not subordinated her foreign policy to the
Soviet Union, but the Indo-Soviet relationship does continue
to reap benefits for the Soviets as India does take Soviet
desires into consideration. This is evident in the Indian
policy towards the invasion of Afghanistan. India was very
noticeably silent when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan.
Indira Gandhi continues to contend that the Soviets were
invited in. [155] When she is questioned about Indian
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silence on Afghanistan she immediately throws up an accusa-
tion of double standards (in reference to the OS in El
Salvador, Chile, and Vietnam). [156] While India's stance on
this issue has definitely not met the acid test of indepen-
dence as conducted by western and Moslem standards, she has
not been acquiescent to the Soviet position either. PM
Gandhi states: "We have said to the Russians, and we have
said it publicly, that we don't like foreign troops in
there." [157] Indian independence was asserted again when PS
Gandhi reminded a meeting of the Soviet-Indian Friendship
Society, in Moscow, that there were "two sides to the
Froblem." [ 158
]
India's position on Afghanistan appears to be a
mixture cf 1) a firm telief that the Soviets have legitimate
interests in Afghanistan, 2) that the Soviets want to and
should remove their troops from Afghanistan, 3) they will
not leave if they feel their interests are not protected and
4) the test way to achieve the above is through quiet nego-
tiation, not noisy public diplomacy. Such an approach has a
certain legitimacy. Just because India does not engage in
strident denunciations of the Soviet Union does not mean she
is subordinate to the wishes of the USSR. One must take
note however, that India has been very quiet on several
issues for which the USSR was roundly condemned by western
and third world countries alike. These include the inci-
dents in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Kampuchea, Poland, and
most recently, the Korean Air Lines jet shot down by the
USSR. These all were met by the claim that quiet diplomacy
is best. The history of silence against the USSR is not
matched by a history of silence against the US. The compar-
ison of US action in El Salvador (55 US advisors) and USSR
actions in Afghanistan (105,000 Soviet troops) is an
example. When this is matched against the lessons of
history, Indian policy on Afghanistan appears at a minimum,
to be based on a sensitivity to Soviet concerns.
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Soviet support of India appears to have reaped
benefits in the United Nations also. A review of the voting
record of India in the United Nations from 1965-1972 showed
that on issues where the U.S. and USSR disagreed and India
did not abstain, her voting heavily favored the USSR.
TABLE T
Indian Voting Agreement with the O.S. and USSR 1965-72









Source: Robert Donaldson. The Soviet Indian
Alignment: Quest for Influence^TCarTisIe Barracks:
unIrea~'5Tates IfIy~¥ar"ToTrege7 i979)
, p. 42.
The pattarn of Indian support of Soviet positions
continued in 198 3. In a record of votes on the 20 issues
the U.S. considered most important, India voted with the
Soviets and against the United States on 13 of them. [159]
Overall Indian percentage cf vote agreement with the U.S.
for 1982 was only 16.6%. [160]
Tfce record of Indo-Soviet diplomatic relations has
indicated a long-standing support for Indian diplomatic
objectives. During Khrushchev's period, India's desire for
great power status was recognized and supported. No doubt
the Soviets had reasons other than altruism, nonetheless
India discerned a support for her aspirations noticeably
absent in American actions. The USSR has provided critical
support against India's two major threats, Pakistan and the
PRC. Soviet support in the United Nations on the Kashmir
issue allowed India to avoid a pleibiscite an d a United
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Nations force. While remaining neutral in 1965, the Soviets
decisively entered the fray on the Indian side in 1971.
Soviet warnings to the Chinese in 1965 and the soviet
nuclear umbrella in 1971 provided India with the necessary
maneuverability to allow her to permanently alter the stra-
tegic balance of the subcontinent. In almost all these
instances, the U.S. adopted a position that either opposed
Indian objectives or was nonsupporti ve in some other way.
The major exception, the 1962 Sino-Indian war, was negated
by American actions in 1965. The key to Indian support of
Soviet initiatives has been an equal Russian support of
Indian objectives.
C. OSIHG THE ROUBLE
1 . Soviet Ext ernal Ass istance
Soviet assistance tc the Indian economy has been a
powerful instrument in creating a favorable image of the
Soviet Union in India. In a poll conducted in September
1974, 25 percent of the respondents who thought Indian and
USSR basic interests were in agreement, attributed it to
Indo-Soviet economic and technological cooperation while 22
percent felt it was because they were both socialist coun-
tries. Only 19 percent of the respondents, university
students, thought the United States had given India "a great
deal" of economic aid. 48 percent felt that the Soviets had
given "a great deal". Similarly, 22 percent felt the United
States had given "very little" aid and only 2 percent
expressed the same sentiment concerning the Soviet Union.
[161 ] While actual aid figures proove the falsity of this
perception, the question remains why it exists. The primary
answer is the high visibility of Soviet aid and the compat-




Soviet economic aid commenced with the Bhilai Steel
Plant agreement in February 1955. The aid was a product of
Khrushchev's realization that unless the ronaligned coun-
tries were able to create some form of economic independence
from the industrialized West, their economies would remain
subordinated to the West with attendant diplomatic and
security implications. Soviet aid sought a double reward -
increased influence with the elite and masses, and a
reorientation of the economy away from the inter-linked
capitalist economies of the West.
The presence of the public sector is not due to
Russian influence. The boundaries for the public sector
were established in 1948 by the Industrial Policy Resolution
which provided for the distribution of industries between
the public and private sector. Its companion, the Planning
Commission, was established in 1950. [162] Both of these
seminal events took place while India was being scorned by
Stalin. Further evidence of India's predeliction for
socialism is contained in Jawaharlal Nehru's 1942 declara-
tion: "...socialism is for me not merely an economic
doctrine which I favour; it is a vital need which I held
with all my head and heart." [163]
Soviet aid to India between 1954 and 1975 totalled
1,943 million dollars. This accounted for 18% of the USSR's
total aid during this period. The bulk of the aid occurred
between 1955 and 1966. During the period 1954-1966, India
ranked as the feremest recipient of Soviet aid. [164] A
major difference between Soviet and American aid, is the
heavy commitment to the public sector by the Russians. A
review of the major aid agreements signed between 1955 and
1966 bears this out.
As Ambassador Galbraith noted, the willingness of
the Soviets to fund the public sector gave them a very




Soviet Bconciic Credits Extended to India
Date of Agreement Value Project
2-2-1955 1,019.6 Bhilai Steel Plant




Korba Coal Mining Project
Neyveli Thermal Power
Station
5-29-1957 149.9 Pharmaceutical Project
9-12-1959 2,812.4 Credits for Third Five
Year Plan













9-28-1959 187.5 Barauni Petroleum Refinery








Production of pumps and
compressors
1-25-1965 1,666.7 BoJcaro Steel Plant










Design Institute for the
Metallurgical Industries
Note: All loans were carried at 2.5% for a period of 12
years with the exception of the pharmaceutical project
which was a 7 year loan at 2.5% interest.
Source: Government cf India, Ministry of Finance, External
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Assistance J968^69 and 1 96 9/70 (New Delhi: Govern-
ment of India FubTisEing House, 1971)
, pp. 109-111.
The handling of the Ehilai Steel Project enhanced this image
even more. Soviet commitment was evident in their
dispatching their engineer minister to personally direct the
project. [165] Articles V and VI of the agreement: for Bhilai
contained provisions for training of Indian personnel and
Indian participation in the construction of the plant.
Article V
The Soviet organisations shall associate at all stages
of the work in India and in the USSR pertaining to the
planning, construction- erection, operation, and other
matters relating tc the works and the township and the
associated facilities a sufficient number of Indian
nationals selected by the Indian authorities with the
object both of utilising the services of such Indians as
well as for training them in such work. The Soviet
organisations shall carry out as much of the work in
connection with the project and the planning, designing
and drawing up of specifications as possible in India.
Article VI
The division of works between the Indian authorities and
the Soviet organisations pertaining to the designing of
the construction of buildings, roads. foundations,
waterways and ether similar things as well as pertaining
to the erection of the works will be decided by mutual
consultation and agreement from time to time. [166]
The result of the Indian participation was reflected in John
P. Lewis 1 assessment of the project:
Hhat struck me most forcefully at Bhilai, having come
directly from other mills... was the extraordinary high
morale of the Indian participants in the project. They
were net onlv enormously proud of the relative good
record that the work at Bhilai had made; they were
completely convinced that this was substantially their
accomplishment. [167]
The quality of work was explicit in Earl C. Smiths evalua-
tion of tte plant: (Ehilai is) "better designed for contin-
uous production than anything I have seen either in the USA
or in Russia proper." [168]
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The Soviet Union was also critical in developing the
Indian oil industry. After western experts had made only
perfunctory attempts at drilling for oil and determined that
India was a non-starter as far as oil potential was
concerned, the Indians made significant discoveries in
Assam, Gujarat, and Punjab. Also, when the three big
western multinationals refused to refine imported crude, the
Soviets assisted in the construction of refineries at Koyali
and Barauni. Soviet technological assistance in the crit-
ical field of energy development remains high even today as
the number of 1982 Indo-Soviet protocols indicates.
Protocols provided for:
1. Oil exploration and drilling.
2. Construction of a magnetohydronamic plant.
3. Assistance in enhanced oil recovery from inactive
wells.
4. Assistance in doubling Indian coal production.
5. Co-productions of mining equipment.
6. Cooperation on development of a coal into liquid fuel
capability.
7. Establishment of a hydroelectric power working group.
A major consideration in Soviet aid is the financial
terms proferred. The terms of the Bhilai agreement, equiva-
lent to those for other projects and stipulated in Article
XII of the contract, called for "12 equal annual install-
ments payable on or before the 15th day of March of each and
every year. . . Interest will accrue at 2 1/2 percent per
annum..." [169] This compared quite favorably to the terms
of Krupp and Demag, approached prior to the Russians for
construction of Bhilai, of 12 percent and a share of equity
capital. [170] The German deal for the Rourkela plant was
closed at 6.3 percent.
The second major advantage to the Soviet terms is
that "All payments tc be made by the Indian authorities as
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aforesaid shall be in Indian rupees to a separate account in
favour of the Soviet organizations to be opened with the
Reserve Bank of India. . . The amounts credited to this
account may be utilised by the Soviet organizations for the
purchase cf goods in India and/or be freely convertible into
pounds sterling." [171] This produces two advantages for
India. India is able to conserve its convertible currencies
and at the same time gain a secure market for Indian goods.
Soviet assistance since the 1950's and 1960* s has
teen sharply curtailed. The Government of India f s Eco nomi c
Survey 1982-83. lists only two loans being extended by the
Soviets in the decade of the 1970' s — one for Rs208. 3
crore in 1977-78, and one for Rs 485.7 crore in 1980-81.
[172] To this must be added an emergency wheat loan of $350
million in 1973. Russia provided no grants during this
decade. actual loan utilization between 1970-71 and 1981-82
inclusive, totalled Rs56 9.0 crore. This equalled 3.5
percent of Indian aid utilization during the same period.
Soviet aid has never commanded a dominating position
in India's external assistance program. Through 1970, the
Soviets accounted for 11.6 percent of the total loans to
India and 1.3 percent of the total grants. That placed the
DSSR as the second largest source of loans but she ranked
behind Canada, Australia, the Ford Foundation, West Germany,
and Norway in the extension of grants. The Soviet loan
effort of Rs10211.0 million up to 1970, is dwarfed next to
the American contribution of Rs66021.9 million which
accounted for 56 percent of all external assistance. Even
when focd aid is discounted, U.S. aid still equals 35
percent of all external assistance received prior to 1970.
[173]
The favorable impression of Soviet aid in India
cannot be traced to the quantities of Soviet aid extended.
In that category the Soviets are at an obvious disadvantage.
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Their advantage derives from the placement of their funds
into highly visible and critical public sectors. It also
derives from the credit terms offered and the stability the
Soviet program achieved through linking it to the Five Year
Plans. The Soviet image has not suffered from a lack of
extending grants or from the unwillingness to reschedule
debt servicing.
2 * Indo-Sovie t Trad e
Khrushchev/s strategy of reorienting the Indian
economy away from the West could not succeed solely on the
basis of providing India with an independent means of
production. It also had to supply markets for Indian
exports and sources for Indian imports.
The growth of Indo-Soviet trade since it was first
formalized in the Indo-Russian Trade Agreement, 2 December
1953, is reflected in both quantity and percentages of the
Indian import-export market.
The 1953 agreement stipulated that trade be in
rupees and this stipulation is still in effect. ( 174 ] The
current rate is fixed at 12.5 ruppees to one rouble.
Surpluses and deficits accrued in trade are kept distinct
from external aid debits. Surpluses garnered under the
barter trade agreements may not be applied to India aid
debits.
Indo-Soviet trade has changed in composition from
India»s initial position as primarily an importer of
finished products and exporter of raw materials. The 1953
Trade Agreement stipulated 39 commodity areas for Indian
import. The bulk cf these were finished products. The
schedule for Indian exports listed 20 commodity areas, all
cf which were raw materials with the exception of leather
manufactures, rope, chemicals, and cinematic films. By the




Soviet Trade as a Percentage of Indian Harket
Year Total Import
Fr USSR
% Fr Total Expert % TO
Import USSR Export TO USSR USSR
1792.0 1.6 .09 1645.8 13.6 .8
1200.7 .9 .07 1116.2 .7 .06
1413.4 6.4 .4 1276.5 5.2 .4
1814.8 45.6 2.5 1215.8 49.0 4.2
2327.0 33.3 1.4 1331.0 60.4 4.5
2912.0 173.7 6.0 1688.0 194.0 11.5
2125.0 164.4 7.8 2026.0 27 1.5 13.4
6176.2 394.4 6.3 4355. 1 511.5 11.7
5665.0 235.0 4.1 5549.0 476.0 8.6
6647.0 474.0 7.1 6378.0 691.0 10.8
7865.0 472.0 6.0 6671.0 564.0 8.4
98 28.0 805.0 8.2 7806.0 647.0 8.3
14341.0 1 138.0 8.0 8242.0 731.0 8.9















Source: International Monetary Fund. Dire cti on of
Trade Statistics Yearbook 1 966 -70, (WasITingtor.:
Infernation aT"H oner a rT~P uno'7~"T9TT) pp. 273-275, ibid,
1971-77, pp. 152-53; ibid, 1983, pp. 212-214.
Note: Figures are in millions of US dollars. IFS figure
is used fcr totals. 1980, 1981, import-export figures are
estimations. For Government of India figures, see Tables
XIV- XVI.
been expanded to 64 different commodities including excava-
tors, cranes, railway wagons, electric motors, rolled steel
products, medicine, and surgical instruments. [175] As early
as 1966, finished goods accounted for 45 percent of India's
exports to the USSR (13 percent in 1956). [176]
Limitations to Indo-Soviet trade were being
discussed as early as the mid-1960' s. Both major limita-
tions discussed were cf a structural nature. The nature of
Indian imports were such that they primarily were consumed
by the government in the public sector. On the other hand,
a majority of Indian exports originated in the private
sector and were not included in the planning process. A
second problem centered around the evolution of the Indian
economy. As the Indian economy became independent, it would
not need the massive capital equipment inputs that
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characterized Indian imports from the USSR in the 1960's
(1965 - 46.9ft of Indian imports from the USSR were equipment
and materials for complete factories). [177] This argument
has been fortified lately with the addition of the question
of Soviet ability to supply the level of technology that
India requires. With the exception of 1978-79, in every
year since 1963, India has carried a balance of trade
surplus with the USSF. The current aggregate surplus is
estimated at $862.5 aillion. [178] This surplus caused the
USSR to cut its level of imports in early 1983. The 1983
trade protocol called for an expansion of trade, but
currently India has cnly placed orders for 71% of her 1983
commitment and is waiting for additional Soviet orders.
[179] The Soviets have held off purchase of Indian goods
(they have only ordered 60% of their commitment) pending a
rise in Soviet exports to India. Even though India has not
developed alternate narkets for many of her goods, India has
not purchased the Soviet goods.
The Soviets are capable of providing India a certain
guality of goods that is becoming less appropriate for the
Indian market as Indian industry develops and Indian tastes
mature. More simply put India does not want Soviet goods
beyond a certain point. [180] This is the root cause of the
trade imbalance. The recent agreement for the USSR to sell
Rs600 million of oil to India, in excess of previous agree-
ments, is ar attempt to redress this problem.
3 . Get tin g Your Eoubles Worth
The Soviets have been able through aid to create a
favorable impression in India. When Indira Gandhi in
February 1982, was asked, "Why has India moved so close to
Russia?" she replied, "...the Soviet Union helps us when we
are in trouble, and the Soviet Union has stood by us in
times of difficulty." She then went on to support her
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assertion with the examples cf staal and oil development.
[181 ] Has Russia succeeded in turning India away from
western markets? Results have been mixed, but the general
answer is no.
Indian trade-flow statistics show that while the
Soviets had become the largest single trading partner by
1981-82, trade with the West (North America, EEC, ESCAP)
still acounted for 52 percent of India's export markets and
U9 percent of India* s imports. When OPEC, which is linked
into the free-market system, is added, the figures jump to
64 percent and 80 percent respectively. A large portion of
the Soviet gain in market percentage appears to actually
come cut of Eastern Europe's share of the market. The
Eastern European share of the Indian export market (minus
the OSSR) was 10 percent in 1970-71. In 1981-82, it was
down to 4 percent. During the same period, the Soviet share
increased from 14 to 19 percent. Likewise, in the Indian
import market. Eastern Europe's share decreased from 8
percent to 2 percent while Russian trade increased from 6 to
9 percent. [182] The Eussian increases are impressive, none-
theless a shifting of Comecon's share between Ccaiecon
members dees not constitute a shifting from capitalistic to
socialistic markets by India.
Another indicator of a failure on the part of the
Soviets to achieve a reorientation of the Indian market is
the Indian response in times of economic crisis. While much
of the governmental controls of the economy are a result of
bureaucratic inertia, India's response to the economic ills
of 1966, 1974, and the current balance of payments problem
has been to liberalize the economy. The 1966 actions were
discussed briefly in the last chapter. In 1974, after the
OPEC price hikes, there appeared in response to inflation
and lower production a policy of loosening the socialistic
reins on the economy. The 1974-75 import policy called for
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a halt tc the practice of adding new items to the list of
commodities that must be cleared for import. [183] The
wholesale wheat, trade was returned to the private sector and
plans for the nationalization of the rice trade were
cancelled. Other indicators of a turning towards a pro-
business, free enterprise system included the income tax
level being cut, lock-cuts being declared in two public
sector strikes, the railway strike being busted, less
restriction on the growth of the large business houses and
the announced decision to net take over any mere banks.
[184] The import liberalizations of 1981-82, discussed in
Chapter IV, are oriented directly at obtaining needed tech-
nologies from the Rest so that India can compete in Western
markets. The private sector continues to be a greater
source of employment and revenue than the public sector.
The Indo -Soviet aid/trade connection cannot be meas-
ured solely in terms of reorientation of the Indian economy.
It also forms an important linkage and point of contact
between the two governments. The number of USSR-Indian
protocols signed between the two countries in 1982 as
recorded in Foreign Broadcast Information Serice (see Table
Till) , shows a dominant economic theme. There continues to
be a steady flow of delegations between the two countries.
This connection cannot be overrated in assessing the devel-
opment of shared interests between the tw: countries.
C. TEE 1BHIHG OF I1DIA
1 . Indian Arms Transfer Pol icy
an understanding of the Soviet arms link to India
necessitates first an understanding of Indian arms transfer
policy and the relationship of purchases from the Soviets to




OS SB-Indian Protocols 1982
Collaboration in Dam Construction 1 January
Cooperation in Nonferrous Metallurgy 26 January
Development Assistance in Fusion 1 February
Technology
Agreement for Joint Manned Space Flight 4 March
Irrigation and Water Management Cooperation 27 March
Powder Metallurgy Cooperation . 30 April
USSR to Launch Indian Satellite 22 May
Construction of Magnet ohy dronamic Plant 28 May
Assistance in Upgrading Enhanced Oil 7 June
Recovery
Assistance in Doubling Indian Coal Product- 20 June
ion (including Rs960 million financing)
Irrigation and Water Conservation 12 September
Science and Technology Cooperation 17 September
Computer Technology and Electronics 22 October
USSR tc Supply 4.75 million Tens of Oil 10 November
in 1983
Agricultural Science and Technology 19 November
Joint Working Group on Hydroelectric 24 November
1983 Trade Protocol 29 December
Indian defense needs are met through three programs.
These are direct arms purchases, licensed production and
indigenous production. Quite often the first two will be
included in the same arms transfer. The licensed production
is then used to gain the technological expertise necessary
for fcllow-cn indigenous projects.
India has basically been through three periods in
which the balance maintained between suppliers has varied.
Frior to the 1965 war there was a very heavy dependence on
non-superpower, western suppliers. This responded to two
Indian motivations. First the services were eguipped with
western style equipment at independence. The officers were
trained on western equipment and tactics and they were part
of the tradition of the services. Also the logistics system
was set up to support western equipment. The second factor
influencing heavy reliance on the UK and France was India's
policy of nonalignment. Nehru* s version of this precluded
arms purchases from either of the superpowers.
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Two principal events combined to cause the first
shift in Indian acquisition policy. The Sino-Indian War in
1962 discredited Indian foreign policy as it had been prac-
ticed. Nonalignment was shown to be a sham unless you have
sufficient military force to back it up. The result was
India's initiating acquisition of substantial amounts of
arms. In the midst of the war the US started supplying
equipment that eventually would fully equip six mountain
divisions and establish an ADA system in the Himalayas.
[185] The deterioration of the situation with the PRC led to
an agreement being signed with the USSR for 12 Mig-21*s in
1962. Thus the policy of not purchasing from the super-
powers was broken.
It took one more event in 1965 to start India on a
path of heavy dependence on the USSR. When the 1965
Indo-Pak War broke out, the United States declared an arms
embargo for the subcontinent. Initially it was a total
embargo. In 1966 ncn- lethal items were approved for sale
and in 1967 ammunition sales were approved on a cash basis.
In 1970 a one-time exception of 300 M113 APC's was approved
for Pakistan. A full embargo was reimposed in 1971 which
was amended in Harch 197 3 to the same level as 1967.
Finally in February 1975 the arms embargo was ended. In the
future, arms sales were to be made on a case by case basis
for cash only. [186] The result of this was that the US
effectively removed itself from consideration as a source of
arms. Eritain also temporarily placed an arms embargo
after the 1965 war.
The combination of needing a counterbalance tc the
Chinese and the US removing itself from consideration
produced a heavy reliance on the Soviet Union. The extent
of the reliance was exemplified by the 1971 Treaty. The
opposition parties in India however did not support the
policy of signing treaties of friendship and 15-year
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economic cooperation agreements. This was not viewed by the
opposition as being compatible with a policy of true nona-
lignment. A series of internal developments, not the least
of which was opposition to the Emergency, resulted in the
Janata Coalition coming to power in 1977. While the Janata
reaffirmed relations with the USSR, they took steps to
balance tte nona lignment policy. One of the steps was to
start diversifying arms purchases. The 1978 purchase of 150
Jaguars was the start of a third period in Indian arms
purchases, a period of diversified arms transfers.
The Indian purchase of aircraft probably best exem-
plifies tte three periods. Table IX reflects all of the
arms purchases- made by India from 1955-62. The numbers
reflect amounts contracted for, both direct purchase and
licensed production. In constructing this table, I viewed
the contract itself as an instrument of policy. I was
interested not in the actual delivery date of the equipment,
but rather when the decision was made and the scope of the
decision.
TABLE IX
Indian Aircraft Purchases 1955-1983
Country Total 1955-65 1966-77 1978-83
OK 885 627 100 158
FR 369 219 150
CAN 55 53 2
FRG 70 35 35
HZ 10 10
SII 12 12
USSR 1332 314 711 307
Table IX clearly shows the shifting of policy. In the
pre- 1965 period there was over a 3:1 ratio of western vs.
Russian aircraft purchases. This shows a dramatic reversal
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to almost a 5: 1 ratio in the Russian's favor from 1966-1977.
Starting with the Jaguar deal in 1978, there appears a
balancing between purchases from European sources and
Russia. A similar pattern is true for the navy. Initially
the Navy was very British in its origins. This gave way to
an almost total dominance by the Soviets. The purchase of
the Type 209 submarine from West Germany signals a limited
move towards diversification of ship purchases. The shift
is not as great as occurred with the aircraft.
It would be incorrect to say that the three arms
transfer periods have affected all major types of weapons
systems similarly. The helicopter market has been balanced
throughout. French licensed production of the Aerospatiale
SA-315 and SA-316 have balanced against direct purchases of
the MI-4 and the MI-8. Purchases of the UK's Sea King for
ASW have surpassed purchases of the KA-25 Hormone. Cther
types of systems have shown a tilt towards the Soviets that
has never been corrected. An example of this is main battle
tanks. The Vijayanta MBT is a UK designed tank that is
licensed produced in India. Licensed production for the
Vijayanta was contracted in 1965. Since this single
purchase (which now accounts for 50X of India's current tank
inventory) Indian purchases have been totally Russian
(except for a small AMX-13 buy in 1970) . They have
purchased the PT-76 (a light tank), the T-54/55, and the
T-72. Th€ recent decision to license produce the T-72 would
indicate there is not going to be a switch in sources in the
future. Finally, seme areas show a total Russian dominance
such as that apparent in armored personnel carriers/armored
fighting vehicles. The Indians have license produced the OT
62/64 (the Czech version of the BTR 50/60) and are now
setting up production of the BMP-1.
The shifts of policy do not have clear-cut bounda-
ries and are not implemented across the board. The trend is
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obvious only when ycu consider
-he total picture. The
overall declaration of policy is clearer in economic terms
than it is when one discusses mere numbers of weapons
systems.
The decision to buy the Jaguar and the Mirage 2000
had a tremendous impact on the Indian economy. The Jaguar
purchase totalled $1.7 billion. This was at a unit price of
$7.2-9.7 nillion. The Soviets in an attempt to dissuade
India from purchasing the Jaguar offered the Mig-23 at a
unit ccst of $2.5 million (figured at Es10 to the dollar) .
At that price the same number of Mig-23 1 s would have cost
$375 million. [187] A further consideraxion is that Soviet
deals are paid through Indian export of specified goods.
This means that foreign exchange is not needed and can be
used for ether items. In FY 1977-78, when the decision was
being made, the Indian balance of trade was approximately
$200 million in the black. This was the only year between
1961 and 1982 when India had a trade surplus. Also in
1977-78 foreign exchange reserves were approximately $4,499
million. Taken in this context, the decision to purchase
the Jaguar assumes a magnitude that numbers of aircraft do
not portray.
2 - Ind o-tJ SSR Arms Trade
The Indian-USSR arms relationship started in 1955
with the gift of two IL-14 transports to India. This was
followed by a purchase of 24 IL-24«s in 1960. In 1961, 10
MI-4 helicopters, eight AN-12 transports and six jet
engines for the JP-24 Marut Mark I were purchased. This was
followed by the purchase of 16 MI-4's and 8 AN-12* s in 1962.
[188] This would seen to contradict the earlier statement
concerning India not buying arms from the superpowers prior
to 1962. The above aircraft purchases were not for military
use. They were purchased for the Border Roads Development
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Eoard. The only piece of military equipment was the
aircraft engines. These purchases did serve to give India a
taste of the USSR*s aircraft.
The first major arms transfer from the USSR was the
MIG-21. An initial agreement was reached in August 1962 for
twelve of the Mig-21*s (delivered in 1964) and for eventual
licensed manufacture in India. By 1964 the Soviets, after
much delay, had agreed to deliver 38 Mig-21 's to India and
to help set up the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)
plants at Nasik, Hyderabad and Koraput. It must be empha-
sized that the Indians backed into this deal. Previously
they had been engaged in negotiations for the OK' s Lightning
(offered at 1/2 price) , but were turned down on their
request for licensed production. As stated earlier, when
the Indians sought to purchase three squadrons of F-104*s,
the United States turned them down. P.R. Chari asserts in
his article that India turned to the Soviet Union out of
dire necessity. Chari points out that there was no major
lobbying group advocating the USSR as an arms source except
the far left which had no political clout. He concludes
"...it was basically the nonavailability of Western arms
that led to India's shift towards the Soviet Union." [189]
Even though the relationship started as a second
choice, it flowered into a full scale client-partner rela-
tionship. Indian purchases from the USSR are depicted
below. [ 190]
A couple of points should be addressed. Notice that
there is no licensed production of naval vessels. The only
license production in this area has been from the UK and
FRG. Most license production has centered on the aircraft
industry. There appears in the late 1970's to be a
branching into armored vehicles. The BMP is to be license
produced at a factory being set up in Andhra Pradesh. [191]







1963 Mig-21 Purchase of 38. Licensed pro-
duction. 1967-7 2: 130
1963 Atoll AAM Licensed Production. 1973-
1979: 130
1965 F-Class Submarine. 4 ordered, deliv-
ered by 1970
1968 Su-7 Fighter. 100 ordered
1968 Petya Class Destroyer. 3 ordered. 8
delivered by 1972
1968 Osa Class Torpedo Boat. 6 delivered
1970-71
1968 Pclnochnyi Class Landing Ship. 2
1968 T-54 MBT. 450 delivered 1968-70
1969 SD-7 50 ordered. Military Balance





1971 SA-2 Guideline. Unit reported
operational
1971 PT-76 Amphibious Tank. 150 deliv-
ered in 1971
1971 MIG-21MF 7 delivered 1972
1971 Styx SSM. To arm Osa Class
1971 Osa Class 8 delivered 1971-72
1973 F-Class Submarine. 4 ordered. 2 del-
ivered in 1974 r 2 in 19751974 Sam-6 Delivery 1975
1974 Petya Class 1 delivered 1974 in addition
to 9 previously
1975 IL-38 4 delivered 1977. Maritime
recce
1975 SSN-9 SSM to arm Nanutchka Class
1975 SSN-2 Styx. 48 delivered 1976-77
1975 Nanutchka Class Missila Corvette. 8 deliv-
ered 1977-80
1975 Osa Class 8 ordered. 2 delivered 1977
1975 Polnochny Class Landing Ship. 4 delivered
1975-76. Total now of 6
1975 BMP Quantity unknown
1975 SA-6 Quantity unknown. Licensed
production
1975 SA-7 same as SA-6
1976 Mig-21bis Licensed production for 150
1976 Kashin Class ASH destroyer. 3 delivered by
1980.
1976 KA-25 Hormone ASW helicopter. 5 delivered
1978
1976 SSN-11 To replace SSN-9. 96 deliv-
ered 1977-78
1977 SA-3 Goa. 500 delivered 1978
1977 IL-38 ASW patrol. 2 delivered 1978
1977 Natya Class Minesweeper. 6 delivered by
1980
1978 T-72 MBT. 70 delivered 1979
1979 MI-8 Helicopter. 60 delivered
1980-81
1979 Krivak Class Frigate
1979 Mig-25R Recce. 2 sgdrns? Delivery
198 1:8












1980 T-72 100 delivered 1980. License
production of 60
aAM to arm Mig-23s








Licensed production of 150
Note: 1982 and 198.3 entries were reported in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service and International ~~
Defense'^ev iewT " ~
in the ccuntry) presages a long-term commitment to Soviet
MBT 1 s.
The Indo-Soviet arms trade accounts for the vast
majority cf equipment on line in all three services. The
establishment of logistics systems, training of technical
personnel and officers is a tremendous argument for contin-
uing the relationship. Another factor influencing continued
arms purchases is the economic aspect.
3- 198 0-8 3 , Div ersifi c ation or Dependence
Since returnicg to power in 1979, the administration
of Indira Gandhi has pursued a program of combining diversi-
fication with increased dependence on the Soviets. Indian
arms purchases for 1S80-1983 are reflected in Table XI.
The table shows a very heavy reliance by the administration
on Russian equipment in 1980-81 that then gave way to seme
rather substantial purchases from the OK, France and the FRG
in 1981-83. Negotiations were ongoing for the purchase of
the TOW and the M198 from the United States. [192]
During the period considered, the Indians made
significant strides forward in their drive for self-
sufficiency. For the Air Force they negotiated the licensed
production of Mig-23»s, Mig-27's and Mirage 2000* s. Armored
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Main battle tank. Licensed













Direct purchase 40, licensed
production of 110
Reported by Indian press.
Onconfirmed
Transport. 50
Licensed production of 150
ASW" helicopter. Reports vary
12 or 20
ASM to arm the SeaKing
VTOL. Six order with two
trainer versions. Option on
six more.
Source: SIPRI Yearbook, 1980-81 . Also uses Foreign
Brgadcase Info rmation Service and Int erna tionaTHTe'fense
He view. ---- - - -
license produce the T-72 and the BMP. [193] Forward progress
in the navy was recorded through the agreement to license
produce the Type 209 submarine.
Trends can be pointed to in many of the purchases.
The Mirage 2000 deal would appear to point to a diversifica-
tion of aircraft as far as suppliers are concerned. This
assertion does not hold up however due to the Jaguar
licensed- production being cancelled at roughly the same
time. [194] Other considerations include the Soviet Mig-25R
replacing the OK Canberra as the primary reconaissance
aircraft and the Soviet AN-32 replacing the Dakotas and
Packets as the primary transport capability.
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In the Army there appears to be a lessening of
diversification. Previously the Indian Army's tank procure-
ment was balanced as is evidenced by the current inventory
cf roughly 1000 Vijayantas (Indian produced, OK design) and
1200 T54/55s. The decision to produce the T-72 effectively
ends any western input into the armored vehicle program.
Future plans include a continuing of the refitting of the
Vijayanta, gradual replacement of the obsolete T-54, produc-
tion of the T-72, and production of an indigenous tank, the
Chetak. [195] The Chetak*s initial production is currently
planned with a European engine. Moscow is holding up tech-
nology transfer of the T-72 *s spaced armor on the condition
that the Chetak 1 s power plant be Soviet. [196] The result
will te a totally Soviet oriented tank program. This trend
is fortified by the continued Indian dependence on the
Soviets for infantry vehicles. BMP licensed production is
scheduled to begin seen.
An exception to the trend in the Army is the
licensed production of the Milan. This continues a reliance
on French AT missiles. The previously produced missile was
the French SS-11. An additional exception is the ongoing
negotiations for a 155mm self- propelled (SP) howitzer. The
only howitzers reportedly under consideration have beer, the
OS M198, the Anglo-French-German FH-70, the Swedish Bcfors
FH-77E, the Canadien GCU5 and the Austrian GHN-45. [197] At
one time the sale cf the M-198 appeared complete but it
foundered on OS export laws and the unwillingness of
Secretary Schultz to give a firm commitment to New Delhi
that the Administration would waive its right to cancel the
order for political considerations. [198] In view of the
systems under consideration, a western purchase would appear
to be probable. India's current SP howitzer is the 105mm
Abbott (OK). A change in buying policy thus has not
occurred. There is not increase in diversification, only a
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continuance of past policy for this weapon type.
Nonetheless, the purchase does retain some western tech-
nology in the Army.
In the navy, the purchase of the Type 239 submarine
is the first majcr ncn-OSSR naval purchase since the 1960's.
Due to its being a licensed production, this will entail a
restructuring of India's shipbuilding. Moreover this
involves western technology, not Soviet. Currently she is
capable only of overhauling F-Class submarines, not produc-
tion. The Type 209 was chosen in competition with another
German design, Swedish, Italian, and Soviet ships. [199] The
trend towards diversification in this field appears to have
motivated the Soviets to change their 1974 stance on not
licensing production of submarines. The Soviets reportedly
offered licensed production of a nuclear submarine but were
turned down by the Indians due to Soviet technicians being
attached to the boat. [200] There was also an agreement in
December, 1982 signed by the Soviet Minister for
Shipbuilding agreeing to cooperate in the design and manu-
facture cf naval ships and patrol boats. [201]
Economically, the diversification of Indian
purchases is much mere significant. The purchase cf the
Mirage 2000 ($3 billicn) , the Type 209 ($350 million) , and
the SeaKings ($4 59 million) totals $3.8 billion. The total
purchase frcm the USSR in 1980 only totalled $1.6 billicn.
This is during a period in which the foreign exchange
reserves have been falling, the balance of trade deficit was
increasing, and India was forced to seek out the SDR 5
billion Extended Fund Facility. The disadvantage that this
posed fcr western suppliers was summarized by an Indian
defense official when he said:
"...the United States imposes too many ad hoc condi-
tions, particularly on equipment usage, spare parts and
ammunition supply. In some cases we can accept them but
not very often. In addition they are expensive. The
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Europeans do not impose such conditions but they are
pricing themselves cut of the market. " [202]
Despite all of the above, India nonetheless made a heavy-
economic commitment to the west. Diversification is clear
in mcnetary terms. It is not so clear in terms of weapons
systems.
The Soviet presence is extensive throughout the
Indian military by virtue of the equipment provided and
current production facilities set up for Soviet mili-ary
technology. The current policies have done much to further
this with zhe increased dependence on Soviet arms in the
Army and Air Force. The Naval diversification has acted to
balance that service somewhat. In view of the ccst of
western arms, the degree of Indian dependence on Soviet arms
will depend to a large degree on Indian ability to develop
an indigenous, modern, arms industry.
E. THE CASE OF IHFLOENCE
The Soviets in India have shown that they have a multi-
tude of weapons to employ in their pursuit of Soviet objec-
tives in India. In many cases, diplomatic, economic, and
security-related initiatives have been employed quite
successfully. Soviet support of Indian diplomatic objec-
tives has been chronicled. The Soviets were instrumental in
the development of the public sector in India and India's
current degree of eccnomic independence. The Soviets noted
and supported the Indian desires for production capability
of advanced equipment in both the Air Force and Army. Has
the Russian achieved the six gcals delineated at the start
of the chapter?
The CSSR has only been partially successful in excluding
Chinese influence in India. India does support the Soviet
tacked Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea and has failed to
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sclve her fccrder problem with the PRC. At the same time,
India is engaged in talks with the PRC aimed at normalizing
the Sino-Indian conflict posture. The Soviets, by increased
identification with India, have contributed to an even
closer relationship between Pakistan and China. Chinese
support for the guerrillas in Afghanistan is another
instance of increased Chinese influence in the subcontinent
due to Soviet actions.
The American presence in India proper is significantly
lower than it was in the 1960* s. This is tempered by Indian
actions over the past year designed to create a warmer rela-
tionship with the United States. Russia must also take into
consideration the heightened U.S. involvement in the Indian
Ccean and Pakistan, again caused in large parr by Soviet
actions.
The United Nations voting pattern of India in 1982 is
proof of the similarity of Indian and Soviet diplomatic
positions. Again, Soviet success in the United Nations is
somewhat moderated by Indian attempts to steer the
Nonaligned Movement en a middle course. The Indian position
towards the USSR, even in the Nonaligned Movement, still
remains much more hospitable than that displayed towards the
United States.
The Indian economy has not made any great strides
towards socialization beyond those initiated in the 1950*s.
Her econcmy remains strongly linked with the western economy
while trade with the East as a percentage of total trade,
has shewn decreases in both imports and exports over the
past decade. The political process remains committed to a
parliamentary form of government.
The Soviets have succeeded in creating a favorable
impression of the USSR in India both among the elite and the
masses. They have constructed considerable ties of a perma-
nent nature between the two countries. The economy has in
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some ways become dependent on Soviet markets. The military
is currently equipped substantially with Soviet equipment.
The Soviet diplomatic/nuclear umbrella continues to afford
India necessary protection from adverse American and Chinese
actions.
Studies of Soviet influence in India produce a surpris-
ingly negative picture of Soviet influence, considering the
political and economic capital the Soviets have expended in
India. Rajan Menon, in his study of rhe Kashmire crisis
from 1947-1966, deduced three cases of influence:
i) India's ability to contribute to the Soviet Onion's
adoption of a pro-Indian position on the Kashmir dispute
from November, 1955; ii) Moscow's impact on India's
behavior during the Hungarian crisis of 1956, and; iii)
the Soviet Onion's ability to arrange, and successfully
bring to a close, the Tashkent Conference of 1966. [203]
When studying the 1971 conflict, he again concluded three
instances of influence:
i) the Soviet Onion's ability to gain India's adherence
to a security-oriented bilateral treaty; ii) the Soviet
Onion's success in securing India's consent to joint
statements whose perspective on the East Pakistan crisis
differed in significant respects from the positions
Bublicly adopted by the Indian government; and iii) New
elhi's success in getting the OSSR to endorse the
Indian position after the outbreak of the Indo-Pakistan
war. [204]
Lastly, the Soviet economic and military programs resulted
in three additional cases of influence:
i) India's role in bringing about a reassessment cf the
negative perspective that the Soviets adopted toward the
Congress government's economic policies; ii) the impact
of the Scviet Onicn on India's behavior during the
Czechoslovak crisis; and iii) the quick re-affirmation
of India's ties with the Soviet Onion by the Janata
government that came to power as a consequence of the
Indian elections of March, 1977. [205]
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Menon's conclusions demonstrate that while the Indians are
influenced to a degree by the USSR, they in turn exhibit an
influence on the Soviet actions.
Robert Donaldson's conclusions of influence are even
less positive for the Soviets. Donaldson writes, "But in
the overwhelming majority of cases, the Soviet Union has
been rebuffed in its efforts to influence Indian behavior."
Donaldson reports that in the specific cases he studied, he
found not a single instance of influence being successfully
applied to Indian votes in the Dnitsd Nations from 1965-72.
[206]
The Soviet Onion holds a mixed bag in India. She is
seen and treated as a friend. At the same time, she has not
succeeded in placing India in a subordinate, dependency
relationship. A major advantage to the Soviet position is
that through years of recognizing and supporting Indian
goals, she has assured consideration of Soviet objectives
and aims en the part cf the Indians.
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III. 05IA- 1M BMBBGEHT POWEH?
It has become quite evident in the last two chapters
that the primary concern of the US in South Asia has been
the east-west balance cf power. Our position vis-a-vis the
USSR has set the parameters of our options and has driven
cur resultant policies. While our concern for the spread of
Soviet influence will and must continue to be a major
factor, another strategic interest is developing. This
interest, unlike the motivation to halt Soviet expansionism,
is inherent to India and South Asia. I refer to India's
emergence as a major power. India currently possesses the
world's ninth largest economy, the third largest army, the
third largest pool cf technical personnel, and is the
current chairman of the Nonaligned Movement. In addition,
she is reaching intc space, has detonated the Peaceful
Nuclear Explosion and has been projected to have an IRBM
capability ty 1990. India's capabilities are such that the
united States must enter the present and growing strength of
India intc its policy equation.
This chapter will probe the question of whether or not
India has emerged as a regional power and whether she has
the capability or potential to seriously affect superpower
actions in the Indian Ocean area. This will be done by
determining the requirements for being a regional power and
then examining India's ability to meet those requirements.
Whether a country is a regional power is a function of
its ability to pursue and achieve its national objectives.
A good starting point then would be to determine what
India's goals are. As outlined by Robert H. Donaldson,
India has five major foreign policy objectives. They are:
1. To secure herself from military threat.
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2. To secure her own independence, maintain her ncna-
lignment, and avoid undue dependence on any one
outside power.
3. Tc insulate the Indian Ocean from great power mili-
tary activity.
4. To promote the maintenance of friendly (preferably
democratic) governments, free of outside dominance,
in neighboring stares.
5. To receive material assistance, on the most favorable
terms, in the development of her economy. [207]
It is obvious that the achievement of the above goals
concerns not only the military capabilities of India, but
also her ability to assert herself diplomatically, both on a
regional and a global basis. Her internal stability and
economic strength are further measures of power status.
A. IHDIA'S BILITABY CAPABILITY
India's ability to secure herself from external threat
has grown significantly. Writing in 1978, Stephen Cohen and
Bichard Park assert:
India's military power, even at its weakest may be more
than adequate for certain regional relationships, and
its potential power, even at its greatest, may be inade-
quate fcr confrontations with a superpower. [208]
A review cf India's military forces support the validity of
Cohen and Park's assessment.
1 • The Indian A rmy
India's army is composed of 944,000 men. The force
structure consists cf two armored divisions, 18 infantry
divisions, 11 mountain divisions, 5 independent armored
brigades, 7 independent infantry brigades, a parachute
brigade, 17 independent artillery brigades, and about 20
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anti-aircraft regiments. Indian army equipment includes 78
T-72 main battle tanks, 950 T-54/55 main battle tanks, 1,100
Vijayanta main battle tanks, BMP-1 armored fighting vehi-
cles, 7C0 OT-62/64 and BTR 50/60 armored personnel carriers
and artillery ranging from 75mm pack howitzers to 105mm
self-propelled howitzers. [209] India also has 200,00
reserve troops, 200,000 paramilitary forces and one million
home guards who are all drilled with military weapons and in
military formations. [210] Some of these formations such as
the Border Security Force are formed into units identical to
infantry battalions with their own supporting artillery
battalions. There also exist three ax-servicement units, a
national cadet corps, a territorial army and a national
volunteer force which together number in excess of 500,000.
[211] India fields quite an impressive number of soldiers,
equipment, and tactical formations.
When India's force structure is compared to her most
likely enemy, Pakistan, both a quantitative and qualitative
advantage in India's favor is obvious. There is a 2:1
manpower ratio in India's favor. There also exists a 2:
1
ratio of tanks in India's favor. The qualitative difference
is apparent when comparing the M48A5, Pakistan's most modern
tank, with the T-72, India's most modern tank. [212] While
Pakistan has contracted with the OS for a direct purchase of
100 MU8A5's, [213] the Indians have contracted to license
produce 600 T-72's. [214] Additionally India is discussing
with the USSR the license-production of the T-82 "when these
more advanced versions are available." [215]
When compared to the PRC there is no massive imba-
lance in numbers of total troop formations and equipment as
there was with Pakistan. India did constitute 10 mountain
divisions after the 1962 debacle and has a vastly improved
capability on its northern border. A major consideration in
balancing India's capability against that of the PRC's is
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China's ccmmitments against Vietnam and the USSR. Also the
relative ease of shifting forces from east to west (and
vice-versa) across the Gangetic Plain when compared to the
Chinese lateral movement ability in Tibet is a factor in
India's favor. Both forces would encounter difficulties
from the terrain in the immediate battle area. The diffi-
culty of the terrain in the east in Arunachel Pradesh was
demonstrated in the 1962 war when the Indians had a six day
forced march from the furthest point traversable by trucks
at Tawang to the Indian forward positions at the Thag La
Bidge. [216] India has improved the road network in both the
Arunachal Pradesh and the Ladakh areas since 1962, but it is
still a very rudimentary system. India's real advantage
lies in its ability to move forces to the general area of
the conflict and then support those forces through much
shorter supply lines. The Karakoram highway was opened
through the Khunjareb Pass in Azad Kashmir in 198 2 [217] and
thus provides a route for Chiness troops -co flank Indian
troops in Kashmir. This must be tempered by the fact that
, it traverses extremely difficult terrain and, as is true of
any mountain highway, it could easily be interdicted.
2- Indian Air Force
India's Air Force is even more impressive when
compared to her potential adversaries. India possesses 635
combat aircraft in service which compares to 219 combat
aircraft for the Pakistanis. A comparison of type aircraft
shows a greater disparity in quality be-ween the air forces
than was demonstrated in the armies. India currently has in
its inventory the MIG-21/M/Bis, the Hunter F56/56A, the HF24
Marut, the MIG-23, the MIG-25, the HAL Gnat Mark 2 Ajeet,
the Jaguar, and the Harrier. The Hunter F56/56A and HF 24
Marut are being phased out and are being replaced by the
Jaguar and HAL Ajeet respectively. [218] The Jaguar purchase
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initially totalled 150 planes of which 40 were direct
purchase, 45 were assembled and the remainder were to be
license produced. [219] Although the production stage has
apparently been cancelled, additional Jaguars are being
considered for assembly in India. [220] The Indians also
purchased the Mirage 2000 in a deal similar to the Jaguar
purchase. Again it involved 150 aircraft of which 40 were
direct purchase, and 110 will be assembled/manufactured in
India. These aircraft will be equipped with the latest
"French Air Force standard Mirage avionics and armament."
[221] Other aircraft coming into tha inventory include the
MIG-23 and the MIG-27. India has contracted for licenced
production of both of these aircraft. The licensed produc-
tion of the Mig-27 is for about 150 aircraft. [222]
The Pakistani Air Forced Mirage Ill's, Mirage 5's
and MIG-19's are not only outnumbered but are quite clearly
qualitatively inferior. The Pakistani purchase of 40 F-16's
[223] does give Pakistan a new capability which worries
India. This capability is offset by the much larger
purchases of the air defense version of the Mirage 2000,
Jaguars, MIG-23's, MIG-25's, and MIG-27's. A similar
quality gap applies to the PRC air force when it is compared
to the Indian Air Force. Most of its aircraft consist of
MIG-17's and MIG-19's. [224] Of China's 5000 combat
aircraft, 4000 ar Mig-17/19's. It has only 80 MIG-21's and
some F-9 fighters. This qualitative difference is also
coupled with the Indian ability to deploy greater numbers of
aircraft where they would affect any potential Sino-Indian
confrontation. The Indians could use all of northern India
with its well-developed logistics base. The Chinese would
be forced to employ their forces in a much less developed




India has managed to build the most significant
naval force in the littoral countries of the Indian Ocean as
the table below indicates. [225] The Vikrant, India's
aircraft carrier completed a complete overhaul on 3 Jan 1982
that is designed to give the ship an additional 10-year
life-span. It is currently being outfitted with the Sea
TABLE XII









India Australia Indonesia Iran Pak SAfr
1 1
1 2
2 3 3 10
24 8 10 4 2
3 4
19 6 12 16 7
8 6 4 12 3
55 18 20 23 HQ 12
Harrier VTOL. Many cf the Navy's destroyers, frigates and
fast attack craft are under 10 ysars of age and carry
surface to air missiles and ship to ship missiles. [226]
India, with its destroyers, frigates, submarines and
aircraft carrier is capable of a forward defense. A major
naval base is being developed at Port Blair in the Andaman
Islands. It is in a position to command the Molacca Straits
and makes India's capability a strategic concern to all
nations traversing the Indian Ocean. [227] Gary Sojka in his
article maintains that the Indian navy has developed a
deterrent capability towards the littoral nations, but not
the capability to deter superpower activity in the Indian
Ocean. The Indian navy is capable of defense of its coastal
waters and territory except under a major attack by one of
the superpowers. It can exercise sea control against the
littoral navies. This was damonstrated in the 1971
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Indo -Pakistan War when India's navy successfully bottled up
the Pakistani navy. India is also able to establish a pres-
ence around the Indian Ocean through its navy.
Significantly for the superpowers, the inclusion of Indian
forces on one side or the other in a superpower confronta-
tion would require a recomputation of force requirements by
the superpower. [228]
**• Indian Defense Prod uctio n
An advantage which India enjoys when compared to her
neighbors is her defense production capability. Of all the
littoral states and China, only China has a defense produc-
tion industry comparable to India's. India has achieved
near self-sufficiency in small arms and ordnance. In the
Industrial Policy Statement of 1948, eighteen crucial
sectors of industry, including defense were reserved for the
government. Today approximately H0% of all industrial
assets in the country are state owned or directed. India's
defense production complex is now the second largest sector
of the industrial economy. Its turnover in 1979 was $1.33
billion. [229]
The defense production base, run by the Ministry of
Defense (MOD) , includes the Department of Research and
Development (DRD) . DRD is responsible for the Defense
Research and Development Organization (DRDO) which controls
35 laboratories and establishments. The second major orga-
nization in the MOD dealing with the defense industrial
complex is the Department of Defense Production (DDP) . It
controls the nine Defense Public Sector Undertakings (DPSU)
and the more than 30 Ordnance Factories in service. [230]
Major Indian licensed-production agreements include




Bajor Licensed- Production Agreements
Country Type Equipment Date
OSSE MIG-21 PL fighter 1964
USSR MIG-21 H fighter 1969
OSSE HIG-21 Bis 1976
OK HAL Gnat Mark 1 fighter 1956
OK HAL Gnat Mark 2 "Aieet" fighter 1972
OK HAL HS-748 Series 1 and 2 Transport 1959
OK HAL HS-748 MF Transport 1971
OK Jaguar 1976
OSSE AN-32 Cline Transport 1979
OSSE MIG-23 1980
OSSE MIG-27 1983
FB HAL Alouette III (SA-316B Chetak) 1962
FB HAL SA-315 Cheetah Helicopter 1970
OSSE HAL K-13A Atoll AAM 1964
FB Bharat SS-11 ATM 1970
FB Hatra B-55 Magic AAM 1977
OK Vilayanta Medium Battle TAnk 1965
OSSE T-72 Main Battle Tank 1982
CZ OT-62 Armored Personnel Carrier 1970
OSSE BMP Infantry Fighting Vehicle 1983
OK Leander Class Frigate 1965
FBG Type 209 Submarine 1980
A general characteristic of the licensed production agree-
ments is that they are phased. A direct purchase of the
equipment takes care of short-term defense requirements.
This is accompanied by an initial phase involivng assembly
of majcr components in India. This in turn is followed by
gradual manufacture cf the components in India. This indi-
genization of the product has experienced varying degrees
cf success as an overall policy. The HAL HS-748 transport
aircraft never got past the assembly stage. [ 232 ] Conversely
the MIG-21FL achieved an 80 58 indigenous content. [233] The
Vjayanta tank moved from an indigenous content of 60% in
1972 to 95X in 1975. [234] The HAL Alouette III/SA-316B
Chetak and the HAL SA-315 Cheetah helicopters achieved
indigenous production rates of 93% that included reexport cf
components to the licenser. [235] India's most significant
achievement in the naval arena was the construction of six
Leander Class frigates at the Mazagon Docks in Bombay. This
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project achieved an indigenous rate of 53%. [236] Wizh the
licensed production cf the Type 209 submarine, India will be
branching out into yet another field of licensed production.
In addition to India's licensed production, she has
pursued a vigorous indigenous design program. Indigenously
designed eguipment includes the HF-24 Marut 1 and 2
aircraft, the HJT 16 Mark 1 Kiran, the Mark II Seaward
Defense Boat and a 105mm tewed howitzer. A major ongoing
project is the Chetak main battle tank which will have
spaced armor, special ammunition and a 122mm rifled gun.
The Chetak is expected to commence trials at the end of
1983. [237] Additionally India is working on a light combat
aircraft for 19 90, a light observation helicopter, laser
guided missiles (AAM, ASM, SAM), and, solid and liquid
propellents. [238] The Godavari Class frigates currently
under construction at the Mazagon Docks are probably the
signal achievement of India's indigenous research and devel-
opment program. Using the same Indian propulsion system as
the Leander Class, they are 25% larger with a 20% increase
in deck space and are actually faster than the Leander
Class. [239] India is also moving forward in avionics, tank
fire control systems, metallurgy and radar.
All of the above shows remarkable progress for India
from the levels of 1947 when all India possessed was a
limited ability to produce some ammunition and military
supplies such as uniforms. The advantages afforded India
through its program of self-sufficiency ware evident as
early as 1965 when the OS arms embargo crippled the
Pakistanis while causing far less problems for the Indians.
There do exist several limitations to India's self-
sufficiency in arms production. When one notes all of the
weapons systems listed in S ipri as indigenously designed or
license produced, ycu notice that not a single all-Indian
major weapons system has gone into production. [240] India
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has yet tc place a :et engine into production. The HF-24
Mark 2 for example went out of production prior to the prob-
lems with the engine being solved. [241] The Chetak MBT
mentioned earlier will have to initially be fielded with an
imported engine due to the indigenous engine having only
achieved a 350Kw rating. Its planned rating is 1125Kw.
[242]
The failure to be able to put into production
state-of-the-art aircraft, missiles and armored vehicles has
resulted in India having to spend foreign exchange reserves
to procure foreign technology. With India's defense budget
totalling only 3.8% cf the GNP, any diversion of resources
for direct purchases or licensed production is bound to cut
into the resources available for research and development.
[243] As it stands only 2% of the defense budget is allo-
cated for research and development. Even when this is
combined with DPSO R+D funds, this remains well below the
R+D levels of the major arms exporting nations which set the
standard for the state-of-the-art. [244] If one accepts the
old adage that one must spend money to make money, India
will have to dramatically increase the amount of money it is
spending en R+D if it hopes to achieve the goal of self-
sufficiency at a technology level egual to the European
middle pewers. It will most assuredly have to exceed expen-
ditures levels such as the budget allocated to the Gas
Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE - holds primary respon-
sibility for developing aero-engines) which had a total
budget of $24 million from 1961-1978. [245]
5 . Power Projection z. India 1 s IRBM
India has the abiliity to protect her territorial
integrity when compared to potential regional rivals. There
are two areas however where India is demonstrably inferior
to not only to the superpowers but also the PRC. Firstly,
100

India does not possess the ability to pro j act significant
power beyond the immediate periphery of her territory.
Secondly, tha lack of an Indian nuclear force precludes
India frcm total parity in dealing with the US, USSR or the
FRC.
India does net possess an amphibious marine force.
[246] The transport capability of the Indian Air Force is
limited as are railway nets out of the country. This lack
of power projection capability can be redressed through the
development of an IREM with nuclear capabilities. This is
an achievement that India is well on her way towards through
programs that are professed to be civilian-usage oriented.
The 18 July 1980 launch of the Rohini I satellite
marked India's entry into an exclusive club; they became the
sixth nation to orbit a satellite using an indigenous launch
vehicle. [247] The SLV-3 four stage, solid-fuel rocket made
its unsuccessful maiden flight on 10 Aug 1979. By the
following July it had been perfected to the point where it
was able to put the 35kg Rohini I into near-earth orbit.
The Rohini II was placed into orbit in 1981 for 9 days. The
PSLV, designed to place a 1000kg payload into a 900 km polar
sunsynchronous orb it is expected to be operational by 19 87.
[248] The head of India's launch vehicle development
program, Dr. Abdul Kalam, declared that by 1990, India will
be able to position a 2500kg communications satellite into
geosynchronous orbit at 36,000km. [249] While the Indian
leadership has consistantly asserted that the Department of
Space's activities are nonmilitary, the Chairman of the
Space Commission and Secretary to the Government in the
Department of Space, Professor Satish Dhawan, asserted in
1979 that the SLV-3 could be converted into an IRBM with a
range of approximately 1500 kilometers. [250] Elkin and
Fredericks assert in their article that if India were to
make the prerequisite decisions to develop nuclear weapons
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and a missile delivery system, she could have an IRBM force
by the end of the decade. [251] A decision to do so however
will require significantly higher expenditures than the
$70.3 million per annum programmed in the 1989-1985 Sixth
Plan. [252]
In addition to the obvious increase in the ability
to project force, the government of India will gain ether
military advantages from its satellite program. Even if
India should decide net to develop a nuclear strike capa-
bility, she will gain in command and control capabilities,
reconaissance and weather forecasting.
The other half of the nuclear force is the abiliity
to put together a nuclear weapon. With Indian detonation
of the 10-15kt Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE) en 18 May
1974, India became the sixth nation to have exploded a
nuclear device. [253] India's motivation for detonating the
PNE were mixed; two rationales are clearly discernable. One
rationale relates tc the present security threat posed by
the PRC and Pakistan while the other concerns the political
advantages vis-a-vis the superpowers.
While the public debate was triggered by the Chinese
detonation of 1964, many saw the opportunity to press
for a weapon which would establish Indian strategic
superiority over Pakistan once and for all. Later, and
more subtly, it became clear that nuclear weapons could
be put to another use; as part of a more general
campaign to restore India to a postition of regional and
gloabl influence. This became the dominant motif in
Indian strategic thinking. In this case, the "target"
was neither China nor Pakistan but the United States and
the USSR, and the objective was not military deterrence
but political influence. [254]
Without a nuclear capability India is forced tc seek
external assistance in order to counter-balance a potential
foe's nuclear capability. This was most evident in 1971.
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As the Eangladesh crisis developed, India found itself
increasingly diplomatically isolated. The United States
signalled by its announcement on 15 July 1971 of Kissenger's
trip tc China that the US could not be counted on as a
counterweight to China. [255] With Pakistan receiving
limited military aid from the US while at the same time
pressing China for a commitment to intervene if India
attacked, India needed a protector against possible Chinese
action. The fear of an emerging Washirgton-Islamabad-Peking
axis aligned against India, resulted in the Soviet-Indian
Treaty cf Friendship of 1971, signed on 9 August 1971.
Would India have needed the Treaty of Friendship if the PRC
did net possess a nuclear capability? [256] The ease with
which India won the 1971 Indo-Pak war and the weather condi-
tions in the Himalayas during the conflict would very
quickly guestion any assertion that China could have
affected the war with conventional forces to any significant
degree. India needed to counterbalance the nuclsar strength
of the PRC not its conventional arm. The need for a nuclear
capability was reiterated in the same war when Task Force
74, headed by the aircraft carrier Enterprise, steamed into
the Bay cf Bengal the day before Dacca fell. Van Hollen
cites K. Subrahmanyam, an Indian defense analyst as saying
"had India possessed nuclear weapons, the Enterprise would
not have steamed into the Bay of Bengal during the
Indian-Pakistan war in what appeared from New Delhi to
constitute atomic gunboat diplomacy." [257]
Indian motivations would appear to still have two
streams cf rationales although their balance is shifting.
India continues to need the nuclear capability to insure the
superpowers taking her seriously. This is most evident in
the Indian Ocean where the US presence has not only
continued but has grown in its size and permanance since
1974. If India is to ever succeed in achieving the
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objective of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace, she must be able
to provide the superpower navies an incentive to leave and
also the assurance of being able to maintain stability in
the area.
The rationale for nuclear development encountered
most often is the need for a deterrent force against
Pakistan. India views with alarm the ongoing nuclear
program in Pakistan. Sources close to the Indian Defense
Ministry stated that Pakistan may be about to explode a
bomb. Members of the parliamentary consultative committee
attached to the Ministry of Defense asserted that Pakistan
was 2/3s of the way tc completion of an atomic bomb. [258]
The Indian Express in editorializing about two seminars on
India's security environment and nuclear options stated that
"just as in conventional so in nuclear weapons, India must
maintain a telling superiority over Pakistan, and for the
same reason, deterrence." Earlier in the same article when
referring to the seminars, it cited "a second point of near
unanimity was that should Pakistan go nuclear, no party and
no government in India would be able to resist the demand
that India must go nuclear too." [259] The seminars in ques-
tion were attended by academics, politicians and senior
retired military. The cross-cutting nature of the second
guote is substantiated by the Patriot (a widely read, far-
left paper), in an editorial where it substantially states
that if Pakistan goes nuclear, so must India. [260]
It is apparent that the lack of a nuclear capability
in the past has severely limited India's options both as a
global actor in her relationships with the US and the USSR
and as a regional actor in her intsraction with China and
Pakistan. What then are India's policy and capabilities?
Have they changed since the 1971 War? Is she still hostage
to the nuclear threat?
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India initially forcefully maintained that her
research and development of nuclear energy was totally
peaceful in intent. [261] This has been modified in Prime
Minister Gandhis statements. On 13 March 1980, in response
to questions, she stated in the Rajya Sabha:
India was committed to the peaceful use of nuclear
energy, but would not hesitate to undertake explosions
or implosions if such were "in the national interest."
...India must make an in-depth study of programs in
neighboring countries. [262]
In July 1980, speaking before the Lok Sabha she reaffirmed
India's commitment to the development of nuclear energy,
regardles cf problems in procuring fuel and heavy water, and
indicated the government was planning for self-sufficiency
in the nuclear field. She said the government was not
considering a PNE at the time but that "we shall go ahead
with it if it is believed to be necessary. [263]
As of December 1980 India had three nuclear
powerplants in operation and another five in various stages
cf construction. Construction is expected to be completed
by 198U at which tine nuclear generating capacity will be
1,684 megawatts or 4K of India's electrical power. [264]
India's goal is to have 10,000 megawatts of nuclear derived
energy by the end of the century. [265] India also has oper-
ational two spent fuel reprocessing plants and four heavy
water plants. [266] Her first plutonium-based fast breeder
test reactor is 9056 complete and is expected to become oper-
ational in 1983. [267^ A third nuclear reprocessing plant is
being designed for construction at Kalpakkam. [268] Heavy
water production, one of the shortcomings of India's nuclear
program, [269] is scheduled to double with the solving of
technical problems and additional plants. [270 ] Proposed
reacter construction includes two units at Narora of 235
megawatts each, [271] and four additional new atomic power
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plants of 235 megawatts each (later to be converted to 500
megawatts). [272] India has developed the ability to produce
nuclear fuel at the Nuclear Fuel Complex where the entire
process from raw material tc completed fuel bundles is
performed. [273] The current production level of 100 tons is
to be raised to 200 tons annually. [274] The above listed
capabilities demonstrate a diversified base in India that
includes plant design, fuel processing and fuel enrichment
capability. In comparing India's nuclear base to China's,
Onkar Marwah notes that 1) India builds its own commercial
power stations while China dees not, 2) India completed
Asia's largest (and first indigenous) variable energy cyclo-
tron while China contracted in 1979 for one from the US, and
3) India has begun the construction of the first "Tokamak"
machine for fusion experiments in the Third World. [275]
The PNE attested to India's ability to put together
a nuclear device. Her increasing experience in working with
nuclear energy and the developing design base indicate an
ability to "go nuclear" if India should so decide. When
coupled with the progress being made in space research,
India has a vary credible potential for creating a strategic
nuclear force capable of threatening the Indian Ccean
littoral and Asian land mass.
If the political decision is made to develop a
nuclear force of a strategic nature, a major appropriation
of funds will be necessary. India's expenditure for
research, design and development in the Government
Department of Atomic Energy from 1969 to 1974 (the PHE) was
$173 million. [276] Cne paper at the above seminar used the
French "Frappe de Force" as an example for determining the
cost to India of developing a strategic strike force of its
own. The paper points out:
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Between 1955-1980 Prance spent approximately US $20,000
million to achieve a force of approximately 120 stra-
tegic, launchers and was expecxea to spend $4 billion
more in 198 1 alone. In completing its programme for
this fcrc€ through 1995, France will end up with a bill
of $60,000 million. To achieve a similar nuclear capa-
bility. India would need to spend the equipvalent of$75,000 million in the next 15 years because it would
have to start from a lower technological base. This
means the budget fcr nuclear defense alone for the next
Even a force designed just to match thax of the PRC's would
incur a significant expenditure.
Does India have the capacity to double her defense
budget? If one looks at the defease budget as a percentage
of the GAP, a historical example of India doubling her
defense budget percentage is apparent. In 1961 the expendi-
ture level was 1.9% and in 1963 it was 3.8%. It gradually
decreased through 1970 to 3- 0* until 1971 and 1972 when it
jumped back up to 3.7*. By 1982 this had reached a level of
3.7%. The 1961-1963 increase, while showing a doubling in
expenditures, must be viewed from the perspective that it
was an exceptionally low expenditure level to bagin with.
Another aspect tc consider is that a strategic nuclear arm
would also have to compete for defense funds with the
conventional forces. The defense budget is already under-
going an expansion due to the massive amounts of aircraft,
armored vehicles and naval vessels being purchased to
modernize the conventional arm. In 1982/83 the defense
budget was raised to Es51,000 million, a 20% increase. [278]
This initial budget was raised by an additional Rs2,500
million. The 1983-64 budget is Rs59,710 million and is
expected to rise. [279] This amounts to a 13.5% increase
over 1982-83. This compares to inflation rates of 12% and
10% for 1982 and 1983 respectively. [280] The increases in
the defense budget thus show that real growth is already
occurring. The 15.9% increase in the government investment
107

in the public sector for 1982-83 illustrates the point that
there will be increasing demands on limited resources from
non-defense sectors also. [281]
The demand on government funds is apparent in the
mid-term appraisal of the Sixth Plan carried out by the
Planning Commission and presented to Parliament by the
Commission Deputy Chairman and Planning Minister S. B.
Chavan. The thrust ct the report was that the country* s tax
base will have to be expanded (although no specific target
areas were mentioned) in order to support a lower expendi-
ture level. The appraisal said that the recommended expan-
sion of the tax base should go hand in hand with a
significant curb in the current consumption expenditure of
the government. It is quoted as saying, "...some economy in
Government's current consumption expenditure will be neces-
sary both to achieve the maximum possible in physical terms
in the Sixth Plan ard to establish a firm basis for the
Seventh Plan." [282] It is apparent then that the Planning
Commission, responsible for development of the Central
Governments economic plans, is seeking a shrinking of
government expenditures. This is the exact opposite of what
would fce needed to develop a strike force.
The combination of expanding conventional expendi-
ture and a doubling cf expenditures to support a strategic
force would require the Indian government to engage in
either extensive deficit financing or expand its rax base.
This is further reinforced when major non-defense needs such
as $33 billion fcr the oil program are considered. Deficit
financing is already a fact with the 1981-82 central deficit
totalling BS1539 crore and the 1982-83 deficit equalling
Rs1375 crcre. [283] There is a real question as to whether
India can expand her tax base significantly over and above
the levels the Planning Commission is already calling for.
The states have jurisdiction over the land and on
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agricultural income. [284] This provides 40 to 45* of the
national income. Vested interests in the states exert pres-
sure on the states net to excercise their jurisdiction and
at the same time fight any move that would revert control to
the union government. An attempt to tax the private indus-
trial sector more heavily would run counter to the current
program aimed at revitalizing that sector in order to make
it mere competitive en the international market. [285] If
these two sectors are ruled out as sources for increasing
the tax case, one for political reasons and one for economic
policy reasons, there remains little else to atsorb a
significant expansion of the tax rate.
A review of India's space program and atomic energy
program has shown that India possesses the technical capa-
bility to develop and field both a nuclear weapon and a
delivery vehicle. A review of the financial aspects of
developing a strategic nuclear capability illustrates that
it would impese a tremendous fiscal burden on India should
she opt for development. This negative aspect must be
weighed along with the opprobrium that India would surely
suffer in the international forum if she were to adopt such
a course. In the opposite corner however stands the
increased stature that India would gain in the international
arena and her ability to strike a more independent path free
of the need for superpower nuclear umbrellas (except in a
confrontation with a superpower) . The primary motivation to
"go nuclear" or not however will be Pakistani nuclear
program. A Pakistari bomb would most definitely make the
Indians swallow the financial costs in order to retain her
territorial integrity and regional dominance.
Currently, interaction with India need only take
into account a nuclear potential combined with a delivery
potential. A farsighted policy will realize that these
potentialities are going tc grow regardless of India's
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decision tc go nuclear or not, based on her non-military
exploitation of space and nuclear energy. There exists in
these potentials the ability for India to move from a mere
regional power to one capable of having extra-regional
influence.
E. THE ECOHOHI AS A SOURCE OF IHTER RATIONAL POWER
Indian goal of regional dominance and eventual extra-
ragional influence is directly dependent on the soundness of
the Indian economy. International power is based on the
economy in three ways: 1) the size of the military-
industrial complex and its ability to absorb the loss of
military industrial imports, 2) the extent to which control
of consumption and domestic production can offset lost
access tc imported focd, and 3) the extent to which trade
relationships minimize dependence on major powers. The
previous section addressed the question of the ongoing drive
for self-sufficiency in the military-industrial complex.
The problem of resource availability and allocation was
shown tc te a basic consideration for both arms procurement
and research and development. This section will address the
two subjects of Indian agricultural indepsndence and
India's ability to avoid undue economic dependence on any
one source.
1 • Indian Tra de repen d enc e
Indian image of being an international mendicant is
neither accurate nor is it a sound basis for developing
policy. India's economy is the world's ninth largest and
ranks thirteenth in industrial output. [286] The GNP
increased 842% between 1950-51 and 1977-78. Industrial
output increased five-fold in the same period. [287] In
1978, India's 1,187,5C0 engineers and scientists and 419,000
110

technicians [288] gave her the third largest poDl of scien-
tists and technicians in the world. India's population
density relative to cropland, even ax the forecasted level
of 1.4 billion is less than present-day West Germany and
one-third that of Japan. India*s educational and research
facilities include 108 universities organized along British
lines, nine institutions of national importance and ten
institutions deemed as universities. India has available
for the training of high-level engineers and technologists,
five Institutes of Technology, the Indian Institute of
Science in Bangalore, and 89 other institutions offering
post graduate and research courses. [289]
The compound annual rate of growth has averaged
27.396 for petroleum products, 21.1% in aluminum ingots,
18.6% in diesel engines, and 8.7% in steel and cement.
India can make its own machinery for steel plants, ferti-
lizer plants, and refineries. India is nearly self-
sufficient in railway lccomotives and produced 9,220
railcars in the first eight months of 1982-83. [290] Motor
vehicles are 90% locally produced. The production rate of
vehicles is targeted to reach 100,000 vehicles in 1988.
[291]
The above achievements have been accomplished
through a largely indigenous effort. Nonalignment and
nationalism contributed to a policy that emphasized self-
sufficiency and independence of action over rapid, inexpen-
sive development. Selig Harrison summarizes:
Measured by nationalist standards, public sector indus-
trial development often takes clear preference, despite
a record of relative inefficiency, because it lends
itself to a greater degree of national control than
private sector development as well as a greater eventual
Sayoff in the state power needed for national security,
t symbolizes national progress, equally shared, as
against unbalanced development in which disparities in
wealth multiply. It is seen as a pillar of self-
reliance and independence. [292]
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India has been very successful in retaining national control
of her economy. Through 1977 India signed roughly 5,200
foreign collaboration agreements that provided for tech-
nology transfer. [293] India has managed to control develop-
ment of her petroleum resources through the Oil and Natural
Gas Commission (ONGC) . The steel, cement, and fertilizer
sectors are in the public domain and under firm national
control. This is notable considering the efforts by some
foreign governments and multinationals to gain entrance into
the steel, fertilizer and oil fields. [294] India has
succeeded in her efforts by going to other sources that
accepted public sectcr development. One of the most often
touted examples of this is the Bokaro Steel Plant. Another
method used by India has been to ban imports such as automo-
biles. This has allowed indigenous manufacturers such as
Hindustan Motors to sell products that otherwise would not
meet foreign competition. [295] Efficiency and quality have
been sacrificed to retain economic independence. This is
not tc say that all Indian products are shoddy. India is
currently an exporter of machine tools to the US, she has
launched satellites, and she is capable of nuclear design
and production. These examples attest to India's ability to
produce a high quality product.
India realizes that her development cannot take
place in a vacuum. Development of an industrial infrastruc-
true requires the importation of capital goods and tech-
nology. The operation of the industrial plant once
established requires high levels of energy input. This in
turn requires India to maintain an active export program in
crder tc earn the hard currencies necessary to purchase
imports. India's trade patterns over the past decade indi-
cate that she has been able to maintain a diversified market
for her exports. Similarly, she has not developed a depen-




Sources of Indian Imports by Percentage
Country 1970- 71 1975- 76 1979-•80 1981-82
OS 28 24 10 10
Canada 07 04 02 02
EEC 20 21 24 22
ESCAP 11 11 15 17
OPEC 08 22 26 29
East Europe (w/ 14 11 12 11
OSSB)
USSR 06 06 09 09
Others 13 06 10 08
TABLE XT
Indian Export Markets by Percentage
Country 1S70-71 1975-76 1979-80 1981-82
OS 14 13 13 11
Canada 02 01 01 01
EEC 18 21 27 20
ESCAP 25 22 23 20
OPEC 07 16 11 12
East Europe (w/ 24 17 13 23
OSSB
OSSR 14 10 10 19
Others 11 11 12 13
TABLE X?I
Percentages of Overall Indian Trade
Country 1S70- 71 1975- 76 1979-•8 1981-82
OS 21 19 11 11
Canada 05 03 02 02
EEC 19 21 25 21
ESCAP 17 16 18 18
OPEC 07 19 20 22
East Europe (w/ 19 14 12 15
OSSB)
OSSR 10 08 09 12
Others 12 08 11 10
113

India* s trade in relation to the superpowers shows
the OS percentage of trade declining by half while trade
with the USSR increased. The open courting of American
business that took place during PM Gandhis trip to the OS
along with the liberalized import policy together should act
to arrest the current decline in Indo-US trade. [296]
Economic analysts also question how viable further increases
in Indc-Scviet trade would be. They point to a growing
incompatibility between USSR technology and quality levels,
and those reguired by a modernizing Indian indusxrial base.
The modernization of the Bokaro steel plant is pointed to as
an example. USSR credits and assistance offered for
construction of the second stage of the Bokaro complex were
turned down reportedly because Soviet technology was
inferior. [ 297
]
India does appear to have two economic dependencies;
cne specific and one general in nature. The most telling
change in Indian trade patterns over the past decade has
teen the increased trade with the OPEC nations. Indo-OPEC
trade accounted for only 7% of India's foreign trade in
1970-71. It now stands at 22%. India's annual oil import
requirement is currently 15. 4 million tons of crude oil and
6.13 million tons of petroleum products. [298] Current
production capability is 14.52 million tons. [299] In 1982
9.5 millicn tons of the import requirement came from Iran,
Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. [300] This equals thirty-two
percent of India's current total crude oil requirement
(including indigenous production). This dependency has been
somewhat offset by an increase in exports to OPEC and remit-
tances sent to India by Indian laborers in those nations.
Exports nonetheless are outpaced by imports by roughly a
4:1 ratio. [301] India has diversified her oil purchases
somewhat by contracting with the USSR for 2.5 million tons
in 1982 and 4.75 million tons in 1983. [302] India's depen-
dence on Mid-East oil remains high.
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The other dependency India is developing is for
western technology. Indian goods must be able to compete on
the world market if India is to ever enjoy a favorable
balance cf trade. The quickest route to competitiveness is
through technology importation. Prime Minis-er Gandhi
states, "It (Indian industry) must ultimately be competitive
and that is why we have liberalized imports, improved our
procedures and made it easier for licenses to be granted."
[303] A drawback of the liberalized import policy is the
short-term increase in the balance of payments deficit.
Dependence on technology transfer has an additional draw-
back. If technology can and is imported, that removes the
incentive to develop an indigenous research and development
infrastructure. Currently 0.695 of India's GNP is spent on
research and development. Sixty percent of this effort is
geared towards space, defense and nuclear energy. It has
been projected that a level of 2.5% is needed in order to
address Indian future needs. [304]
a. External Assistance
The massive development program of the past
thirty-five years cculd not be solely financed by Indian
capital. Extensive borrowing was and still is necessary.
In November 1981 India took out a loan of SDR 5 billion from
the International Monetary Fund in order to address balance
of payment problems. The decision on India's part to draw
only SDR1200 million cf its allotted SDR1500 million as the
third installment of the 3-year IMF loan, would seem to
auger well for India's overall financial status. [305] When
this is combined with an upsurge in foreign exchange
reserves, [306] it would seem India's import policy is
improving and her need for future loans would diminish.
This dees not appear however to be the case. In a 27 August
1982 editorial the Indian Express predicted trade deficits
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by 1984 reaching $9 billion due to the global recession,
uncompetitiveness of Indian exports, domestic supply
constraints, and the import policy. This will result in a
need for $11 billion in external aid in order to stave off
bankruptcy. [307] A year later Far Eastern Econ omic R evie w
echoed this sentiment when it reported that "It is doubtful
whether India can narrow its trade gap (56£ of total exports
in 1982-63) substantially by the end of 1985 when the IMF
loan will have run out. It is estimated that India's repay-
ment burden will rise sharply after 1985 and it will have to
find US$10- 12 billion to meet the repayment and interest
obligations by the end of the decade. [308]
India continues to seek loans at concessional
rates. Estimated aid utilization for 1982-83 is reflected
below. The aid figures are listed as Rupees crores.
TABLE ZTII

















As of January 1982, India had at tha World Bank
requests totalling $5 billion for 36 different projects.
[309] The World Bank commitment for 1983 is $2.2 billion.
[310]
India 1 s various lean agreements indicate a
broad-based attitude towards loan usage. Uses include
importation of needed technology and management, purchases
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of capital goods, assistance in establishing industries, and
providing capital fcr lending agencies. A profile of
external assistance to India as recorded in Foreign
Broadcast Information Service for 19 82 is listed in Table
XVIII.
TABLE XYIII
1982 External Assistance Usage
Ccuntry Amcunt Use
FRG RS 200 million Drilling Vessel
Japan Rs 440 million Telecommunication
Expansion, Railways
World Rs 2,800 million Agricultural Refinance
and Development
EanJc Corporation for the
purpose of
agricultural projects
OK Rs 1,900 million 1.000 megawatt power
station
world $200 nillion Expand oil refineries
Eank
USSR Rs 960 million Double coal production
World Rs 2,250 million Rural electrification
Bank
IFC Rs 640 million Man-made fiber expansion
Italy $13 million Import agricultural
machines, fertilizer,
trucks and chemicals






Japan Rs 1,260 million
Japan
(grant)
Rs 1 . 7 million
USSR i




The energy program is directly linked to India's
oil dependence, the need for balance of payment support, and
the need for western technology. An examination of India's
oil development program would serve to illustrate how India
deals with the question of retaining economic independence
while attaining needed production levels. It will also
serve to measure India's potential for solving the double
problem of oil dependency and redressing the balance of
payments deficit. As stated earlier India currently imports
15.4 million tons of crude oil and 6.13 million tons of
petroleum products. This accounts for roughly 40% of her
imports. [311] Oil imports pose several problems for India.
They consume extensive amounts of scarce foreign exchange
and the inability to purchase more leads to energy short-
ages. Tte ripple effect this has was illustrated when the
Nangel Fertilizer and Heavy Water Production plan had to be
closed down due to a power shortage. [312] This in turn
affected both atomic energy output and agricultural
production.
India's policy for gaining energy independence
is based on indigenous productions goals of 60.5 million
tons ty 1990 and 100 million tons by 2005. [313] Production
in 1982-83 was 24 million tons. [314] The Oil and Natural
Gas Ccmisission (ONGC) has drawn up a plan costing $33
billion to achieve the production goals. The goals are
based on a hydrocarbon reserve of 15 billion tonnes of which
7.7 billion must be converted from theoretical reserves into
reserves. [315] The ten-year project will require a massive
influx of capital equipment. This includes foreign
purchases of 150 new land rigs, 20 offshore rigs, 150 supply
and support vessels, and 200 well and process platforms.
[316] It has been estimated that 70% of the total outlay
118

would have to be in foreign exchange. India has gone to the
World Bank to finance the development projects. A $165.5
million lean approved in November 1982 for development of
the new Krishna Godavari Basin brought to $1 billion the
total for India's loans from the World Bank for oil develop-
ment. The soft loans being afforded by the World Bank has
allowed the CNGC and India to pursue a nationalistic devel-
opment policy. Otherwise India would be forced to deal on
more favorable terms with the multi-national oil companies.
The World Bank however is seen as changing its policy under
OS pressure to force commercial development of promising
fields such as the Godavari Basin.
India has attempted to involve foreign companies
in her oil development program under very stringent condi-
tions. In 1980 India offered 32 blocks to foreign compa-
nies. Sixty-seven companies showed interest and this was
short-listed to 34. Of these 34 only Chevron Overseas
Petroleum actually leased. The oil companies saw the selec-
tion of exploration blocks, the terms dealing with "cost
oil", the taxation of imported equipment, and taxes on the
oil itself as prohibitive. India further insisted on the
ONGC having a say in exploration and if oil was struck, the
ONGC would become a partner with 51% of the equity. In a
second round of talks initiated in August 1982, India liber-
alized its terms. These included the right for companies to
export the "profit" component cf oil produced, a reduction
of income tax from 75.05% to 56.375% (with a 15% levy on all
production as a royalty), and the opening of some blocks in
the Godavari Basin. The change in terms is seen as a result
of the World Bank*s energy loan policy realignment. [317]
Only three firms evinced any interest and none of them have
signed a contract. The ONGC has reportedly temporarily
shelved its plans for foreign involvement until the
International oil glut dissipates.
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India»s self-sufficiency drive is not limited
solely to cil. Ccal is receiving heavy emphasis as an
alternative source of fuel. Extensive investments have been
made in the coal sector- Total investment in the coal
sector increased 45 percent, 54 percent and 28 percent in
1980-81, 1981-82, and 1982-83- The coal program is running
into problems as 68 of the 133 open and under- ground
projects are behind schedule- Delays are attributed to
various reasons including difficult geo-mining conditions,
inadequate geological surveys, the absence of feasibility
studies before commencing projects, land acquisition, and
supply of capital equipment by public sector industries.
[318] Ccal production rose by 9.7 percent in 1980-81 and 9.7
percent in 1981-82. The question of power availability,
particularly in West Eengal and Bihar States is a constraint
to further increased production.
The energy program proves that India will accept
production setbacks before relinquishing control of even the
most important projects. Her use of multilateral capital
sources is an exaiple of her tactics. There remains
substantial doubt as to whether India will achieve self-
sufficiency. As a minimum, it appears a lessening of oil
dependency on OPEC is likely.
c. Economic Power?
International power was defined at the beginning
of the section as being partly based on the extent to which
trade relationships minimize dependence on major powers.
The patterns of trade flow indicate a balance being achieved
between the two superpowers . India has established diversi-
fied sources of imports and markets for her exports in addi-
tion to the superpowers thersby giving her added
flexibility. The sources of external aid are to a large
extent multilateral and untied and as such do not act as
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mediums cf influence. Most importantly, India has retained
operating control of her key industries. An added advantage
to having key industries in the public sector is that these
industries can be mobilized for emergencies with the
effectiveness of planned economies while India retains a
democratic political system. India's rate of progress would
be slowed significantly if she were to be cut off from
import sources. At the same time, due to indigenous manu-
facturing capability and control, her resilience should
prove to be adequate under most circumstances.
2. Agr icu ltural Self- sufficiency
The efforts of President Johnson in the mid-1960's
to redirect Indian development strategy and curb Indian
opposition to the OS involvement in Vietnam through food aid
underscored the importance for India of attaining self-
sufficiency in food production. The above situation had
been brought about in large part due to the strategy
employed in the Second Five Year Plan. In the Second Plan,
growth was to be based on an increased supply of capital
goods. The allocation of productive resources to the
production of capital goods was to create greater productive
capability. This in turn was to eventually mean a greater
production base for consumer goods. The priority of
resources to the industrial sector meant that other sectors
such as agriculture were left with minimal resource alloca-
tions. Agricultural programs were to be furthered through
increased labor mobilization and increased efficiency.
Efficiency was to be increased through "exhortation, ration-
alization and organization." [319] The result was an India
that remained heavily dependent on the monsoon and imported
food.
The successive droughts of 1964-65 and 1965-66 with
the attendent rise in food imports, made it evident that a
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new strategy was necessary. In 1965 the High Yielding
Variety Programme was initiated with the stated goal of
bringing 60 million acres undar high-yield plants by 1974.
[320] Called the "green revolution ," the program was a
package of hybrid seeds that needed large quantities of
fertilizer, an assured supply of water, and adequate amounts
of pesticides. The program, developed with the Rockefeller
Foundation, was producing record crops by 1970-71. Wheat
production went from 93.4 million tons in 1965-66 to 209.0
million tons in 1970-71. Rice production increased from
90.0 million tons to 124.4 million tons in the same period.
[321] The government set a goal of a. five million ton buffer
stock by the last year (1973-74) of -he Fourth Plan. The
target was later revised tc seven million tons in view of
the record crops being produced. [322] The grain shortfalls
of 1971-72 and 1972-73 demonstrated the shortcomings of the
green revolution. It became apparent that the green revolu-
tion was limited by the availability of the three prime
ingredients; water, fertilizer, and pesticide. The solving
of the dual problem of fertilizer and water availability
forms the nexus fcr future Indian self-sufficiency in
agriculture.
a. Irrigation Potential
In 1969-70 approximately 78% of the cultivable
area in India was fed by monsoons. [323] Dependence on the
monsoon has two drawbacks. The monsoons are undependable
since at least one year in five will result in the monsoon
failing or coming at the wrong time. The degree of depen-
dence on the monsoon is reflected in the 1982-83 projected
crop figures. Following a poor monsoon there was a decrease
from the 1981-82 production level of 8.1 million tons. [324]
Secondly the monsoon in most sectors will only support








rainfall in the four months of the summer monsoon. The
major exception, Tamil Nadu receives 80% of its rainfall
during the northeast mcnsoon of October and November. [325]
The advantages of irrigation in this regard is evidenced in
TABLE XIX
Indian Double-Cropping 1969-70




Table XIX. [326] The combination of crops lost due to
monsocn failure and inability to doublecrop is significant.
An equally important factor is related to industrial produc-
tion. Agricultural contractions directly affect rates of
industrial growth by reducing savings, rural buying power
for manufactured goods, and the cotton fiber used in textile
goods. Agricultural products also account for about 35% of
India's exports and act as a major hard currency earner.
Irrigation is a high priority in the current
national plan. The total irrigation potential of projects
in place of 22.6 million in 1950-51 had been raised to 6 1.4
million hectares in 1981-82. [327] The target of the Sixth
Plan is for 14.0 million additional hectares of irrigation
to be added between 1979-80 and 1984-85. The 14.0 million
hectare target is an upward revision of the original target.
In 1979-80, 1980-81, and 1981-82 the increases were 2.1,
2.3, and 2.5 respectively. The trend would indicate the
target being met. Maximum eventual irrigation potential of




Utilization of current potential is of concern
to planners. Through the latter half of the 1970 's, utili-
zation of major and medium schemes lagged behind potential
ty roughly four million hectares. The cost of creating
major/medium irrigation schemes has gone from Rs2,770 in the
First Plan to Rs5,880 in 1979-80 and Rs6,96 9 in the Sixth
Plan. [328 ] Considering the constrained resource situation
India faces, "optimal utilization of the existing potential
may well be more desirable than the taking up of large new
schemes." [329] One way that increased potential may be
achieved other than new construction is through maintenance
actions such as lining the canals. By this action alone an
additional 6 million hectares could be irrigated.
The ratio of major/medium irrigation schemes to
minor schemes points to a trend that is having major impli-
cations for India. Landless labor makes up 20-30% of the
population and is increasing. [330] h major factor in the
increase is the overall green revolution. The use of the
hybrid seeds is geared to the farmer who has enough land to
be able tc form capital and buy n9cessary equipment such as
tractors, irrigation pumps and fertilizer. Under the
government irrigation programs major and medium schemes
[331 ] are fully funded by the government. Minor schemes are
partly funded by savings put forth by the individual farmer.
In the period 1978-1 S82 minor irrigation potential increased
by 5.6 million hectares while major and medium projects only
increased by 3.7 million hectares. This ratio is a product
of the constrained resources of the central government. The
minor project capital-sharing format is much cheaper to the
government and therefore more attractive.
h lessening of emphasis on major and medium
schemes will mean leaving the subsistance farmer at the
mercy of the monsoons. One might hypothesize that this will
eventually result in the subsistence farmer borrowing from
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the large landholder or moneylender during drought years
with a high probability of eventual foreclosure following
successive years of drought. Thus irrigation, so necessary
for a stable agricultural sector, could act as an acceler-
ator of ineguities in income and land tenure distribution.
The ability/willingness of the central government to reverse
this trend will depend largely on economics.
t. Fertilizer Osage and Production
The third leg of the green revolution is ferti-
lizer. The use of hybrid seeds designed to significantly
increase yield, reguires massive amounts of fertilizer.
Total consumption of fertilizer increased from 294 thousand
tons in 1960-61 to 2.26 million tons in 1970-71 and 5.5
million tens in 1980-81. [3 32] In terms of volume this Drakes
India the fourth largest consumer of nitrogenous fertilizers
in the world and the sixth largest user of phosphatic ferti-
lizers. In terms of per hectare input of nutrients, India
ranks far behind many countries with modern food sectors.
For example the OS uses 112 kg/hectare; the FRG, 471
kg/hectare; and France 294 kg/hectare. These usage rates
compare to 31 kg/hectare in India.
India experiences several problems in increasing
fertilizer usage. These include education of the farmer,
inability of the famer to afford fertilizer, and the lack
of production capability. Steps have been taken to promote
consumption of fertilizer. Higher amounts of short-term
credits are being provided through co-operative banks in
order to enable farners to purchase fertilizer. A ferti-
lizer promotion campaign is ongoing in 103 districts. This
includes identification of manufacturer and consumption
targets for each district and the establishment of 15,000
additional retail sales points throughout the districts.
Also minikits of 20 kilograms of fertilizer are being
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supplied to selected small and marginal farmers. The Food
Corporation of India (responsible for imported fertilizer),
is setting up its own marketing force and retail outlets in
addition to the above.
The production level of fertilizer in India has
increased from 150 thousand tons in 1960-61 to 4,093 thou-
sand tons in 1981-82. [333] The gas supplied by fields such
as the Bcmbay High provide India with the raw materials for
nitrogenous fertilizer production. India is still dependent
on outside sources for 80% of its rock phosphate and all of
its sulpher. India currently has the capacity to produce
5.3 million tons of nitrogenous fertilizer and 1.42 million
tons of phosphatic fertilizer. Capacity utilization is only
66.955 and 68.2% respectively. This is due to energy short-
ages, poor management, and lower prices for imported ferti-
lizers. An additional capacity of 4 million tons of
nitrogenous fertilizer is expected with eight years as four
plants currently under construction and six proposed plants
come on line. Phosphatic production is expected to increase
to 2.6 million tons by 1989-90.
Even with such dramatic increases in production
capacity, India remains a major importer of fertilizer.
Indigenous production accounted for 67.5% of the 6.1 million
tons of fertilizer used in 1981-82. Self-sufficiency is
slowly being achieved. In 1970-71 indigenous production
accounted for only 47% of usage. There are problems that
stand in the way of further self-sufficiency. One problem
is that domestic fertilizer is more expensive than imported
fertilizer. Domestic costs are expected to rise as new
plants go on line. The monetary difficulties are frankly
discussed in the Economi c Survey, 198 2-83 which notes:
High-cost fertilizer in a country with such low levels
of fertilizer use is likely to constitute an important
constraint in increasing agricultural productivity. It
is, therefore, important that maximum attentio is
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devoted to full utilization of existing capacity and for




a means of providing plen-
:ers at reasonable prices.
Jpecial attention also needs to be given to strength-
ening the institutional mechanism for flow of credit to
the agricultural sector, particularly to small and
marginal farmers. [334]
The green revolution has provided the vehicle
through which India can achieve food self-sufficiency.
Foodgrain production was up to 133.1 million tons in
1981-82. The total stock of foodgrains at the end of
December 1982 was 12.7 million tons of which only four
million tons were imported. [335] Land under irrigation and
fertilizer production have shewn tremendous strides since
the mid-1960 •s. If one just looks at the trends in these
two areas, self-suf ficeincy seems assured. The constraint
of monetary resources looms large and could along with popu-
lation growth upset the plans for agricultural independence.
The lack of money is threatening the expansion of the fully
funded medium and major irrigation schemes. This carries
with it the threat of an increasingly divided agricultural
sector of landed farmers and landless laborers. Likewise
the lack of money could lead to a lessening of fertilizer
usage, particularly if the balance of payments were to seri-
ously deteriorate.
Population growth is another factor to contend
with. The birth rate as of 1980 was 35 per 1003. [336] At
this rate the population will eventually exceed 1 billion.
As noted earlier, seme authoritiss assert that popultion
will stabilize at 1.1 billion. Current foodgrain production
estimates do not go beyond 175 million tons. [337] If the
current level of 133.1 million tons is marginally adeguate
for a population of 700 million, then 266.2 million tons
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will be necessary for a population of 1.4 billion. This
equates to a 91.2 million ton shortfall.
India has made significant strides towards agri-
cultural independence. The continuation of this rate of
progress is dependent on the allocation of resources. So
far the goal of becoming a medium power has called for
considerable additional expenditures for conventional force
armaments, military research and development, a nuclear
energy program, a space program, non-military research and
development, and oil exploration. Added to this list now is
agricultural programs for fertilizer and irrigation. The
guestion to raise is what programs will be given a high
priority and which will absorb cuts in funding.
C. IHDIAfi DIPLOHATIC INFLUENCE
India has long considered herself an international actor
of some import. India's leaders have envisioned a pivotal
role for India in the world. Jawaharlal Nehru once stated:
Leaving these three big countries, the United States of
America, the Soviet union and China, aside for the
moment, look at the world. There are many advanced,
highly cultured countries. But if you peep into the
future and if nothing goes wrong, wars and like - the
obvious fourth country in the world is India. [338]
flhile many non-Indians would question the validity of
Nehru's assertion, it serves to illustrate the Indian
perception of India's potential and the ultimate goal of
Indian policy. India aspires to be a regionally dominant
power, to some day emerge as an extra-regional power, and in
the future possibly gain superpower status.
A nation's international position is related to that
nation's actual power capabilities. It is also a product of
the elites perception of its desired role. The inflated
position that India occupied in the international forum
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prior to the humiliation of 1962 at the hands of the PRC, is
an example of the latter proposition at work. Nahru articu-
lated this position when he said,
The fact of the matter is that in spite of our weak-
nesses in a military sense - because obviously we are
not a great military power, we are not an industrially
advanced power - India even today counts in world
affairs. [§39]
The reduction of India's position post- 196 2 demonstrated
that the elite perception must be based on a realistic
appreciation of the national power.
Since 1962 India has established a secure, stable power
base. It is based on a vastly improved regionally-capable
military and a self-sufficient economy. This has allowed
India to once again pursue a policy of seeking a leading
role in the internat icnal f crum.
Broadly stated, India 1 s goals in the international forum
revolve arcund two objectives. Of primary concern to India
is removing superpower influence from the subcontinent and
the Indian Ocean littoral. A logical assumption is that
India's influence in the subcontinent will increase as
superpower presence decreases. Ths physical size, economic
strength and military power of India would guarantee a posi-
tion of regional predominance for India. Of equal impor-
tance is India's goal of restructuring the international
system. The restructuring has two distinct purposes. If
India is to be an eventual extra-regional power, the inter-
national system must be capable of accepting additional
canters cf power. It is in India's interest to encourage
the move from the post-World War II world of bi- polarity to
multi-polarity. The second aim of restructuring the inter-
national order is economic. Only through assured access to
loan capital, modern technology, and markets can India hope
to continue her modernization of the Indian economy and thus
provide the basis fcr increasing Indian power.
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1 • Excluding the Super cowers
India has been notably unsuccessful in her attempts
to exclude the superpowers from the subcontinent. The
involvement of the OS and China in Pakistan which allowed
Pakistan to pursue a policy of equality with India, is the
most noticable failure of Indian policy. The US decision to
assist in the rearmament and economic development of
Pakistan in 1981 illustrates a continued inability on the
part of the Indians to influence US policy in South Asia.
It was noted in Chapter I that currant us policy is making
an effort to take Indian sensibilities into account.
Nonetheless, the sale did take place over the objections of
India.
A continued American policy of confrontation in
Afghanistan runs counter to the Indian interest. Indira
Gandhi postulates, "Eakistan would like for the Soviets to
stay in Afghanistan so that Pakistan can take advantage of
the situation. You see, it's Pakistan's excuse for getting
arms. [340] While this might be a somewhat byzantine atti-
tude, it does accurately reflect India's position. Earlier
in the same interview the prime minister stated that an
increasing flow of arms tc the antigovernment forces in
Afghanistan was making it "more and more difficult for the
Soviets to get out." [341 ] Observers of the Afghan peace
talks sponsored by the UN assert that a settlement is within
reach and that "the issue before the United States is no
longer whether a settlement in Afghanistan is possible tut
whether this is the test time for one and whether the type
of settlement envisaged in the UN negotiations would be
acceptable." [342] The disclosure that the US has stepped up
its support for the insurgents both in the quantity and
guality of arms supplies [343] would indicate that the US
has opted to continue a policy of support for the
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insurgency, The influence that India has been able to bring
to bear en the issue has been inadequate to achieve Indian
objectives.
A second aspect of the Afghanistan problem is that
it represents the first stationing of superpower troops in
the subcontinent. India did not react strongly to the
Afghanistan invasion. India has stated, "we don't like
foreign trccps there", but when called on to condemn the
invasion in the ON, she abstained. [344] There exists within
India, a growing recognition of the threat posed by the
Soviet troop deployment. Nonetheless, India has been unable
to use her considerable influence as a trade partner and
arms client to induce a reduction of the Soviet presence.
The Indian Ccean deployments of the superpower
navies further illustrate the inability of India tc further
its ambition of superpower non- presence. The as base at
Diego Garcia has gone from being a low-level communications
station in the early 1970 , s to its current status as a major
replenishment base. This includes the ability to accept
E-52's and provide a protected deepwater port for several
ships. OS and USSR naval presence has also shown a dramatic
increase. The US has gone from a three-ship force (MIDEAST
FOR) in 1972 [ 345] to permanently maintaining a carrier task
force in the Indian Ccean. [346] The Soviets have upgraded
their presence through deployments such as the 1979 deploy-
ment of the Minsk, two guided-missile cruisers, and the Ivan
Rcgov. [347]
The specific issues of Afghanistan and the Indian
Ocean hav« been addressed in more depth elsewhere in this
paper. A short review of Indian objectives and superpower
actions has shown that India has been and remains fairly




2- Restructuring the I nternational System
Jawaharlal Nehru 1947
We have proclaimed during this past year that we will
not attach ourselves to any particular group. This has
nothing tc do with neutrality or passivity or anything
else. We are not going to join a war if we can help it;
and we are going to join the side which is to our
interest whan the time comes to make the choice. [348]
Indira Gandhi 19 72
It (ncnalignment) was and is an assertion of our freedom
of judgement and action, • .Success! ve US administrations
have ignored the fact that India must see her problems
and her relationships in a different perspective. They
have insisted on interpreting our nonalignment within
the confines which they imagined to be slanted in favor
of Russia. [349]
Starting with independence India has pursued a
policy of political nonalignment. There has been one
continuing thesis to India's foreign policy: the centrality
of securing and safeguarding an independent center of power
with foreign policy autonomy. [350] In the 1950 •s India
attempted to play a subject role in the international
system. [351] India suffered from an imbalance between the
role it sought and its capabilities. She attempted to over-
come her weaknesses by politically mobilizing the other
nations of Asia and Africa that were emerging from the colo-
nial system. The development cf the nonaligned movement, in
which India played a leading role, was an attempt to break
cut of the bipolar system and create a situation where India
could benefit from both major blocks.
India continues today to strive for a position of
leadership in the Nonaligned Movement. India is currently
the chairman of the Nonaligned Movement. Mrs. Gandhi's
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stewardship of the February 1982 Nav Delhi Conference was
significant in that it demonstrated a lower degree of
anti-OS rhetoric and a more balanced approach to the east-
west confrontation. Unlike Havana, there was no declaration
cf the Soviets being "the natural ally" of the Nonaligned
Movement.
India* s positions were outlined in a draft political
declaration that she prepared for the conference. In it
when calling for disarmament, India addresses both
superpowers. [352] Throughout the document there were no
mentions of the Soviets by name and three cf the US. One
was a call upon the US to "adept a constructive position in
favor of peace and dialogue" in Nicaragua. [353] Another was
indirect in calling for self-determination in Puerto Rico.
[354] The third contended that a US law was incompatible
with the Panama Canal Treaty. [355] The US was not mentioned
by name but its support for Israel was condemned.
References to the Indian Ocean called for removal of bases
(Diegc Garcia was mentioned by name) and called on both
superpowers tD halt the arms build-up taking place there.
The Soviets were not isentioned by name in the paragraphs on
Afghanistan although there was a call for a withdrawal of
foreign troops. [356] The above may not appear as a balanced
treatment of the two superpowers, but when it is compared to
the Havana Accord and the final text of the conference, it
is much more balanced. It should be remembered that the
draft India was preparing was for the use of the Nonaligned
Conference. As a draft, it had to placate and coopt the
extreme factions if there was to be any hope that it would
be used as a working draft.
The final text is somewhat of a measure of the
effectiveness of India in the Nonaligned Movement. The
final text was much more condemnatory of the US than the
draft. In it the US was chastized eleven times compared to
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once for the OSSR. [357] It is significant that the one time
the OSSR is mentioned is in reference to the Indian Ocean.
The working committee on the Indian Ocean was chaired by
India. It appears initially that India and the ether
moderate nations were not able to bring about ?. moderation
of the movement. A deeper investigation reveals that the
vast majority of the anti- OS statements were contained in
the Middle East and the Latin America sections. The commit-
tees responsible for the drafts that were presented to the
main tcdy on these twe issues were the PLO and Cuba respec-
tively. In all other areas, moderation prevailed. The
economic draft was considered to be the most important
product of the conference. This was an area in which India
has a great deal of interest. Singapore*s delegate, a
moderate nation with a definite capitalist commitment,
declared, "In the economic sphere, sense and sobriety were
pervasive." [358] As Indira Gandhi says about the final
text; "Be have tried not to be openly critical or use a
strident tone of voice." [359]
India serves as a moderating force in the Nonaligned
Movement in order to increase the effectiveness of the move-
ment. By replacing condemnation with cooperation the
Nonaligned Movement will find a much more receptive audience
in Europe and North America. Gandhi gives voice to the new
attitude during a press interview:
We believe that the West--that is the industrialized and
affluent countries, need us as much as we need them. We
are not asking for pity nor charity of any kind. We areK t F n
asking for cooperation, which will
it will help us." [360]
help them as much as
Indian emphasis as evidenced in the quote, is on coopera-
tion, not on the previous "you owe us" attitude.
Indian program for economic cooperation includes:
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1. agreement on immediate launching of global negotia-
tions.
2. Increased food production in developing countries.
3. Reversal in tfce present disturbing trend in the flow
of assistance, particularly ccncessionnal assistance,
from developed to developing countries.
4. Strengthening oultilateral cooperation.
5. Devising mechanisms to finance the development of
energy resources in developing countries.
6. Speedy adoption and implementation of schemes,
including regional arrangements to lighten the finan-
cial burden of increased oil prices and to ensure
supplies of oil to developing countries.
7. Prevision of financial support for balance of
payments problems in the transitional stage of oil-
developing countries.
8. Reversing protectionist trends.
9. Development of the solidarity and collective self-
reliance of developing countries to reduce their
vulnerability to pressures from and events in
affluent countries. [361]
The above program, presented to the meeting of 44 developing
countries in New Delhi in February 1982, includes all those
points necessary for India to continue her current nation-
alist economic policy. India's success in promoting her
nationalist policies alone was evidenced in her current
problems with the ADE and World Bank. India, by interna-
tionalizing the issues, hopes to achieve success such as
that almost attained ty the Law of the Sea negotiations.
India's ability to incorporate its national objec-
tives into the Nonaligned Movement platform was evidenced in
the New Delhi Message. The Message called for the immediate
convening of an international conference on money and
finance for developmental purposes. Its goal was a
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comprehensive restructuring of the international monetary
and financial systems. Special emphasis was placed on
enabling developing countries to solve balance of payment
problems without interrupting the development process.
Satisfaction of basic food and energy needs, access to
markets and fair prices were all included. [362] India
succeeded in having her program adopted and having it stated
in tones that were to India's advantage.
This paper does not assert that the Nonaligned
Movement is a unified organization which India can ber.d to
her will. The judgement is made that India has an important
say in its proceedings and has the respect and ear of many
nations in the Nonaligned Movement. In the military there
are "combat multipliers " which increase ones combat power.
The Nonaligned Movement acts much like a combat multiplier
for India.
D. INDIA AS A MIDDLE POWER
This chapter has addressed the question of India's
current status as an international power and her potential
for future years. The vehicle used to make the determina-
tion was India 1 s ability to achieve her policy objectives.
Five general policy objectives were outlined at the begin-
ning of the chapter. Have they been met?
1 . Objective; Secure Her self Fr om a Military Threat
India* s most likely threat is Pakistan. A much
stronger Eakistan was dismembered in 1971. Indian military
capability has grown to the point that Stephen Cohen
asserts, "American policy -makers have come to agree on a
short list of propositions concerning the nature of US
interests in South Asia... In summary form, these proposi-
tions seem to be: 1) Pakistan can no longer obtain
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strategic superiority on the subcontinent, even with a irajor
external arms supplier..." [363] India's development of its
mountain divisions and its air force preclude a repetition
of the 1962 defeat by China. India 1 s main weakness is that
she does not maintain a strategic nuclear capability ar.d is
susceptible to a nuclear strike by the US, USSR and China.
India does retain the option to develop a nuclear force that
would counter the PRC-s present capability and Pakistan's
potential. This known capability has a certain deterrence
affect that must not te discounted. India's navy is suffi-
cient to protect her borders from all but the superpowers.
The ongoing acquisition of modern surface and subsurface
craft and of aircraft such as the Jaguar and the Mirage
2000, will continually enhance India's ability to protect
its seaward flank. Conventionally India is secure from all
but the superpowers. In nuclear terms she must continue to
depend on a nuclear umbrella being proferred by one or both
superpowers.
2« Objective; Maintain Independence and Non alignmen t
Indian economic policy has stressed a balanced,
self-sufficiency oriented development program. India's
import and export markets are diversified. Dependencies
have appeared in the areas of energy and technology. The
former dependency is being attacked through a highly nation-
alistic development program. There remains doubt as to
whether total self-sufficiency will ever be gained. As a
minimum, there will occur a lessening of oil dependency.
The dependency on western technology is less critical in
that the needed technology can be obtained from a multipl-
icity of sources. India's industrial sector has shewn
steady, though not spectacular, growth. Its strength lies
in its national control. India has also shown a vast
improvement in agricultural production. A repeat of the
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dependency of the 1960's does not appear likely unless popu-
lation growth gets entirely out of control.
The Indian military-industrial complex will increas-
ingly act as a guarantor of Indian independence. With an
independent means of arms production, India is much less
susceptible to pressure from suppliers. India still
requires large inputs of foreign arms, particularly at the
higher tachnology levels. Again, the requirement can be and
is being met by diversified sources. India's ability to
absorb an arms cut-off was demonstrated in 1965. Her
capacity in this regard is much improved since then.
India has shown an independence of action with
regard to diplomatic policy initiatives aimed at rapproche-
ment with the PRC, rapprochement with Pakistan, seeking the
removal of all superpower naval forces from the Indian
Ocean, and calling for the removal of Soviet forces in
Afghanistan (although in somewhat muted tones). Her actions
have not all been as independent in appearance. The muting
of her response to Soviet troops in Afghanistan would seem
to indicate that India has not learned from a history full
of invasions from across the Hindu Kush. India*s recogni-
tion of the Heng Samrin regime also poses questions of
Soviet influence- India has however shown herself to be a
force in the Nonaligned Movement and has worked for a
balanced approach being adopted by that organization. India
has been accused at times of being aligned, even of being an
ally of the Soviet Onion. An in-depth look at Indian mili-
tary, economic and diplomatic policies does not support this
assertion.
3 - Objective: I nsula te the Indian Ocean
This is one area where India has demonstrably
failed. This is evident in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Diego
Garcia. India has not convinced Pakistan that India will
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act responsibly, as befits a big power, in her relations
with Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan seeks support from
the US and the PRC. India has not shown either the desire
or capability to police the areas removed from her borders.
Thus the OS and the USSR cannot be assured of stability in
the absence of a superpower presence. In view of their
strategic needs vis-a-vis each other, they are required to
maintain a presence in the area. Lastly, the PRC and
American perception of an Indian tilt tovards the USSR
creates a need for a balancing influence elsewhere in the
region. Together ttese reasons point to a continued super-
power presence fcr seme time to come.
4. Obj ect ive: Friend ly Neighboring Governments
India demonstrated in 1971 her ability to impose her
will by force of arms on her subcontinental neighbors. The
Himilayan border states accept positions compatible to
India's. They are well aware of what happened to Sikkim.
Sri Lanka f s acceptance of the Indian lead was evident in the
1983 Tamil riots. Pakistan remains the exception. The
regime in Pakistan is autocratic and vehemently opposed to
India*s view of regional primacy. Even in Pakistan there is
a growing recognition of the face that Pakistan cannot
defeat India as will be shown in the next chapter.
5- Objective: Receiv e Favorable Material Aid
It has been demonstrated that India has sought and
received vast amounts of aid. The combination of multilat-
eral and untied aid has allowed India a maximum degree of
flexibility. India has not relied on any one source for a
critical area such as energy. Technology transfer in the





India has pursued independent, nationalistic goals.
She has been successful to cna degree or another in all of
her objectives save one. She has not been able to alter the
continued and growing superpower presence.
There can be little argument that India is the domi-
nant regional power. It is evident through her mass and her
military and economic strength. There remains a real ques-
tion of whether India can become an extra-regional power.
She lacks any significant power projection capability. she
is developing a projection capability, but may lack the
fiscal resources to complete it. India's future success is
going to hinge on her ability to finance the move into the
21st century. Her growing energy and food requirements must
compete with the security needs required for big- power
status. Only when one considers the progress made since
1947, does the likelihood of India succeeding become mere
apparent.
A single development, the creation of a strategic
nuclear force, will in itself elevate India far above her
current position on the international ladder. This has been
demonstrated to be a very real possibility whose realization
comes closer each day through civilian oriented programs.
The United States has been able to base its past policies
primarily en the grounds of competition with the USSR.
India is a growing power that must be regarded in her cwn
right. Failure to recognize India's national power and
national interests, will result in the continued inability
of India and the west to bring to fruition their attempts at
better relations. This will increasingly act to the detri-
ment of the strategic interests of the United States.
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17. COHSTHAINTS OH ABEBICAH POLICY
Viable policy options cannot be formulated nor can a
policy be implemented free of its anvironment. U.S. capa-
bilities and needs, the actions of opposing players and the
policies and objectives of the target must be considered.
Failure to do so will result quite often in policy failure.
The failure of past American policy in South Asia can be
attributed to a large degree, to not understanding the limi-
tations that regional rivalries imposed, misunderstanding
Indian strategic objectives, and an overestimation of the
impact of the United States 1 influence.
American policy cptions in India are limited by the
United States' global interests, regional interaction, and
Indian pclicy objectives. This chapter will seek to outline
these constraints and therefore establish the boundaries of
the United States* pclicy options.
A. 6I0BAI IBTERESTS
American global interests in India can be categorized as
threat opposition, maintenance of economic lifelines (Indian
Ocean sea lanes of communication) , and the growing impact of
Indian political and military capabilities.
The actions of the Soviet Union— their ongoing economic,
political and security ties with India, have been addressed
previously. The initially favorable consideration that
Soviet actions habitually receive, balances against a wide-
spread suspicion of American actions. The continued pres-
ence of Scviet troops in Afghanistan, from whence a drive to
the Persian Gulf could be easily mounted through a precccu-
pied Iran or a politically dividad Pakistan, carries a
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twofold threat to the United States- A Soviet drive to the
Persian Gulf, and subsequent establishment of a Soviet naval
base, wculd complicate the American strategy for confining
the Soviet Navy. It would also seriously endanger the
economic lifelines of the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
The Scviets appear to have adopted a policy of creating
situations of dependency through economic and military aid
packages, and Friendship Treatias throughout the Indian
Ocean littoral. The Soviet Union has concluded Treaties of
Friendship with Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, Mauritius,
Mozambique, Tanzania, and India. [ 364 ] This does not mean
that other Soviet options do not exist. Other Soviet policy
options include:
1. Militarily invade Pakistan and/or Iran and secure
bases on the Indian Ocean.
2. Induce the Balkanization of Pakistan and then receive
basing rights from a newly "liberated" Baluchistan.
3. Attempt to achieve such an overwhelming position of
strength in Afghanistan so as to threaten Pakistan
into aligning with the USSR and thereby secure
transit and basing rights.
4. Make Pakistan an ally and recipient of Soviet favors.
United States* policy must account for these Soviet options
and enact policies that will preclude Soviet action.
The emergence cf India as an increasingly dominant
regional power will require the United States to seek a new
balance in her policy. Indian actions in 1971 clearly
demonstrated that India has achieved a sufficient degree of
independence of action where she can, and will, act unilat-
erally, against Soviet wishes, to achieve her purposes in
the subcontinent. For example in 1971, it was the Soviet
Dnion»s pclicy that changed frcm its initial position, not
Indian. As the Indian naval, air, and nuclear capabilities




This treatment cf global constraints has been brief.
The author feels that the need to counter Soviet actions and
influence is obvious and is not the subject of this thesis.
The Soviets in India, their policies and influence, was
addressed in the second chapter. Likewise, the growing
importance cf India was shewn in Chapter III. The major
limitations on American policy options include:
1. U.S. actions aust anticipate and plan for a multipl-
icity of Soviet actions.
2. The Soviet enjoys a favorable reputation with much of
the Indian populace and elite, that will enhance the
implementation of their initial policies and counter-
policies.
3. U.S. policy cannot act solely on an East-West basis.
The period when the region was so unimportant as to
allow the United States to "opt out" is gone.
4. Indian reasons for unilateral action and the Indian
capability to act unilaterally must be considered.
Policies that run counter to India's base needs will
invite an Indian reaction that could effectively
negate any U.S. policy gains.
B. REGICHAI RIVALRIES
The single-largest impediment to successful implementa-
tion of an American policy is the regional conflict
postures. The depth and lasting nature of these regional
relationships effectively limits any policy. Historically
it has been shown that the befriending of one country in the
region means antagonizing another. The interaction of the
regional conflict posture with the well-established conflict
postures of the USSR-US and OSSR-PRC leads to current and




South Asian Alignment Tendencies
Interrelated Conflict Alignment
Postures Tendencies
PAK-IND, IND-CHN therefore PAK+CHN
IND-CHN, CHN-USSR " IND+USSR
AFG-PAK, PAK-IND ." AFG+IND
CHN-USSR, CSSR-USA " CHN+OSA
VTN-CHN, CHN-USSR " VTN+USSR
VTN-CHN, CHN-IND » VTN+IND
(potent- IND-AFG, AFG-PAK " IND+PAK
lal) BGD-IND, IND-PAK » BGD+PAK
BGD-IND, INE-CHN '• BGD+CHN
If the potential Indian and Pakistan alliance were
thrown out, then there exists two basic alignment groups.
Group One would consist of Pakistan, China, the U.S., and
Bangladesh. Group Two would consist of India, the USSR,
Afghanistan and Vietnam. As you can see the rapprochement
of Pakistan and India and of India and China would result in
major reductions in the tendency to align with group two.
A tracing of the evolution of the relationships in South
Asia since 1951 shows a causal flow. Pakistan sought an
outside source of arms and political support against India
and gained it in the United States. India in turn,
increased her ties with the OSSR. The anti-PRC position of
the United States and India drove them together from 1959 to
1965 and resulted in a loosening of Indo-USSR ties. After
the 1965 War, when the United States for all practical
purposes packed its bags and left the region, Pakistan
turned to the PRC, who was in opposition to India,
Pakistan*s primary fee. The PRCs support of Pakistan rein-
forced the USSR's support cf India. India*s identifying
with the OSSR threw the U.S. into a Pakistan "tilt" during
the 1971 Indo-Pak war. The U. S.-Pak tilt was further
strengthened by Pakistani ties with the PRC, with whom the
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U.S. was attempting to open relations because of its
anti-OSSR posture. Since the 1979 Afghanistan invasion, the
United States has reentered the subcontinent due to its USSR
containment policies and has found its allies in the PRC and
Pakistan.
A tracing of the security requirements effecting the
move towards nuclear proliferation further demonstrates the
interrelationships. One could say that the USSR went
nuclear tecause of the nuclear capability of the U.S. Even
if the chronological order had been different, the result
would have been both powers possessing nuclear weapons. The
PRC was driven by its security needs to form some type of
nuclear response to the USSR*. The PRC's development of a
nuclear option in turn gave India a need for a nuclear capa-
bility in order to deal with the PRC on an equal basis and
deter it. India's acquisition of nuclear capability
resulted in Pakistan launching an effort to gain a nuclear
capability.
The core regional conflicts are India-Pakistan and
India-PRC. These conflict postures show a potential for
rapprochement. If rapprochement were to occur, this would
completely alter the field of Anerican policy options to the
advantage of the United States.
1 • India-Pakistan
The conflict posture between India and Pakistan has
its beginnings in 700 years of Moslem-Hindu competition.
The formation of the state of Pakistan resulted from the
Moslem minority's fear that they would occupy a subservient
position to the numerically dominant Hindus if India encom-
passed all of British India. The Moslem community's polit-
ical arm, the Mosleir League, agitated for and received a
separate Moslem state. The formation of the Pakistani and
Indian states laid the seeds for issues that still exist
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today. The splitting of the Punjab, the Indian seizure of
Junagodh, and the conflicting claims over Kashmir divided
feelings deeply between the two countries. The Kashmir
issue has resulted in two wars (1948, 1965) and today the
two nations are separated by a cease-fire line, not a mutu-
ally agreed-upon international border. Indian control of
the water feeding into the Indus River Valley also acts as a
source of friction. Occassional support by both countries
for separatist movements in each others territory serves to
deepen suspicions. The Indian support of the separation of
East Pakistan and subsequent formation of Bangladesh, looms
large in the minds of Pakistanis who fear a Soviet-Indian
move to divide their country. These fears have a further
historical base in the irredentist feelings explicitly
stated by Indian highest officials at the formation of the
two states in 1947. India's insistence on regional domi-
nance serves to further increase tensions between India and
Pakistan since Pakistan sees this insistence as neither
legitimate or necessary.
Indo-Pak relations have undergone a substantive
change since 1971. There appears to be two major reasons.
Firstly, a systemic change occurred after the 1971 Indo-Pak
War. The result of the war, other than the creation of
Bangladesh, was the loss to Pakistan of 16% of its land
mass, 5595 of its population, 33% of its cultivable land and
40% of its GNP. [366] This clearly established India as the
predominant power on the subcontinent both militarily and
economically. A.F.K. Organski argues that preponderance
produces greater stability than military balance. Organski
posits that under conditions of preponderance, the weaker
power dares not attack, thus insuring stability. [367] In a
situation of military balance (as existed before 1965 and,
to some degree, up to 1971), nations may feel compelled to
resort to war in order to maintain the balance or to achieve
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strategic objectives. Simply put, in a balance cf power
situation, a military solution is a viable option. In a
situation of preponderance, it is not. This has produced an
attitudinal shift on the part pf the Pakistanis. Pakistan
appears tc realize that they are in a strategically inferior
position both in current and potential capabilities.
The second factor was the establishment of the
Russian presence in Afghanistan. This has reawakened in
some sections of India the possibility of her traditional
invasion corridor being used again. With this in mind India
could appreciate the value of a unified, stable Pakistan
which was able to act as a buffer. The Hindustan Times in
an editorial supporting the no-war pact, decried the Indian
ambivalence to the Russian threat in the following passage:
"India has ignored seme basic geopolitical truths like the
essential incompatibility of Indian and Soviet objectives in
the regicn. With the Soviets ensconced in India f s prox-
imity, the countries in the area will begin to key their
policies to accomodate the Kremlin, not New Delhi. India
had two buffer states between it and the USSR— Pakistan and
Afghanistan. Now there is only one. Pakistan, by this
reckoning, has none. The lack of alarm in the Indian
Government at this trend is amazing. It should make us
sympathetic to Pakistani security concerns." [368] The
concern of India for Pakistan»s stability was voiced by PM
Gandhi in an interview with Aman when she emphasized that a
strong and stable Pakistan is of great interest to India.
[369]
Attempts at rapprochement have centered on the
no-war pact proposed by Pakistan in September of 1981. The
initial Indian response was ambivalent and seemed to view
the Pact as a propaganda ploy by the Pakistanis. By
mid-January 1982, after exchanging suggestions on the
contents cf any pact, it was agreed that Pakistan's Foreign
1U7

Minister Agha Shahi would come to New Delhi for
consultations. The Three- days of talks that started on 29
January 198 1, produced several important developments. PH
Gandhi presaged the Indian position when she stated, "Nc-war
pact or not, I can assure you that India will never attack
Pakistan." [370] This was then followed by what was to
become the primary plank in the Indian bargaining posture.
In the same interview with Pakistani journalises she
offered, "Cur treaty with the Soviet Union is just what it
says. It is a friendship treaty. We are willing to have a
friendship treaty with you." [371] India thus staked out a
position seeking a comprehensive treaty, whereas Pakistan
sought a much more limited objective through a no-war pact.
The other outcome of the January talks was the agreement to
set up a joint commission to deal with bilateral matters.
Talks were scheduled to resume in Islamabad sometime rewards
the end of February.
Prime Minister Gandhi's no-aggression statement and
the friendship treaty offer are based on the feeling that a
no-war pact is redundant. India 1 s interpretation of the
1972 Simla Agreement argues that under it, non -aggression
has already been agreed to. Pertinent articles are as
follows:
Article II
That the two countries are resolved to settle their
differences by peaceful means mutually agreed upon
between them. Pending the final settlement of any'of
the problems between the two countries, neither side
shall unilaterally alter the situation and both shall
prevent the organization, assistance or encouragement of
any acts detrimental to the maintenance of peaceful and
harmonious relations.
Article IV
That the basic issues and causes of conflict which have
bedeviled the relations between the two countries for




That in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, they will refrain from the threat cr use of
force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of each other. [372]
Pakistan views the Simla Agreement as a treaty designed to
end a war and nothing more. [373] There is also some justi-
fication for Pakistan feeling that she signed the Simla
Agreement under duress since India was holding 90,000
Pakistani's as POW's from the 1971 war.
The talks scheduled for late February 1982 never
took place because of an incident in Geneva. The Pakistan
ambassador to the Human Rights Commission raised the ques-
tion of the status of the peopls of Kashmir before the
Commission. Not only did India resent being grouped with
other naticns such as Israel and South Africa, it saw
Pakistan's action as contentious and unnecessarily provoca-
tive. Additionally India saw it a s a breach of what it
considered a basic understanding of the Simla Agreement.
This understanding was that all issues between the two coun-
tries would be solved bilaterally and would not be elevated
to multilateral forums such as the Commission or the United
Naticns. This Indian position is one that it has logically
taken with all of its neighbors. [374] Because of India's
preponderance of economic and military capabilities when
compared to the other naticns of the subcontinent, if she
can keep matters of dispute on a bilateral level, she is
then assured a preeminent bargaining position. Just as
logically, Pakistan attempts to move matters into a multi-
lateral fcrum where the Pakistan bargaining position is
enhanced.
The move towards conciliation received another
setback in April when President Zia-ul Hag of Pakistan
announc€d that observers from Gilgit, Skardu and Hunza were
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nominated to the Maj lis-i-Shcora , Pakistan's Federal
Advisory Council. Zia followed this up by saying that the
three northern areas were not in dispute, they were part of
Northern Pakistan. [375] India immediately responded that
those states are an integral part of India that is being
illegally occupied by Pakistan. [376] External Affairs
Minister Rao, in response to reports in August 1982 that
Pakistan was planning to integrate Azad Kashmir into the
civil service structure, reiterated that the whole of Jammu
and Kashmir are Indian and that Pakistan's actions are
illegal. [377] This sequence of events gave rise to the
guestion of whether or not Pakistan was trying to scuttle
the talks. This was reinforced by the suspicion that the
replacement of Pakistani Foreign Minister Agha Shahi by Lt
Gen Sahabzada Yagub Ali Khan was due to his being more
hard-line towards India than Shahi was. [378]
India and Pakistan nonetheless continued to work
towards the joint commission. The process received a
substantial boost when President Zia visited New Delhi on 1
November 1982 on his way to the ASEAN countries. At the
summit meeting, PM Gandhi and President Zia agreed to the
establishment of a joint commission and issued instructions
to their respective bureaucracies for a rapid conclusion to
the actual wording of the agreement. [379]
Cn 24 December 1982, an agreement for establishment
of a joint commission was initialed. It became effective on
10 March when the two foreign ministers signed it. The
commission, which is to meet annually, is tasked with
strengthening "understanding and to promote cooperation
between the two countries for mutual benefit in economic,
trade, industrial, education, health, cultural, consular,
tourism, travel information, scientific and technological
fields." [380] The commission is empowered to create sub-
commissions which will meet as often as necessary. The
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joint commission has a life of five years and will be
automatically renewed unless either party gives notice
otherwise-
Indian and Eakistani policy aims have converged
sufficiently to prcduce such landmarks as the November
summit and the Joint Commission. This does not mean that
all is well between the two countries. India continues to
press for a Friendship Treaty as opposed to Pakistan wanting
a No-War Pact. The basic disagreement over Kashmir remains
although people as prominent as Morarji Desai have suggested
that the current line of control be accepted as a border.
[381] The basic suspicion between the two countries still
exist as they continue to view each other as a major threat
to their national interests. This is reflected in commen-
tary about Indians nuclear program and her conventional
modernization prograo.
The move towards rapprochement received a major
setback as a result cf the Indian response to ricting in the
Pakistani province of Sind. Indira Gandhi stated to a
Congress (I) Party meeting:
The people of Pakistan have been struggling for democ-
racy which they enjoyed for only a brief period. He are
for democracy and shall ever be so. We have to oppose
injustice. There should be democracy everywhere and
there is nothing bad or improper about it.
Several things are happening all around us that cause
concern. We never want to interfere in the internal
affairs of any other country but we always condemn and
shall ever condemn acts of inhuman treatment, whether in
our country or outside. When such things take place in
our neighbourhood. we naturally are moved because of
repercussions within the country. We cannot keep cur
eyes closed. [382]
The Pakistani response to this and Indian request that Khan
Abdul Ghaffar Kan be released, was to accuse India of inter-
ference in Pakistanis internal affairs. The Pakistan Labor
Minister went so far as to say the the Indian-sponsored
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agitation in the Sind was aimed at creating a Sindhudesh.
[383] Rhetoric aside, Indian policy was clear whan it sealed
the Jammu and Kashmir borders with Pakistan in early
September and returned fleeing anti-Zia agitators to
Pakistan. [384]
The long-term affect that the recriminations have on
the process of rapprochement remains
.
to be seen. The high
level of animosity and suspicion that remains in both coun-
tries is guite apparent. At the same time, the nonshel-
tering of agitators by India in Jammu and Kashmir serves
notice to both the Pakistan People 1 s Party (PPP) and
President Zia, that India has a real interest in maintaining
relations with the Zia government.
A final note on India's policy towards Pakistan.
Indian interest in a successful conclusion to the talks
extends beyond neutralizing a traditional enemy.
Rapprochement with Pakistan would lessen the need for
Pakistan to arm itself. This would then lessen Pakistan's
reguirement for a closer relationship with the US. [385]
This in turn would hopefully (from the Indian viewpoint)
reduce the OS presence in Pakistan. It follows then that
the reduction of superpower presence in the subcontinent
would be accompanied with a concurrent rise in India's
regional influence.
2 . In dia^PRC
flhen looked at objectively, there appears to be
little reason for the Indians and Chinese to be in conflict
with each ether. Tte Himalayas act as a sufficient border
to prevent massive troop movements in either direction. The
terrain offers successive lines of defense. Neither country
can pose a naval threat to each other. The Chinese have a
nuclear force, but using it on India would offer the USSR an
excellent excuse to rid itself of the "Yellow Peril." The
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two countries are net competitors in the economic arena.
They do compete for influence in the Third World, but that
level cf competition is hardly a reason for war.
The Indo-PRC border dispute is indeed an inheritance
from the British Raj. Through the Lhasa Convention of
September, 1904, and the conventions with China and Russia
in 1906 and 1907 respectively, Britain established a sphere
of influence in Tibet and a buffer against the southward
expansion of the Russian empire. [386] The Simla Convention
of 1914 established Outer Tibet as an autonomous region. It
also fixed the border between Northeastern Indian and Tibet
along the crest of the Himalayas. China initialled the
draft but did not sign the finalized agreement. [387] Thus
was the ground laid for a future dispute over the border.
India based its claims on the McMahon Line and China argued
for a border along the southern foothills of the Himalayas.
The British "forward policy" created another area of
dispute in the Ladakh area called the Aksai Chin. The
conflicting Chinese and Indian claims over both areas were
sufficient to cause the two countries to go to war in 1962,
a war in which India was severely trounced. Actual hostili"
ties ceased when the ERC unilaterally withdrew twenty kilo-
meters frcm its line cf control. This has remained the de
facto border. A de jure border or a treaty ending hostili-
ties was never signed. This issue remains the focal point
for the Sino-Indian dispute. The border guest'ion, along
with the Indian ties to the DSSR, has produced an enduring
relationship between China and Pakistan, India's other major
threat.
India is currently engaged in a series cf talks
aimed at reducing Sino-Indian tensions. These tensions
center around the as-yet unresolved border issue, Soviet
aspirations in Asia and the Indo-Pakistan problem. A less-
ening of tensions between India and China would have major
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benefits for India. The current need for the Soviet nuclear
umbrella was discussed in the section on India* s nuclear
strike capability. India's gain from a lessening of
tensions would be double in this area: 1) they would be
less threatened by the Chinese nuclear force and 2) by no
longer needing the Soviet nuclear umbrella, they would be
able to strive for a lesser degree of identification with
the USSR. This would have definite benefits in India's
quest to become the leader of the Nonaligned Movement.
Another benefit could be the loosening of the Sino-Pakistan
alliance if Peking were to develop the opinion that India
was not a Soviet ally. This would then lessen the Chinese
need for a counterweight tc Soviet influence in the region
with a possible follow-on decline in the ties between
Islamabad and Peking. A by-product of a loosening of
Sino-Pak ties could be a more amenable Pakistan as Pakistan
feels itself becoming more and mors isolated. As can be
seen, the stakes are much higher fcr all concerned than just
the territory in dispute.
There have been four rounds of discussions sc far
between India and China. The first round took place in
Beijing from 10-14 December 1981, the second in Delhi from
17-20 May 1982, and the third in Beijing from 28 January to
1 February 1983. The fourth round was concluded in October
1983 in Delhi. The series of talks was preceded by the
Indian External Affairs Minister Atal Vajpayee going to
Beijing in February 1979 and the Chinese Foreign Minister
Huang Hua visiting Delhi in June of 1981. [388]
The visit of Secretary Gonsalves of the Ministry of
External Affairs to Eeijing on June 20, 1980, served to
determine the negotiating postition for each side in the
subseguent talks. Chinese Vice Premier Deng Xiacping
offered to settle the border dispute by both sides accepting
the current lines of control as the border. [389] India
154

refused this offer but "welcomed the offer as a starting
point for negotiations and as evidence that Beijing wanted
the process of normalization taken up again. [390] Beijing
also threw in a majcr concession when Deng "confirmed that.
China would not continue its support for Pakistan's call for
•self-determination* in Kashmir, declaring it a bilateral
problem between India and Pakistan that should be settled
amicably." [391] India's position was explained in an
article by the T imes cf India:
Mr. Rac reiterated the krown Indian stand on the border
dispute. In India's reckoning the Chinese package is
based en the fruit cf military gains which could hardly
be the basis for an amicable settlement. India has gone
a long way in fcrmulating its new approach to the
dispute since 1960 when it declined to discuss the
border dispute with China. India expects China to
appreciate its security compulsions to facilitate a
situation in which India might be able to come to an
honorable settlement in the western sector with China.
[392]
Indians maneuverability is restricted by public
opinicn. Rcbert Horn states in his article, "Indian resent-
ment toward China is so substantial that India's freedom to
compromise with China is greatly circumscribed. It is
unlikely that any Indian government could take an agreement
to Parliament for approval without significant Chinese
concessions." [393] The rigidness of both sides on the
boundary dispute resulted in India following China's line at
the December 1981 round and announcing that the territorial
problem "was not a precondition to development of friendly
ties in ether areas." [394] Secretary Gonsalves clarified
this position in the statement issued prior to the May 1982
talks. He pointed out that the boundary question is a
difficult and complex one but that it is central to the
relationship between the two countries. He went en to say
that it is not possible to isolate the central issue from
others. India and the PRC could build up their relations in
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ether fields, but if this main question is left unresolved
it will have its reflection elsewhere. [395] What this
translated into as far as actual progress at the 1982 talks,
was the agreement to send three Indian delegations to China
Sealing with oil, railways, and agriculture, and three
Chinese delegations to India. The Chinese delegations were
to study wheat breeding, dairy development, and the third
delegation was composed of scientists (discipline not
known). [396]
The fourth round of talks made limited progress in
determining the approach to be taken in solving the border
issue. The Chinese and Indians sought to marry their
different working propositions. The Indian position
included 1) an early solution, 2) a just solution taking
into account the legitimate interests of both sides, 3) a
common agreed approach and basis for discussion, 4) the
proposals advanced by either side do constituting an
approach to the problem should be considered by the other,
U) a propitious atmosphere for an early settlement, and 6) a
sector by sector approach. The five-point Chinese approach
includes: 1) equality, 2) friendly consultations, 3) mutual
understanding and accommodation, 4) fair and reasonable
settlement, and 5) a comprehensive solution. [397] The major
achievements of the fourth round were the agreement to
recognize the relevance of historical data , agreeing to
recognize the inadmissibility of the use of force in
acquiring territory, and the Chinese willingness to adopt a
sector by sector approach instead of their previous compre-
hensive approach.
There had developed in India prior to the fourth
round, the feeling that substantive progress would not be
made. This was reflected elsewhere in the Gonsaives state-
ment cited earlier and is echoed by many of the newspapers.
The Hindu gives voice to this theme:
156

The fact is that there is a stalemate, if not a dead-
ig even a mutually accep- . _
basis for substantive discussions. As neither country
appears to be ready yet to engage in serious negotia-
tions, the best that can be done is to keep open the
dialogue. [398]
It remains to be seen whether the progress of the fourth
round in agreeing to basic propositions can be translated in
the future into actual progress on a border settlement.
Keeping the dialogue open is a sentiment that is
voiced quite often. External Affairs Minister Rao speaking
in December 198 1, told the Lok Sabha that "the very fact
that this long-standing dispute between the two countries
has gone to the negotiating table for the first time after
two decades should be regarded as a positive develop-
ment... (the) spirit of accomodation that both sides
displayed during these discussions, augured well for contin-
uing the exercise." [399] The theme "at least we're talking
in civilized tones" is constantly repeated by both govern-
mental figures and the newspapers.
A major concern of India's has been to reassure the
Soviet's that Sino-Indian rapprochement will not be attained
at the cost of Indo-Soviet relations. Horn's article is
replete with examples of high-ranking Indian officials reas-
suring Russia every time forward progress is made in their
relations with China. Indira Gandhi states "Our ties with
Russia are not related to our ties with China at all.. .our
relations with one country are in no way connected with our
relations with any ether." [400] Soviet concern is under-
standable if their primary objective in India is as Robert
Donaldson claims to "enlist Indian participation as a count-
erweight to China in the Asian balance of power game." [401]




One of the methods that India has used to show China
and the USSR that India does not consider its relations a
zero-sum came is her use of the Kampuchean issue. By recog-
nizing the Heng Samrin regime, India has indicated to China
that while it is serious about the negotiations with China,
India still plans on maintaining solid relations with the
USSR. At the same time India has reassured Russia with
actions as well as wcrds. It would be foolhardy on my part
to say that this is the only reason that India has recog-
nized the Heng Samrin government. India does have a history
of friendship with the S RV (Heng Samrin 1 s "allies" in
Kampuchea) and considers them to have a common heritage in
the struggle against colonialism. At the same time India
has accepted seme negative returns as a result of her
Kampuchean policy. In the United Nations India took part
with 10 other countries in jointly sponsoring an initiative
to unseat the Democratic Republic of Kampuchea (DRK) . They
lost 90 to 29 with 26 abstentions. [402] At the Nonaligned
Conference in New Delhi in February 1983, India again
supported the Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) . The
division at this conference over the issue was apparent when
26 countries spoke cut on the floor as being in favor of
seating the DRK. [403] India was in favor of seating the PRK
but shifted its position to leaving the seat vacant because
it was the "only practical way." [404] The decision to
support the PRK also puts India in opposition to ASEAN which
is net enly closer to India, but also offers a greater
market potential than the SRV.
India's PRC policy could produce major benefits as
outlined at the beginning of this section, in terms of its
goal cf regional and extra-regional influence. First an
agreement must be reached that would be acceptable to a
consensus in India. Current positions on both sides will
not allow this. India has assumed a position of holding the
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door open for future developments. If future elections
provide the Congress (I) a stronger electoral position then
there may be a break in the Indian position, but not before.
3- Reducing Regional Conflict
There exist major advantages for India which mili-
tate for a settlement of her disputes with Pakistan and the
PRC. An Indian settlement with Pakistan would lessen the
need for Pakistan to seek external allies and therefore
could, and should, lead tc a reduction of superpower pres-
ence in that country. A reduction of Indo-PRC tensions
would lessen the need for the PRC to be in Pakistan. The
removal of the PRC shield (more aptly stated - a two- front
threat against India) could act as an inducement to Pakistan
to be more receptive to Indian bargaining positions. When
viewed from the perspective of Indian security needs, the
lessening of the PRC-Eakistan threat decreases the need for
the Soviet umbrella. This in turn decreases the need for a
balancing United States presence.
As many advantages as rapprochement offers India, it
is still stalled tc different degrees on both fronts.
Mutual suspicion remains endemic between India and Pakistan.
The status of the Pakistani nuclear program is unclear.
Besides making India justifiably nervous, a nuclear capa-
bility is Pakistan/s one hope for regaining a position of
balance or near-balance with India. The success of a
Pakistan nuclear program, or an anticipated success, would
act as the precipitator of another Indo-Pak conflict as
India sought to retain its position of preponderance.
The Sino-Indian dispute has shown even less progress
than the Indo-Pak confrontation. The Indians steadfastedly
maintain their claim to both territories in question without
exception. The Chinese, while showing a willingness to
surrender their claims in the Arunachel Pradesh area, will
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not budge on the question of yielding the Aksai Chin. The
strategic value cf the Aksai Chin as a means of access for
the Chinese to Tibet is un disputable. One positive aspect
is that India and China have had in operation for twenty
years, mutually recognized de facto lines of control. The
actual potential for renewed fighting is minimal, unlike
along the Indo-Pak bcrder.
The reduction of regional tensions and thereby the
dissolution of the Indo-USSH- Afghanistan-Vietnam alignment
tendency, is by no means assured. The over interrelation-
ship tetween India, Pakistan, and China, is at its best
since independence. Still, substantial issues remain to be
resolved. As long as these regional tensions exist, they
will continue to severely limit American options. An over-
identification of the United States with one country or
block, will result in the estrangement of another country.
The current situation is both an opportunity and a
limitation. American options have already multiplied as is
evident in the Indian reaction to the ongoing American mili-
tary and economic aid to Pakistan. That aid is limited in
its scope, and need take care rhat it does not cross the
threshold created by India * s revised strategic assessment.
As the regional tensions increase and decrease, so will the
thresholds cf acceptable American policies rise and fall in
the eyes cf the three primary regional contenders.
C. IHOIAI POLICY OBJECTIVES
A product of the East-West confrontation has been an
American tendency to paint issues in black or white and as
issues of democracy versus communism. It is best stated in
the old Southern homily, "If you ain't with us, ycu agin 1
us." This viewpoint, more appropriately, this set of blin-
ders, has not allowed the United States to fully appreciate
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the national objectives of third nations such as India.
Support for the public sector was seen as creeping communism
and not as as drive for economic independence. Indian oppo-
sition tc United States involvement in Vietnam was seen as
evidence of an alignment with the Soviets, not as a natural
policy of a recently independent, former colonial territory.
The legitimate strategic objectives of a sovereign
nation will not always be in agreement with American poli-
cies. The Indian and American perspectives of world and
bilateral issues are different. A difference of policy dees
not mean that the policies are deliberately in opposition.
Neither does it mean that the Indian policy is necessarily
in support of, or in cbeisance to, a Soviet policy.
American policymakers must understand where Indian and
American strategic objectives overlap and where tfcey
diverge. India has shown since independence that she will
pursue her core values irrespective of external pressures.
In this manner, Indian objectives and policy act as an
important constraint on United States policy.
The divergence cf American and Indian objectives has
been apparent in many of the issues touched on in this paper
already. The Indian use of the Kampuchean issue as a means
of recognizing past Soviet diplomatic support and as a
signal to the PRC, fulfills Indian requirements that do not
exist for the United States. Indian nuclear program is
driven by her need to diversify her energy resources.
Militarily, it is driven by the need to counter an actual
Chinese nuclear threat and a potential Pakistani threat.
The United States 1 interest is to halt the horizontal
proliferation of nuclear weapons, both because of the danger
of a lowered usage threshold, and because of the increased




Global needs require that the United States maintain an
active presence in the Persian Gulf region and Indian Ocean.
The same applies in Pakistan. This runs counter to an
Indian need for the absence of superpower influence in order
for India to increase her influence. The United States and
India line up in natural opposition on many issues in the
Nonaligned Movement, particularly those of an economic
nature. The United States, as a "have" nation, does not
share the redistribution of wealth goals that motivate
"have-not" nations such as India.
In the next twc sub- sections, two issues will be
explored to determine the degree of divergence between
United States and Indian objectives, and the impact any
divergence will have on limiting American policy options.
The economic issue is used because it is an issue in which
the United States and India must deal with each other, some-
times bilaterally, and at ether times in a multilateral
forum. The Arab-Israeli conflict is addressed because it is
an issue in which tte United States and India both have a
vested interest, yet are not required to deal with each
ether in pursuit of their policies.
1 . Indian Eco no mic Policy
The Indian economy is an example of American oppor-
tunities mixed with very real constraints. The major
constraint devolves from the Indian drive for economic inde-
pendence that has been discussed at various points
throughout the paper. The opportunities stem from: 1) a
continued and growing need for western technology, 2) the
systemic imbalance between the Indian and Soviet economy,
and 3) a desire on the part of India to not become ever-
identified with, or economically dependent on, the Eastern
bloc. The major impetus though, is a positive one; the
Indian recognition cf the desirability of, and need for,
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western technological know-how and capital. This need is
reflected in Indian import -export policy.
The objectives of Indians import-export policy are
outlined in the Government of India 1 s (GOI) Economic Survey
J98 2-83:
"...the policy sought to I) provide to industries, espe-
cially in the small-scale sector, easier and mere
regualr access to their requirements of inputs in order
to maximize their outputs and improve their produc-
tivity, II) provide a stimulus to those engaging in
exports and in particular to manufacturing units
contributing substantially to tha export effort. Ill)
reduce or dispense with licensing formalities wherever
Possible and to further simplify and streamline proce-
ures, with accent on time-bound system, IV) extend
support to upgradation of technology; especially with a
view to cost reduction, and V) to move forward to self-
reliance by specific measures of support to indigenous
industry where necessary." [405]
This was translated into several actual policy steps.
Import replenishment licenses (REP) were made more attrac-
tive. Exporters who exported over 10% of their production
(subject to a minimum of Rs 5 lakhs) were allowed to import
machinery against their own REP licenses without the recom-
mendation of a sponsoring authority and without indigenous
clearance. Exporters who exported 25% or more of their
production of select products in any of the two previous
financial years were allowed to utilize their 1981-82
Automatic and Supplementary (import) licenses on a repeat
basis irrespective of their value. This was done in order
to maintain uninterrupted production. Automatic licenses
were increased 20% in value over past consumption. Units
set up under the 1C0% Export Oriented Units Scheme were
allowed to import all their requirements of raw materials
and capital goods. Raw material and components for IDA/IERD
projects were exempted from customs duty. Additional types
of raw materials, components and consumables were allowed
for import under Open General License for actual industrial
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usars. The value limit for imports to promote technological
upgradaticn and modernization under the Technical
Development Fund Scheme was doubled to $500,000. Access to
foreign exchange to accomplish technological modernization
was alsc improved. Finally, export houses and trading
houses were allowed to import machinery for setting up
common servicing centers for Their supporting manufacturers.
[406]
India* s import policy did not however amount tc a
wholesal€ opening up of her markets to foreign interests.
Finance Minister Mukherjee while explaining the policy to
the Lck Sabha, stated that the available capacity of produc-
tion would be used to boost exports and that the liberaliza-
tion of imports was for this same purpose. [407] His
follow-on statements then confirmed that steps were being
taken tc speed investment clearance procedures. Prime
Minister Gandhi made it clear that India plans an import
policy that will allow critical imports and greater invest*
ment , but that technology would not be garnered at the loss
of self-sufficiency. She admits that India needs external
assistance and technology to become competitive, but she
adds limitations when she specifically excludes consumer
goods frcm those areas in which foreign investment is
allowed. [408] The theme of liberalization within prescribed
limits is again stressed when PM Gandhi points our that
while India is trying to liberalize the licensing system,
she will not allow monopolies to grow. [409]
The liberalization policy is an indigenously moti-
vated effort. The 1981 5 billion SDR IMF loan stipulated
that "the inport policy for 1982-83 and 1983-84 will contain
significant steps aimed at liberalizing imports where appro-
priate in the interest of economic efficiency. Far Ea stern
Economic Re vie w refers to India* s efforts to liberalize as
"an International Monetary Fund prescription." [410] The
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same article however also mentions that India initiated its
general import policy in 1978. One can also go back through
the 1970' s and see other times when a periodic loosening of
the bureaucratic stranglehold on market forces occurred.
Another primary indicator of the Indian origins of the
import policy, is the lack of editorial opposition en the
grounds of it being a policy inflicted on India by foreign
elements. Opposition to the policy seems to center on the
short-term balance of trade deficits that will result from
import liberalization. These deficits are seen as leading
to an increased reliance en external aid and thereby a
decrease in India's independence. [411] If the import policy
were an imposition, India's zealousness where her indepen-
dence is concerned wculd surely have been aroused and would
have been vociferously espoused by the opposition.
The opportunity and the limitations are clear. An
Indian need exists that the United States can fill if it
chooses tc do so. The limits to which American capital will
be allowed into the country are established in equity
limits, the selection of industries eligible for foreign
participation, and the success India has in limiting its own
red-tape.
Along with a liberalized import policy, India
continues her domestic development program. External
capital aid is a necessity as long as India seeks to follow
a development program that features self-sufficiency and
limited foreign capital access. Indian policy seeks two
goals, one of which is economic, the other of which is both
economic and political. Firstly, India seeks its loans on
the cheapest terms available. Secondly, India seeks aid
that is not tied in its usage. This translates into a




The seeking of aid at concessional prices is not
just good business on the part of the Indians. Faced with
chronic balance of payment deficits and ever-expanding
development requirements, the difference between hard leans
at market rates and concessional soft loans represents a
significant increase in both total cost of a loan and the
size of the debt-servicing burden. The United States
retrenchment in its external aid program produced circum-
stances that indicate the effect that soft and hard loans
have on India.
When the OS cut back on its commitment to the IDA, a
major source of Indian soft loans, this meant a drop in
India»s share of pronised 1982 IDA funds from $1,600 million
to $840 million. When World Bank president A. W. Clausen
visited India, he committed the World Bank to $500 million
in loans to help fill the gap. World Bank loans however are
given at a 12% interest rate whereas IDA soft-loans only
carry a 0.7535 flat service charge. [412] This means that
India must now pay a $100 million a year interest payment
for monies that she previously would have only had to pay a
service charge on. [413] The terms of payments are also more
favorable with the IDA. The IDA calls for 80 semi-annual
repayments after a moratorium of 10 years. IBRD loans (the
World Ban^s hard-lean agency) on the other hand require
repayment in in 10-30 years after a 3-10 year moratorium.
The IFC, favored by the US, charges 16% interest and has a
repayment period about half that of the IBRD. [414]
A second source of difficulty for India in securing
funds is her lessening percentage of funds allocated. Her
share of IDA funds is expected to drop from 40% to 34%.
[415] This is largely due to the entry of the PRC into the
ranks of aid consumers.
In view of the decreased availability of conces-
sional leans, India has been forced to go to the open
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market. Their reluctance is unmistakable in the following
extract from the Eco nomic S urvey 198 2-83:
Unfortunately, the outlook for concessional assistance
from normal sources is far from encouraging. .. .It has.
therefore, become necessary to resort to additional
external borrowing to meet the residual financing
reguirements of the balance of payments, keeping in view
the paramount need to maintain the country's indebted-
ness and its ability to service foreign debts within
prudent limits. [416j
Freedom of action in the usage of external aid
remains a priority of India. Any time a nation borrows
money, a question of dependence arises along with questions
of whether influence is being gained by the lender. A high
percentage of the loans extended to India over the past
decade have been untied as reflected in Table XXI. The
decline in Soviet aid to India noted in Chapter II can
partly be explained ty the fact that Soviet aid is almost
TABLE XXI
Percentage Untied External Aid
Year Total Exter- Grants % of Grants Untied % of Un
nal Assist. in Total Credits Tied in
Total
1972-73 666.2 12.0 1.8 277.6 41.7
1973-74 1035.7 20.7 2.4 451. 1 43.6
1974-75 1314.5 93.9 7.0 647.9 49.3
1975-76 1840.5 283.3 15.4 854.8 46.4
1976-77 1598.9 245.8 15.4 886.2 55.4
1977-78 1290.0 260.6 20.2 288.4 2 2.4
1978-79 1265.8 2 73.4 21.6 306.2 24.2
1979-80 1367.0 3 04.5 22.3 29 1.3 21.3
1980-81 2164.9 396.4 18.3 376.5 17.4
1981-82 1967.8 350.6 17.8 577.2 29.3
always resource and project tied. Untied aid and grants
have traditionally been a large percentage of Indian total
external aid picture. While a peak percentage for untied
aid and grants of 70.8% was reached in 1976-77, the trend
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through the 1970*s was generally in the 40-50% range. The
Economic Survey indicates that the United States, West
Germany, Sweden and the IBRD, were the primary sources of
untied aid.
In the absence of achieving untied aid, India next
seeks multilateral aid. The Economic Surve y 1982-83 noted
that $2.2 .billion of the total $3.73 billion package from
the Aid India Consortium for 1982-83, was from the IDA and
IBRD. [417] This means that 60% of the aid is from a multi-
lateral source in addition to a large portion being untied.
While multilateral aid can carry preconditions, such as the
IMF extended fund facility (EFF) , there is not the extension
of influence that occurs with bilateral aid.
The Indian pclicy of seeking external aid as a means
of supporting her development will inhibit the need for
western capital investment. The Indian policy of seeking
untied and multilateral loans decreases the potential for
bilateral American aid to India. In these two ways, Indian
policy will act as limits on American options. Anc-her
major limitation was shown in Chapter I, where it was
evident that vast expenditures of aid do not necessarily
equate to influence cr gratitude.
Again, American limitations are mixed with opportu-
nities. India does need the aid. The United States has an
important voice in most of the primary multilateral lending
agencies that India must go to. The attachment of condi-
tions such as occurred with the IMF EFF can act to insure
the Indian economy remains primarily western oriented.
2- Indian Mid -East Pol icy
The United States and India have for differing
internal and international reasons, adopted totally opposite
policies in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The United States is
essentially the sponsor of Israel and has not recognized the
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FLO as a legitimate government. India has adopted a policy
fully siding with the Arab cause. India has recognized the
PLO and has accepted the credentials of a permanent PLO
ambassador in New Delhi.
The two opposing positions are realistic products of
the two countries differing priorities. The United States*
reasons include a powerful Jewish interest group, Israelis
firm commitment to the western camp, the military superi-
ority of the Israelis, the memory of the Holocaust, and a
distaste for deserting a proven ally. These reasons have
been powerful enough to sustain the American commitment
despite severe economic pressure and extensive opposition in
the Third World.
Indian reasons are equally compelling:
1. She maintains a population of 80 million Moslems,
larger than the population of Pakistan. Support of
Israel would provide a potential rallying point for
Moslems seeking to disrupt the Indian state.
2. 32 percent of India's oil requirement is provided by
Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
3. 22 percent of India's overall trade is with OPEC.
4. Indian imports from OPEC exceed exports to OPEC by a
4:1 ratio. An important means of balancing this
trade deficit is worker remittances from Indians
working in the Persian Gulf countries.
5. In her continuing struggle with Pakistan, India
cannot allow Arab support to be captured by Pakistan.
The economic and political considerations for India
are substantial. India is already faced with Saudi Arabia
financing a portion of the Pakistani F-16 purchase.
Pakistan is also maintaining an undetermined number of
Pakistani soldiers in Saudi Arabia. [418] A final concern in
this vein is reported (but never confirmed) Arab financial
support for an "Arab bomb." An economic concern not
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mentioned above, is the emergence since 1973 of OPEC as an
alternative source of external loans. During the period
1973-1982, loans by OPEC, the Saudi Arab Fund for
Development, Iran, Iraq, and the Kuwait Fund for Arab
Economic Development, totalled Rs1,268. 1 crores. [419]
The compelling nature of the economic and political
arguments has produced a virulently anti- Israel policy.
When Indira Gandhi was asked if there was a basis for coop-
eration between India and Israel, she replied, "I absolutely
deny the existence of cooperation between us. There never
was cooperation between us and I see no possibility cf coop-
eration fcetween us and Israel in the future." [420 J The
Indian position includes supporting the PLO' s full partici-
pation in any talks, "complete withdrawal of the Zionist
occupation forces from all the occupied territories,
including Jerusalem," and the creation of a Palestinian
state. [421]
The Indian position has avoided outright condemna-
tion cf United States policy. Hhile condemning Israel for
the 1982 invasion of Beirut, PM Gandhi called upon all
nations which were in a position to influence Israel to take
immediate steps. She did not name the United States, nor
did she ccndemn the United States for its backing of Israel.
[422] When composing the draft declaration for the New Delhi
Nonaligned Conference, India avoided naming the United
States. Paragraph 71 reads:
It (the Conference) viewed with grave concern and disap-
pointment the support, sophisticated weapons, economic
and financial aid and political backing given to Israel,
which enabled it to implement its settlement policies in
Palestine and the Arab countries. In this reaard, the
Conference also expressed grave concern at the estab-
lishment cf strategic arrangements, which it believed
could only lead to an escalation of tensions in the




Tie combination of Indian political and economic
needs, and her public policy statements make twc points
clear: 1) India fully supports the Arab position and will
not change her position any time in the near future, and 2)
India, knowing the American position, is willing to nor let
this issue stand in the way of better Indo-U.S. relations.
Such a willingness is implicit in the Indian government
intentionally not castigating the United States by name.
The Mid-East offers an excellent example of how the
United States and India can pursue totally opposite objec-
tives without allowing it to affect the remainder of the
issues. American policy is constrained in that we will
never gain Indian support for cur objectives (as presently
defined) . By a proper appreciation, on both sides, of the
other motivations, the disagreement can be confined and not
allowed tc infect the overall relationship.
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7. A PBESSNT AND FUTURE POLICY
The previous four chapters have formed a framework
within which an overall policy approach may be formulated.
The general outlines of this framework include:
1. India has emerged as a dominant, stable, regional
pover which may, in the next ten to 15 years, develop
eitra-regional capabilities.
2. India's naticnal interest is compatible with the
United States 1 national interest on some issues. On
other issues, there is a basic divergence of inter-
ests.
3. Past American policy has not been supportive of
primary Indian strategic objectives including
economic self-sufficiency, international stature, and
regional dominance.
4. Past American attempts at exerting influence have
created a bias on the part of much of India's elite
that causes them to guestion U.S. motivations.
5. Scviet policy, due to a natural convergence of
economic and political goals, has been much mere
supportive of Indian aspirations.
:
6. Current Soviet capabilities limit the USSR potential
for assisting in future Indian economic development.
7. The Soviet Onion, through its invasion cf Afghanistan
has been demonstrated to be a threat to Indian stra-
tegic objectives.
8. Active attempts by regional actors to lessen regional
conflict postures is opening new options for the
United States.
It is with these broad considerations in mind, that the
United States must pursue its objectives in India and South
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Asia as a whole. A policy formulation must have at its
inception a clear set of objectives. Objectives in turn,
are formed by an appreciation of the United States* national
interests in the regicn. Fcr the purposes of this paper I
have grouped our interests into seven broad categories.
1. Blocking Soviet Expansionism - This includes the full
spectrum of Soviet influence. Soviet expansion of
their military presence, diplomatic influence, and
economic influence guite often is accompanied by a
decrease in U.S. influence. Most critically, the
Soviets must not be allowed an overland-supplied
naval base in the Persian Gulf region. The U.S. must
maintain control of the sea lanes of communication in
th€ area. Finally, the U.S. must act to prevent the
slide of India into a position of full alignment with
the USSR.
2. Reduction of Eegional Conflicts - The settlement of
regional conflicts ranks as a strong interest due to
its impact on American ability to formulate and
implement any kind of effective strategy dealing with
Soviet expansionism or nuclear nonprolif eraticn.
Regional conflicts also have a direct bearing on
American policies towards the Peoples Republic of
China (PRC) . The regional conflicts of most concern
are those between India and Pakistan, and India and
China.
3. India's Growing Power Status - India has emerged as
the dominant, stable regional power. Current trends
would point towards the eventual emergence of India
as a lore than regional power with a direct capa-
bility of affecting U.S. strategic policies.
4. U.S. Trade Cpportunities - It is in the United
States 1 interest to create opportunities for U.S.
business overseas. The historic trade pattern in
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this area is one showing a U.S. surplus in the
talance of trade. This operates to balance American
deficits elsewhere. The increasing technological
capability of India* s economy would point towards an
increase in the porticn of the Indian economy that
constitutes a market for American goods. Expansion
of D.S. commercial ties could lead to increased
influence and can be used as an effective tool in the
containment of the USSR.
Nuclear Nonprolif eration - It is in the interest of
the United States to halt the spread of nuclear
weapons. While understanding the need for nuclear
energy, it is vital that the spread of nuclear tech-
nology and capabilities be done in a controlled
manner. This issue is of concern not just because of
the spiraling regional arms race that it could
engender, but also because of the implications it
could have for other areas of the world. The insta-
bility of the current and past Pakistani regimes adds
to the criticality of the situation.
6. Reduction of Narcotics Trade - Our interest in the
narcotics trade is focused primarily on Pakistan,
where until recently, opium harvesting was legal.
The 1979 Pakistani opium harvest equaled 82% of the
world demand. [424]
7. Democracy and Human Rights - American interest in the
spread of democracy and the protection of human
rights springs from the concept that a democratic
nation will share our aspirations and ideals and
thereby be more compatible. The U.S. also proceeds
from the assumption that a nation based on a broad-
based consensus will be inherently more stable and
thereby provide a sounder basis upon which the U.S.
can base its policies. This latter concern is prima-
rily focused towards Pakistan.
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Many of the interests listed, such as "containing the
USSR," directly act as American objectives. Other interests
act as means of achieving a primary objective. In this
category falls the interest of reducing regional conflict in
order to decrease the Soviet presence. Broadly stated,
American objectives are:
1. Contain Soviet influence and power.
2. Insure the security of the economic lifelines of the
Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean.
3. Develop the lost favorable and stable regional
balance of power possible, based on a realistic
appreciation cf regional actors 1 national power and
objectives.
4. Insure the ncnproliferation of nuclear arms capa-
bility in South Asia.
5. Retain maximum flexibility for future American
acticns.
Because of the geopolitical location of South Asia, the
United States must rely heavily en the strength and support
of regional powers. Even with a multitude of Diego
Garcia^, te they island bases or continental Asian bases,
the United States will never be able to project conventional
power to the South Asian/Persian Gulf region as quickly or
massively as the Soviet Union. The ease with which the USSR
massed divisions to neve into Afghanistan, is not one that
the United States can match with supply lines that stretch
to the far side of the globe. American power must be
supplemented by that of the regional powers. American
policy must act to achieve a commonality cf purpose between
the American government and regional governments. To accom-
plish this, the United States needs to influence events so
as to create a need for the American presence, and an
absence of need for the Soviet presence.
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American policy should incorporate two main concepts.
First , the trends towards rapprochement within the regional
system must be encouraged and assisted. Through the less-
ening cf regional tensions, one of the main assets that the
Soviets can offer, security (in arms sales or nuclear
umbrellas), is devalued. The value of Soviet political
support against regional adversaries would also decline.
The decline of the security and diplomatic mediums as means
of influence would tend to enhance economic interaction as a
medium of influence. This author would argue that the
economic arena is one in which the United States is much
more equipped to do tattle than the USSR. The emergence of
economics as preeminent can cnly occur in a situation where
regional tensions have been reduced. It is also true that,
only with a reduced conflict level can United States poli-
cies be enacted without antagonizing some regional opponent.
An overriding assumption being made by the author is
that rapprochement is possible. The ability of India and
Pakistan to form a Jcint Commission, and the existence of
Sino-Indian talks, is evidence of this potential. This
assumption forms a basis for many of the following policy
steps. If this assumption proves to be false, then many of
the individual policy steps recommended would remain valid;
however, the overall policy approach would have to be
amended.
The second thrust cf American policy must be to provide
opportunities for regional actors to side with the United
States. Primarily, this is achieved through a realization
of the regional actors goals and suiting American policy to
complement those goals. This is not to say that United
States policy should be uncritically subordinated to the
regional actors 1 goals. It does mean that the United States
may need tc compromise en some of its past policies. The
United States and' regional actors may also need to
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selectively agree to ignore issues in which their interests
collide, particularly if it does not have a direct bearing
en the U.S. -Regional Actor relationship.
Before addressing specific policy actions, it would
serve to narrow the field of play by discarding a few unac-
ceptable pclicy options.
A. LEARHIHG FROM THE PAST
Simply put, the United States must avoid three extreme
policies. These policies include:
1. "Opting Out" - Returning to the policy of 1965-79 in
which the United States determined that Sou-ch Asia
was not critical to th United States 1 national
interest and cculd therefore be ignored.
2. Alliance With Pakistan - Abandon any relationship
with India and develop a treaty relationship with
Pakistan that would include formal security clauses
and possible United States basing in Pakistan.
3. Alliance With India - Abandon the current relation-
ship with Pakistan and develop the above-mentioned
treaty relationship with India.
The importance of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf as
an economic artery of the western world precludes the United
States frcm not pursuing a positive policy in South Asia.
To withdraw from the area and adopt a policy of "letting the
chips fall as they nay, " would offer an opportunity to the
Soviets that they would be foolish to ignore. The "opt out"
policy also does not square with the emerging and potential
national power of India. India already has developed the
ability to act unilaterally within the subcontinent. Unless
faced with nuclear action by either of the superpowers or
conventional attack by the USSR, India has the capability to
adjust any one of its borders, with the possible exception of
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the bcrd€r with the PEC. A scenario in which India further
dismembered Pakistan is within the capabilities of India.
Over the long-term, the United States must consider India's
potential fcr power projection. As India develops her air
force, her raval capability, and a potential IRBM, India's
ability to complicate American strategies will grow. It is
possible that Indian power will grow to the point of
precluding some United States options for unilateral action
throughout the reaches of the Indian Ocean littoral.
The importance of South Asia in the nuclear nonprolifer-
ation question is unquestionable. It houses two of the
almost-nuclear nations of the world. If either of those
nations were to actually opt for the building of a nuclear
force, this would break down a critical psychological
barrier that is currently holding back other nations from
developing nuclear ams.
A final consideration is the growing influence India
will enjoy in the Nonaligned Movement as she seeks to reas-
sume a leadership position in that movement, this time
backed by real national power (unlike the 1950's) .
The policy of securing alliances with either Pakistan or
India is not feasible. The primary reason for this is that
to offer an alliance to either country would halt any
rapprochement between the two countries immediately. In the
case of siding with Pakistan, we would be committing
ourselves to a country that is historically unstable and is
strategically inferior to its neighbor. This strategic
inferiority extends to the realm of potential power also.
The question of the stability of Pakistan cannot be overs-
tated. The tempo of separatist movements such as the one in
Baluchistan, are at least temporarily slowed due to nation-
building policies adopted in that province. Nonetheless,
the lack of a popular consensus to support the Zia regime
remains. The pouring of modern arms into Pakistan and
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possible American basing privilages, as such a policy would
dictate, would effectively close any doors open between the
United States and India.
A policy of allying with India is no more viable than an
alliance with Pakistan. Unless there is a dramatic change
in India 1 s threat perceptions, she will continue to avoid
alliances. Even in her hour of need in 1971, India did net
accept Breshnev 1 s offer of a collective Asian security pact.
Instead, India secured a Treaty that gave a maximum return
of allowing unilateral Indian action, while not accepting
any real limitations contrary to already established policy.
Another facet to consider is the affect that a U.S. -Indian
alignment would have on Pakistan. In the mid- and
late-1960's, the USSR and Pakistan made it clearly evident
that a USSR-Pakistan alignment is in the realm of the
possible. An alliance with the Soviet Union would offer
several advantages tc Pakistan including: 1) arms, troops,
and nuclear protection against India, 2) recognition cf the
Durand Line, 3) capital investment at the level India needed
20 years ago, and 4) a cessation of aid to secessionist
movements.
As stated earlier, an assumption in discarding these
extremes, is that a balance is possible. If future event
show that balance is not possible, a selection between one
of these three extremes become necessary. Since United
States economic and balance-of-po wer requirements will
remain, the "opting out" option remains unacceptable. In
choosing between India and Pakistan, one will have to weigh
the better strategic position of Pakistan, Pakistan's
greater need and Pakistan's historical willingness to enter
into security pacts, against the superior national power and
stability of India. Based on a long-term evaluation of
potential, India becomes the favored selection.
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The remainder of this chapter will address the policy
question from the viewpoint that regional rapprochement is
possible even though difficult to achieve. The suggested
American pclicy in such a situation is one of active
balance. This is not the same as the balance of the 1970 , s,
one of egual neglect. It should be one seeking active
pursuit of established American objectives in conjunction
with fulfilling the objectives of regional actors.
B. THE LIMITS OF INFLUENCE
The United States should realize and accept the idea
that India will not become an outright ally of the United
States in the current geopolitical environment. India
proclaimed a policy cf nonalignment at independence and has
maintained that position since. She has, when faced with
external threats, adopted short-term "marriages of conven-
ience" such as the turn to the United States after the 1962
war and the Friendship Treaty in 197 1. In the future, if
faced with a greater Soviet presence in Afghanistan or a
Soviet move, diplomatic or military, into Pakistan or Iran,
India night consider a relationship bordering on alliance
with the United States. In the absence of a drastically
changed Soviet threat perception in India, the United States
must adjust its goals to realistically achievable limits.
The Soviets have expended enormous sums of economic,
military and diplomatic capital in India since 1955. Still,
en several issues they have had to accept contrary Indian
policies and have even been put in positions of changing
Soviet pclicy in order to retain Indian support. The
tailoring of Soviet policy towards Pakistan from 1969-71 is
an example of Indian influence on a broad Soviet policy.
The Indian ability tc induce the Soviets to supply certain
levels cf military equipment and technology offers ether
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examples cf specific cases of Indian influence. The Scviet
reversal of its longstanding opposition to naval licensed
production and assistance illustrates one such case.
Beth Robert Donaldson and M. Rajan Menon, in their
studies of Soviet influence in India, drew similar conclu-
sions. Soviet influence was seen as minimal, particularly
when involving primary Indian objectives. Both authors
demonstrated a countervailing Indian influence on the USSR.
These conclusions dovetail with an unpublished study by this
author which examined the extent of Soviet influence on
Indian policy in 197U and 1982. In studying the influence
mediums of military arms transfers, economic assistance and
diplomatic support, influence was shown to be limited.
In 197U arms transfers were shown to exert enough influ-
ence to perpetuate the heavy purchases from the USSR. When
the arms transfer influence was confronted with subsequent
uncouplementary higher Indian needs, such as rapprochement
with China, the higher priority objective was met. The
economic costs of avoiding an arms dependency on Russia was
demonstrated in Chapter II of this paper, yet India has
adopted the policy of diversification.
The treatment of the economic issue showed that India
was net to be swayed from her positions by the Soviet
economic connection. Many of her decisions in this area,
such as the liberalizations of both 1974 and 1982 previously
discussed, actually worked against Soviet interests. The
only appearance of influence appeared to be exercised by the
western nations. India, realizing her need for western
capital and technology, has tempered her tone and taken the
path of compromise instead of confrontation. Still, all
that changed was the means, net the ends.
Diplomatic influence was of a similarly limited value to
the USSR. Indian PRC policy is contrary to the primary
Soviet objective in India. To this one can add the
overtures to the United States, Indian policy on
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Afghanistan, and Indian actions aimed at "un-aligning" the
Nonaligned Movement.
The assessment shewed that India has not bsen terribly
influenced by any of the influence resources. She set cut
on a course of nonalignment and self-sufficiency in 1947 and
has not strayed from it. There have been tilts to the
alignment but even in the period of greates- alignment,
1971-76, there does not appear to have been a great deal of
influence exerted. The conclusion of this author is that if
a nation's goals are complementary to the goals of India,
then arms trnasfers and other influence resources can act. as
enticements to cement a relationship. They may also produce
benefits on issues removed from India's strategic needs such
as the Indian silence in 1968 on the invasion of
Czechoslovakia. India seeks regional dominance. She will
take help where she can get it, but she will not pay for it
in the currency of influence.
Dnited States policy in India should then accept that
India is an extremely nationalistic country with its own
well-established objectives. To every picture however,
there exist two sides. Just as Soviet influence en India
has been shown to be limited, the Soviets have achieved a
muting of Indian criticism in areas of contention and active
support in areas of agreement. The United States should
tailor its programs towards achieving these goals. The
method for doing this is supporting primary Indian strategic
needs that are not contrary to American national interests.
C. H01AIIGBHENT
Acceptance of Indian nonalignment constitutes a neces-
sary and firm base fcr any United States policy approach.
The Dnited States should accept the Indian definition of
nonalignment which precludes an overall alignment but allows
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agreement with either superpower on specific issues.
American adoption of such a definition has two benefits.
First, the United States would be seen in India as accepting
and supporting the primary thesis of its foreign policy.
Secondly, it would remove the east-west blinders from
American eyes, and allow a pragmatic, rational approach to
specific issues.
This approach should be extended to India's role in the
Nonaligned Movement. Currently, India and the United States
share a primary policy interest in the Nonaligned Movement.
This interest happens to be in opposition to USSR interests.
The Cuban-sponsored efforts to radicalize the Nonaligned
Movement works to the disadvantage of the United States and
India. India needs the Nonaligned Movement to further its
goals of reordering the international economic system. She
realizes that a radicaliza tion of the Nonaligned Movement
will result in the decreased influence of the Nonaligned
Movement with industrial countries, the very audienca that
India must sway. The United States interest in moderating
the Nonaligned Movement is obvious - decreased Soviet influ-
ence and a greater acceptance of American policy initiatives
in the Third World.
India is demonstrating an increased influence in devel-
oping the policies of the Group of 77 and the Nonaligned
Movement. The United States should subtly support the emer-
gence of India as a leader of the Nonaligned Movement. This
is a goal that India has cherished since Nenru. The
benefits that the Soviets accrued in the 1950*s through the
inclusion of India in international forums, can now be
garnered by the United States. India realizes the impor-
tance of the United States in the international economic
system and egually realizes that the United States has much
more influence in that arena than the Soviets. An active
American move to support the selection of India and four or
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five other critical governments in the Third World as a sort
of ad hoc committee, would work to the advantage of the
United States in several ways. India's stature would be
enhanced at the behest of the United States, a fact that
India can't help but be aware of. It would provide the
United States with a functional unit with which tc discuss
north-south issues. It would also present re the Third
World an image of an America interested in a constructive
approach to issues that concern them.
The United States has traditionally looked towards
Europe when devising possible United Nations security forces
sent to police various hot spots. The most recent example
is Beirut. Indian willingness to provide troops was demon-
strated during the United Nations intervention in the Congo.
A United States approach to India asking her to provide
troops would again elevate India's status, demonstrate the
United States' belief that India is an important actor on
the international scene, add a truly nonaligned appearance
to such a force (thus limiting Soviet criticism or making it
costly tc USSR-India relations), and provide one more point
of contact between the American and Indian governments.
Grenada is a perfect example. Indian inclusion in a
Commonwealth police force would show India the United
States' commitment to withdrawing from the island. It would
confront India with the true nature of the previous regime
and Soviet/Cuban machinations in the area. It would also
make India committed to the successful establishment of
democracy on that island.
India envisions a world role for herself. She envisions
that role as a member of the Nonaligned Movement. The
United States can assist in Indian achievement of these
goals at little cost to the United States and with consider-
able benefits in Indc-US bilateral affairs. The costs of
such a policy only become prohibitive if the United States
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assumes that India will act as a Soviet spokesman. As
stated earlier, the likelihood of this is minimal. In the
past, Soviet support of Indian nonalignment and interna-
tional aspirations has garnered Indian support of Soviet
objectives that carried acceptable costs for India. This
could be achieved by the United States. The United Stares
must keep in mind however, that India is a sovereign country
with its own imperatives, just like West Germany, England,
France, or Italy. As such, we will not receive uncondi-
tional support from India and at times she will continue to
oppose our actions, just as our European allies do.
D. REGIONAL DOMINANCE
Despite repeated public denials to the contrary, a
central theme in Indian foreign policy is regional domi-
nance. India has achieved a de facto regional dominance,
economic and military, that only direct superpower interven-
tion can counteract. Even superpower intervention has limi-
tations. Conventionally, India has such a massive
preponderence of force that she oan act quickly enough to
accomplish her goals prior to superpower conventional inter-
vention. The politics of the east-west confrontation would
tend to cancel out nuclear intervention.
American policy reeds to recognize Indian dominance and
display this recognition in evert policy actions. Such a
recognition has real limitations however. An all-out
pandering to Indian regional dominance would undoubtedly
ruffle Pakistani sensibilities and security fears, possibly
to the extent of driving Pakistan into an alliance with the
USSR. There must be a balance to United States policy and




The growing appreciatd.cn in India of the need for a
stable Pakistan to act as a buffer against Soviet expan-
sionism has been noted. Here United States and Indian
interests converge. Care must be taken to insure that the
policy steps taken tc create a stable buffer do not drive
the Dnited States and India apart as OS-Pak policy has in
the past. -American policy in Pakistan should continue its
current two-pronged approach of nation-building and
providing Pakistan with a limited military capability.
Arms transfers to Pakistan will remain the central
Indian objection to United States policy in Pakistan. The
Onited States can take several actions to make the arms
transfers more palatable to the Indians. First, the purpose
and objectives of the arms transfers should be constantly
reiterated to India. American diplomats should stress the
trip-wire nature of the sales to Pakistan. Demonstrate
through numters that the commitment to build up the Pakistan
armed forces is primarily designed to increase Soviet costs,
not balance Indian fcrces. The F- 16 serves as a perfect
example. The sale cf 40 F-16 f s in no way balances the
Indian purchases of the Jaguar (initial deal for 150), the
Mirage 2000 (150), the Mig-23 (85), the Mig-25 (16), and the
Hig-27 (150). The imbalance of the mere numbers is
magnified when the technological transfer and long-term
security advantages cf Indian licensed production are
considered.
At the same time, the Onited States should abandon the
policy of explaining the Onited States 1 selling of arms to
Pakistan solely in terms of Soviet containment. The
purchase cf American submarines to Pakistan shows this to be
patently false. The Onited States should instead, stress
the constructive side of Onited States arms sales to
Pakistan. Pakistan views India as a threat. This is a
fact, no matter how much India professes its bewilderment at
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such a Pakistan attitude. Pakistan can opt for two means of
redressing the current imbalance between India and Pakistan.
One is to build a conventional deterrent. The other is to
build a nuclear deterrent. The United Stares should argue
to India that America is actually assisting Indian security
needs by building up Pakistani conventional forces and
thereby obviating the need for a nuclear capability. The
United States can also argue with the Indians that only by
building a position of trust and influence with the
Pakistanis, can America dissuade them from developing a
nuclear bomb.
The United States should also point out the economic
aspect of the arms sales to the Indians. The United States
is not giving these arms to Pakistan. American terms with
Pakistan are much more economically severe than those
between India and the USSR. This acts as a natural limiter
of US-Pakistan arms sales. Pakistan, even with Saudi assis-
tance, has a limit beyond which it simply cannot afford
anymore American arms. This level is well below the level
that India can arm herself.
The United States can further limit the impact of sales
to Pakistan by extending the same exact offers to India.
This has already been done in the case of the F-16. This
will result in some Indian purchases, but overall sales will
be limited by current American laws concerning expert of our
more advanced technologies. What the United States must not
do, is provide anti-US forces in India with political ammu-
nition by supplying Pakistan with weapons we refuse to sell
India. The United States cannot afford a repeat of the
1960*s, when we supplied Pakistan P-IOU^s but refused to
sell them to India.
A last consideration on arms sales to Pakistan is
consultation with India. Throughout any talks with
Pakistan, the United States should consult with India. This
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does not mean affording the Indians a veto over American
sales. It does mean that the United States should: 1) keep
from surprising the Indians, 2) keep the Indians aware of
our objectives with each sale, and 3) constantly parade in
front of the Indians our assessment of the balance between
the twc countries. This will show that we are not
attempting a balance cf India and Pakistan.
Maintaining a balance between military and economic aid
to Pakistan is important to U.S. -India ties. By involving
ourselves in nation -building in Pakistan, we assist the
Indian gcal of building a stable buffer. We also demon-
strate that the 0. S . -Eakist an bilateral relationship is not
solely a security arrangement. This would act to allay
Indian fears of an emerging United States policy of balance
in the subcontinent. It would give the United States a much
more stable base upon which to formulate its policies in
Pakistan. Finally, nation-building, by creating a more
stable and satisfied electorate, will decrease the tendency
cf leaders in Pakistan to raise the Indian bogeyman in order
to distract attention from internal dissidents.
The United States must act in any way it can to further
the rapprochement between India and Pakistan. The United
States should not allow itself zo become embroiled in the
issue of Kashmir. The United States can encourage both
sides for an adoption of a de facto border and for a disen-
gagement along the border. We should not however, attempt
to impose ourselves as the peacemaker. Any failure would
carry *ith it a feeling, probably on both sides, of American
favoritism.
The current situation in Afghanistan is a direct chal-
lenge to India 1 s dominance cf the subcontinent. The United
States faces advantages and disadvantages for either course
it adepts concerning support or nonsupport of the Afghan
insurgents. If American continues support, she insures a
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continued Soviet troop presence in Afghanistan, Soviet
attempts at the de stabilization of Pakistan become more
likely, and the United States will be pursuing what is
construed in many circles, including some in India, as an
obstructionist policy. Advantages include a continued
reminder to the world of Soviet expansionism, a continued
awareness in India of the Soviet threat, support from the
Islamic world (including Iran where no one knows what will
happen post-Khomeini) , and cost in blood and material to the
Soviets. Dnited States withdrawal of support would alienate
the Islamic world, it would alienate certain factions in
Pakistan, it could be counted in Soviet calculations as a
lessening of American resolve and willingness to use force
in the Persian Gulf. It would also result in Soviet troops
remaining within easy striking distance of the Gulf. On the
plus side, the United States would achieve some kind of
moral high-ground by no longer appearing obstructionist.
The United States should continue its aid to the Afghan
insurgents. It should not increase that aid. At the same
time the U.S. should not stand in the way of Zia's efforts
to find a solution. If Zia can find a way to get the Scviet
troops cut cf the country, we should support him. This will
achieve several goals. Soviet troops will be further from
the Persian Gulf. The Afghan refugees will be able to go
home thereby removing a major burden and source of insta-
bility from Pakistan. Zia will remember our support cf his
diplomatic intiative. Alsc, such a foreign policy success
is bcund to increase his stature and acceptance in his
country and thereby give him a graater ability to create
initiatives within Pakistan designed to increase electoral
participation.
Continued aid at current levels would have a positive
effect in India alsc. Indian diplomats are becoming more
and more aware as time goes on that the anti-Karmal movement
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is indigenous and not western-imposed. The durability of
the insurgency after four years of fighting in conditions
where the Soviets have employed such tactics as eradication
of whole villages and chemical warfare, argue against the
insurgency being outside generated. The prices for arms and
ammunition in the black markets of Peshawar also show the
Indians that massive arms supplies are not being supplied by
the western and Islanic blocks, as claimed by the Soviets.
The Indians are seeing that the situation in Afghanistan is
not of American making and perpetuation. They are realizing
that the cause is a Soviet unwillingness to leave behind a
representative government. American aid at current levels
does not allow for the situation to be blamed on the United
States by any except those who are strongly pre-disposed
towards that sentiment anyway. At the same time, it allows
the insurgency to survive and provides the Indians with a
true evaluation of their position in Soviet planning, just
as was demonstrated in 1962.
£. ECONCHIC ASSISTANCE AND TRADE
So far, the policy steps have addressed Indian objec-
tives in the political arena. Amsrican policy should also
seek to recognize and support, where possible, Indian
economic goals. The strength of the United States in this
area is evident when one sees the essential eguivalence of
the United States and USSR shares of the Indian market.
After nearly three decades of intense effort by the Soviets,
they have succeeded only in pulling slightly ahead of the
United States in overall trade with the Indians. The trade
flow figures show that much of that Soviet gain was at the
expense of the USSR's Comeccn partners. The strength of the
United States becomes more apparent when one realizes the
minimal effort expended by the United States to penetrate
the Indian market over the past fifteen years.
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The United States government should adopt a policy of
openly encouraging Aierican private sector involvement in
India. The current import policy offers the most favorable
environment in years. If Myron Seiner's assessment that
India is slowly abandoning what was essentially an infant
industry policy is correct, then the potential for American
trade is even greater. [42 5] fin equally important aspect of
the trade relationship will be to keep American markets open
to Indian goods. The government will have to actively
counter tie actions cf special interest groups that seek to
close American markets to Indian goods.
An adjustment of the American external aid policy would
be of value to Indo-U.S. relations. Past American failures
in this area should net be allowed to preclude future United
States involvement. Instead, we should take a lessen from
the pages of the Soviet experience. The Soviet, with a much
smaller investment, achieved a much greater result both in
public relations and in the furtherence of Soviet objec-
tions. It is true that the Soviet return was enhanced by
favorable Soviet actions in other arenas, but there were two
essential ingredients of Soviet aid policy that directly
contributed to Soviet success. One aspect was the long-
term, planned nature of Soviet aid, thus affording Indian
planners the ability to incorporate Soviet capital imputs
into the Indian Five Year Plans. The second aspect was
Soviet support of Indian economic objectives.
The Aaerican process of allocating the budget will not
support a Five Year Elan-type approach to external aid by
the United States government. The chances of Congress fore-
going its annual say over budget expenditures for the sake
of Indian planners is absolutely nil. The United States can
still act to prevent any repeat of the short -tether policy.
Each aid agreement shculd be for a specific purpose, mutu-
ally arrived at by the United States and India. It should
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not then be subjected to subsequent monthly reviews that
attempt to link it to other policy goals.
American policy should not be opposed to public sector
development. Three decades attest to the fact that India is
committed to a mixture of free enterprise and public owner-
ship. No amount of American pressure is going to cause
India to abandon the public sector. It will only cause her
to go elsewhere for aid. At the same time, three decades of
a planned economy has demonstrated the vitality of the
Indian private sector. The private sector does not need
American sponsorship to insure its continued existence.
India has clearly marked the boundaries of its public
sector. Within those boundaries are several industries that
the United States could offer significant help, not the
least of which are the petroleum and fertilizer industries.
These are two areas in which past American actions have
engendered Indian hostility. Where better to make a policy
statement of changed American perspectives and policies?
The United States should pursue this issue not only in
bilateral aid, but also in multilateral aid. While any
American influence wculd be less direct, aid through multi-
lateral agencies still can accrue benefits to the United
States. The size of the American aid commitment to the IDA,
IBRD, and ADB is well known to the Indians. The impact of
American desires on those organizations is just as well
known. India is well aware that with the emergence of the
PRC as a borrower, India's share of the aid pie will
decrease. The United States should insure however, that the
overall aid pie does not decrease. Once the allocations are
set and India has decided on what it wants to use its allo-
cations for, the United States should support India's objec-
tives. The cost in dollar terms is not greater, but the




The United States has occupied a legally questionable
position in regards to Tarapur. The United States signed a
binding agreement in 1963 to supply a nuclear station and
fuel in return for safeguards and guarantees that India
purchase her fuel only from the United States. Subsequent
to that, due to internal American laws, America has failed
to keep its end of the agreement. Due to the oftentimes
irrational and emotional response of anti-nuclear forces in
America, the chances of repealing the 1978 Nonproliferation
Act are poor at best. This leaves the United States with
basically a choice between terminating the contract and
thereby foregoing any controls on Tarapur, or attempting to
circumvent the NPA. The current administration has chosen
the latter policy. The success in concluding the deal
between India and France solved the fuel issue. The
impending agreement between India and Siemens of West
Germany should go a long way towards solving the spare parts
issue. In the absence of West Germany being able to supply
all of the needed spare parts, a presidential waiver with
congressional approval will be required. If that approval
is not granted, the United States should, upon consultation
with India, terminate the agreement and remove this issue
from the agenda.
6. DIEGC GARCIA
American global commitments preclude the abandonment of
Diego Garcia. Siirilarly, in the absence of regional
stability, the Indian Ocean Zone of Peace Concept is unac-
ceptable to the United States. The advantages gained would
favor the USSR much too heavily. In this issue, the United
States will remain opposed to Indian objectives. There are




The United States could assurs India that the American
presence will not be substantially increased. The United
States should guarantee India that no American bases are
being contemplated, now or in the future, in the subconti-
nent. Ihis would allay Indian fears on this score, and at
the same time, maintain a reduced American profile.
The United States could also act to coopt Mauritian
support. This would depend on Mauritius' reasons for
contesting the American presence on Diego Garcia. If the
Mauritian objective is truly an absence of U.S. naval
forces, there is little bargaining room for the United
States. If however, Mauritian concern over Diego Garcia is
primarily economic, i.e. who the rent is paid too, then
there is room for American maneuvering. An adroitly managed
economic package, combined with a possible transference of
the 99-year lease from Great Britain to Mauritius, could
conceiveably remove Mauritius as an opponent to the American
presence. It would also cut out from under India one of its
primary arguments concerning Diego Garcia.
B. CHIHA
The United States will encounter difficulties in meshing
its Indian and PRC policies. As with Pakistan, American
policy towards India depends to a large degree on the desire
of those two nations to solve their differences. The
concern of India over Chinese military capabilities should
be listed right alongside similar concerns being expressed
by Japan, South Korea, and ASEAN. There is no denying the
importance of a secure, stable, China for the American
policy of containing the USSR. At the same time, ether
American allies and potential friends have legitimate fears
of a militarily expansive China. A United States policy
that focused on economic rather than military aid to China,
194

would be much more palatable to India. As in the case with
Pakistan, the United States needs to avoid creating an
Indian threat perception that would require a continuance of
the Soviet umbrella.
The United States is net eguipped to act as a mediator
in the Sino-Indian dispute. The United States does not have
sufficient influence with either country to affect the
bargaining. In the absence of substantial progress, the
United States would run the risk of being blamed by both
sides for the lack cf progress and of being partial to the
ether party. A policy of quiet encouragement to both sides
to settle the conflict would be in the American interest.
American diplomats can point out to the Indian the obvious
advantages of rapprochement, beginning with the Chinese
nuclear threat being removed. Sino-Indian rapprochement
could also result in a lessening of Chinese support for
Pakistan and removal cf the threat of a two-front war. Both
of these events would be major strategic gains for India and
would contribute to Indian dominance of the subcontinent.
The advantages of rapprochement for the Chinese are just
as strong. The timing of the initial Sino-Pak overtures
makes it obvious that a chief interest of the PRC in
Pakistan is to counter Soviet influence in India. The
Chinese are undoubtedly aware of the fact that the 1971
Friendship Treaty was constructed by the Indians largely to
checkmate Chinese action. The United States should keep the
PRC informed of the status of U.S. -Indian relations and our
evaluations for future improvement. If the Chinese see a
potential for a future lessening of Indo-Soviet ties, this
might act as an incentive for the Chinese to be more flex-
ible. It should also be pointed out to the Chinese that
increased Chinese activity in Pakistan or on the Sino-Indian
border could easily negate all of the American efforts to





The policy steps outlined in this chapter were drawn
from the lessons of the past 36 years. History has shewn
India to be extremely nationalistic. She has striven to
achieve an independence of action in the economic, polit-
ical, and security arenas. India has demonstrated that she
formulates her individual policy stances on an issue by
issue basis. Indian support of another country*s objectives
is dependent on that country's support of Indian objectives.
The review of the history of American and Soviet
involvement in India demonstrated a basic difference in
tactics. The United States has historically pursued a
policy in South Asia and India that was subservient to the
global east-west confrontation. This policy failed to prop-
erly account for the national aspirations of India. Too
often, a doctrine such as public sector development was
condemned for its association with socialistic doctrine. It
was not viewed as a legitimate option chosen by a government
to forward its national interest. The United States also
failed to accurately evaluate the potential long-term
national power of India and Pakistan. Henry Kissenger cited
Churchill in order to justify a balance-of-power approach of
siding with the lesser power to contain the larger power.
[426] Such a policy was inappropriate for the Indc-Pak
confrontation. While such a strategy worked for Great
Britain in its dealings with the Continent, it was doomed to
failure in a situation where such an imbalance of national
power existed. For a long time, the United States could
afford a policy that ignored the predominance of India in
South Asia. This might even be true today. However, if one
looks into the not -to-distant future, it becomes obvious
that India is going to occupy a position of growing impor-
tance in the world. An American failure to comprehend this
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and provide for it, could result in the United States being
faced with regional military complications and global polit-
ical setbacks in such forums as the Nonaligned Movement.
The Soviets have taken a much broader outlook towards
India. It is quite true that between the Indians and
Soviets there were areas of natural agreement. One such
area was the Indian desire for economic independence and the
Soviet desire to decrease the economic dependency of the
Third Horld on the West. Even so, Soviet economic aid to
India was accomplished only after the Soviets first
performed an about-face from their initial position of
condemning the hybrid socialism/free enterprise system of
India. The Soviets also supported the Indian aspirations
for regional dominance and world leadership.
The United States is in a position to develop a closer
relationship with India. The regional trends towards
rapprochement, the growing disparity of the Indian and
Soviet economies, and the trend by India's leadership to
establish a policy of truer nonalignment, all combine to
create a situation the United States can take advantage of.
A United States policy of seeking oat areas of agreement and
containing areas of disagreement is bound to achieve
results. This paper has singled out the Indian policies of
nonalignment, Indian aspirations for world leadership and
regional dominance, and the Indian desire for economic inde-
pendence, as areas in which the United States can support
Indian goals. Other issues, such as nuclear nonprolifera-
tion, the United States presence in the Indian Ocean, and
U.S. -China policy were listed as areas in which the United
States must adopt a posture of damage control, of limiting
the area cf disagreement.
Central to the policy approach is a basic attitudinal
change on the part of the United States. The United States
can no longer consider India an international begger. She
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is a regional power that has already developed extra-
regional political clout. India needs to become an integral
part of the United States planning process. when India is
accorded the same position and treatment that America
extends to other regional powers, than there will exist a
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